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Abstract 
 
This thesis aimed to investigate the relationship between obsessive-compulsive 
symptoms (particularly obsessive intrusive thoughts) and executive functions 
(particularly working memory). Previous research had demonstrated executive 
function (EF) deficits in individuals with OCD. Executive functions are those 
cognitive mechanisms that help to control and regulate thoughts and behaviour. 
However, several questions remained unanswered: 1) do individuals with 
subclinical OCD also demonstrate EF deficits? 2) Are those EF deficits found 
in individuals with OCD trait in nature, or caused by state factors? 3) Are EFs 
implicated in OCD-relevant processes, such as thought control strategies? 
Three studies were conducted to help investigate these questions further. The 
study presented in chapter two found no difference between individuals with 
subclinical OCD and nonclinical individuals on a range of executive function 
tasks. The study presented in chapter three found that an increase in obsessive 
intrusive thoughts did not lead to impairments in working memory. The study 
presented in chapter four found no relationship between working memory and 
an individual’s ability to dismiss obsessive intrusive thoughts. The implications 
of the results from this thesis are discussed and future directions are suggested.  
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Chapter 1 – Introduction to obsessive-compulsive 
disorder, obsessive intrusive thoughts and executive 
functions. 
1.1: Chapter overview 
In this chapter, I will first introduce obsessive-compulsive disorder (OCD) and 
focus particularly on one core symptom – obsessive intrusive thoughts (OITs). 
I will then introduce current cognitive theories of OCD, and describe the factors 
that these theories posit are important in the development and maintenance of 
OCD. I will also introduce the continuum model of OITs; the idea that OITs 
are experienced by all individuals but vary in some fundamental ways, such as 
frequency and associated distress. Those with OCD experience OITs at the 
clinical extreme end of the continuum. I will then describe some contested 
claims of cognitive theories of OCD and list some unanswered questions. 
Following this, I will introduce “subclinical obsessive-compulsive disorder” 
and explain how research into such samples can increase our understanding of 
OCD. Next, I will introduce executive functions in OCD and subclinical OCD, 
and explain how they may help to answer some unresolved questions in OCD 
research. Executive functions are those cognitive mechanisms that control and 
manage other lower-level cognitive processes and thereby facilitate self-
directed behaviour toward a goal (Banich, 2009). Finally, I will describe an 
alternative possibility, that EFs are simply a consequence of OCD phenomena 
and may not provide any useful information about the development and 
maintenance of OCD.  
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1.2: Obsessive-compulsive disorder, obsessive intrusive 
thoughts and cognitive theories of OCD 
Obsessive compulsive disorder (OCD) is a mental health disorder 
characterized by unwanted thoughts, images or impulses alongside ritualistic 
mental or behavioural acts (American Psychiatric Association [APA], 2013). 
These characteristics of OCD can vary significantly between individuals and as 
a result, OCD is considered a heterogeneous condition (e.g. Markarian et al., 
2010; McKay et al., 2004). Obsessive compulsive disorder affects 1-3 percent 
of the population at some point in their life time (Rasmussen & Eisen, 1994; 
Kessler et al., 2005; Torres et al., 2006) and is associated with significant 
impairments in functioning and quality of life (Eisen, Stouf, & Rasmussen, 
2006; Markarian et al., 2010). For example, individuals with a diagnosis of 
OCD may experience disturbed sleep and disrupted occupational functioning 
(such as loss of work; Markarian et al., 2010) and symptom severity has been 
found to negatively correlate with quality of life (Eisen et al., 2006). In addition 
to this, 60-90% of individuals with OCD present with at least one other 
psychological disorder, such as depression or anxiety (Ruscio, Stein, Chiu, & 
Kessler, 2010; Torres et al., 2006).  
Defining obsessive intrusive thoughts 
The unwanted thoughts, images and impulses that are characteristic of 
OCD are often referred to as obsessive intrusive thoughts (OITs).  However, 
currently there is no universally accepted definition of OITs, which is 
problematic for assessing and understanding OITs (Julien, O’Connor, & 
Aardema, 2007). This lack of a universal definition of OITs ultimately has a 
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negative impact on understanding the development and maintenance of OCD. 
It is therefore important to define OITs in the most accurate way. One of the 
difficulties with forming a definition of OITs is that within the literature the 
terms “intrusive thoughts”, “intrusions”, “cognitive intrusions”, “unwanted 
intrusive thoughts” and “obsessive intrusive thoughts” are often used 
interchangeably (Julien et al., 2007). In addition, there are a range of similar 
types of thought which are often confused with OITs, such as negative 
automatic thoughts, worry, and task-unrelated thoughts. In order to form an 
accurate and universally acceptable definition of OIT, it is therefore important 
to consider the commonalities between current definitions, as well as the 
differences between OITs and other types of thought.  
One way of assessing commonalities between OIT definitions, and a 
way of helping to form a precise definition, is to consider both process 
characteristics and content (Clark & Purdon, 1995). Process characteristics 
refer to the form that the thoughts take; for example, repetitiveness. Content 
refers to thematic characteristics of the OIT; for example, aggression. In terms 
of process characteristics, most definitions describe OITs as presenting not only 
in the form of thoughts, but also in the form of images (e.g. the image of 
carrying out a repulsive sexual act) or impulses (e.g. the impulse to jump from 
a great height). Obsessive intrusive thoughts are also often described as being 
unwanted, due to the anxiety-provoking content of the thoughts, and the 
negative impact that the thoughts can have on day-to-day life (Clark & Rhyno, 
2005). The spontaneous nature of the thoughts is also captured by most 
definitions, as OITs appear suddenly into conscious awareness. In addition, 
OITs are often described as recurrent or repetitive, and difficult to control 
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(Clark & Rhyno, 2005; Julien et al., 2007). Finally, OITs are frequently 
described as interrupting the task at hand, often because they are discordant 
with what a person is thinking or doing at the time of the thought (Clark & 
Rhyno, 2005; Julien et al., 2007). 
 Whereas process characteristics have been captured by most definitions 
of OITs, content has generally been ignored. In a study which used the most 
comprehensive measure of OITs (“Inventario de Pensamientos Intrusos 
Obsesivos”), García-Soriano, Belloch, Morillo, and Clark (2011) found that 
OITs frequently cover the themes of aggression, sex, religion, symmetry, 
doubts, contamination and superstition. However, OITs can be highly 
idiosyncratic and cover a range of themes (Rachman, 1981), and so it is 
important that definitions of OITs do not include strict content boundaries. 
Indeed, García-Soriano et al. (2011) found that 10% of participants indicated 
that their most upsetting OIT was not from the list of OITs provided, suggesting 
that it covered a different theme. Definitions of OITs, therefore, should state 
some of the most common OIT themes, whilst also making it clear that OITs 
can cover a range of different themes. 
In order to further our understanding of OITs, it is important to consider 
the distinction between these cognitions and other, similar, types of cognition 
– in other words, to be clear on what OITs are not. Although information on 
the differences between OITs and other types of thought is likely excessive for 
OIT definitions, it remains a useful way of understanding more clearly what 
OITs are and are not. Four similar types of thought that are often confused with 
OITs are worry, negative automatic thoughts, rumination (Clark and Rhyno, 
2005), and task-unrelated thoughts. Worry has been described as a “chain of 
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thoughts and images, negatively affect-laden and relatively uncontrollable” 
(Borkovec, Robinson, Pruzinsky, & DePree, 1983, p. 10). Both OITs and worry 
interrupt ongoing activities, are difficult to control, and are subjectively 
unpleasant. However, compared to OITs, worry tends to take a verbal or 
linguistic form (as compared to in the form of thoughts, images, or impulses); 
tends to be more realistic, more unpleasant, more voluntary, of a longer 
duration, and tends to cause a greater interference in functioning (Clark & 
Rhyno, 2005). In terms of content, worry tends to relate more closely to every 
day concerns than OITs (Turner, Beider & Stanley, 1992), and the content of 
worry is more acceptable (Julien et al., 2007). Although worry is characteristic 
of a range of anxious states, it is typically found in generalized anxiety disorder 
(GAD; APA, 2013).  
Negative automatic thoughts are recurring, disapproving comments 
about oneself (e.g. “I am useless”) (Ingram, Atkinson, Slater, Saccuzzo, & 
Garfin, 1990). Both negative automatic thoughts and OITs tend to share several 
process characteristics: repetitiveness and intrusiveness (Clark & Rhyno, 
2005). However, negative automatic thoughts tend to be more volitional and 
self-directed than OITs, they are predominately verbal or linguistic in form (as 
compared to in the form of thoughts, images or impulses), and less disruptive 
of ongoing activity than OITs (Clark & Rhyno, 2005).  In addition, negative 
automatic thoughts tend to be experienced as longer chains of related thoughts, 
whereas OITs are more likely to be experienced as short bursts of thought. In 
terms of content, negative automatic thoughts typically relate to themes of loss 
or failure, whereas OITs tend to relate to themes of aggression, sex, religion, 
symmetry, doubts, contamination and superstition (García-Soriano et al., 2011; 
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Julien et al., 2007). Finally, negative automatic thoughts are likely to be 
perceived as more rational and ego-syntonic (in line with an individual’s self-
image) than OITs.  Negative automatic thoughts are typically found in 
depression (Beck, 1967), although they are associated with range of mental 
health disorders. 
Rumination has been described as “repetitive and passive thinking 
about one’s symptoms of depression and the possible causes and consequences 
of these symptoms” (Nolen-Hoeksema, 2004, p. 107). In terms of process 
characteristics, rumination and OITs are both recurrent and repetitive; however, 
rumination tends to be longer in duration, more ego-syntonic (in line with a 
person’s self-image), volitional and directed by the individual, than OITs 
(Clark & Rhyno, 2005). In terms of content, rumination is more likely to be 
past-orientated and self-focussed than OITs. Although rumination is associated 
with range of mental health disorders, it is typically found in depression (Beck, 
1967). 
Task-unrelated thoughts (sometimes referred to as ‘mind wandering’) 
is a broad term given to any thoughts that are not relevant to the task at hand 
(e.g. Smallwood & Schooler, 2006). Task-unrelated thoughts can include 
fantasies, future concerns, or past mistakes, amongst many others. In terms of 
process characteristics, OITs differ from task-unrelated thoughts in that OITs 
are spontaneous, whereas task-unrelated thoughts are sometimes deliberate 
(Seli, Risko, Purdon, & Smilek, 2016). In terms of content, OITs are negative 
and unwanted, whereas task-unrelated thoughts are sometimes positive (e.g. 
fantasising about winning the lottery; Seli et al., 2016). However, there are 
many process and content overlaps with OITs and task-unrelated thoughts, and 
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in this respect OITs are most accurately thought of as a type of task-unrelated 
thought. In other words, all OITs are task-unrelated thoughts, but not all task-
unrelated thoughts are OITs. 
 In summary, OITs are those thoughts, images or impulses that are 
unwanted, spontaneous, repetitive, difficult to control, that interrupt the task at 
hand, and broadly cover the themes of aggression, sex, religion, symmetry, 
doubts, contamination and superstition. Indeed, this is the OIT definition that 
will be used throughout this thesis. Examples of OITs may include an 
individual imagining themselves carrying out an unprovoked aggressive act on 
another individual as they walked down the street, or suddenly doubting 
whether they locked the front door of their house as they arrived at work. These 
OITs differ from worry, negative automatic thoughts, rumination, and task-
unrelated thoughts in terms of process characteristics and content.  
Understanding the development and maintenance of obsessive-compulsive 
disorder 
 Current understanding of the development and maintenance of OCD is 
best informed by a range of cognitive theories (Clark & Purdon, 1993; Clark & 
Purdon, 2016; Rachman, 1997, 1998, 2003; Salkovskis, 1985, 1989, 1999; 
Salkovskis & Millar, 2016). There is a significant degree of overlap between 
each of these cognitive theories, and many include elaborations on previous 
theories, rather than opposing or contradictory ideas. Indeed, because of this 
significant overlap, these theories are often referred to collectively as 
“cognitive theories of OCD”. Understanding what cognitive theories can and 
cannot tell us about the development and maintenance of OCD is crucial for 
informing future theoretical developments. Indeed, there are likely to be 
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important factors that influence the development and maintenance of OCD, but 
have not yet been considered by cognitive theories of OCD.  
The central claim of cognitive theories of OCD is that OITs become 
problematic (more frequent, intense, and distressing) when appraised or 
interpreted in negative ways (Clark & Purdon, 1993; Rachman, 1997, 1998, 
2003; Salkovskis, 1985, 1989, 1999). Although OITs are a central symptom of 
OCD (American Psychiatric Association [APA], 2013) they are also 
experienced by the general population (e.g. Abramowitz et al., 2014; 
Radomsky, Rachman, Shafran, Coughtrey, & Barber, 2014). In other words, it 
is not OITs themselves that are problematic, because many people experience 
them without experiencing any significant distress or dysfunction. Instead, it is 
the way that individuals evaluate the OITs that is important in determining 
whether they become more frequent and distressing. More specifically, 
individuals with OCD may feel that an OIT is an indication that they are 
personally responsible for preventing some anticipated harm from occurring to 
the self or others (Salkovskis, 1985, 1989, 1999). In addition, individuals with 
OCD may misintrerpret the significance of their OITs, or believe that OITs are 
equal to actions (Rachman, 1997, 1998, 2003). 
Cognitive theories of OCD also provide an explanation for why these 
negative appraisals occur in the first place; they are said to be a product of 
dysfunctional beliefs that an individual may hold about their thoughts and the 
world around them (Obsessive Compulsive Cognitions Working Group -
OCCWG, 1997; 2001; 2003; 2005). More specifically, it has been 
demonstrated that that individuals with OCD are likely to 1) feel responsible 
for the thoughts they experience; 2) overrate the importance of their thoughts; 
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3) feel the need to control their thoughts; 4) overestimate threats; 5) be 
intolerant to uncertainty; and 6) be prone to perfectionism (OCCWG, 1997; 
2001; 2003; 2005). Understandably, these dysfunctional beliefs have a direct 
impact on the way that individuals think about their OITs. 
Finally, cognitive theories of OCD highlight the importance of an 
individual’s response to OITs (often referred to as compulsions) in the 
development and maintenance of OCD. Negative beliefs and interpretations of 
OITs lead to an individual becoming distressed and anxious by the OITs that 
they experience; often believing that they are “mad, bad or dangerous” 
(Rachman, 2003, p.6). In an attempt to reduce anxiety caused by the OITs, 
individuals may respond by carrying out covert or overt compulsive acts, such 
as repeated checking of a door, or washing their hands (Rachman, 1997, 1998, 
2003; Salkovskis, 1985, 1989, 1999). Although these compulsive acts may 
reduce anxiety in the short-term, in the long-term they prevent individuals from 
disconfirming the faulty appraisals associated with OITs, and ultimately cause 
distressing OITs to persist (Rachman, 1997). Individuals with OCD are also 
more likely to suppress OITs than nonclinical individuals (Morillo, Belloch, & 
García-Soriano, 2007; García-Soriano & Belloch, 2013; suppression refers to 
the effortful process of trying to remove a thought; Wegner, 1989). However, 
most of these suppression attempts are unsuccessful at removing OITs (Purdon, 
Rowa, & Antony, 2007). 
To give hypothetical example of how an OIT may become problematic 
for an individual, based on cognitive theories of OCD: an individual may 
suddenly have the thought of shouting out something offensive during a church 
service. This thought is ego-dystonic (conflicts with the individual’s self-
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image) and therefore unwanted, as the individual considers themselves to be 
very polite and religious. The thought interrupts what the individual was 
previously doing – reading a prayer. As the individual often feels the need to 
control their thoughts and feels responsible for the thoughts that they 
experience, they become anxious and distressed and feel compelled to act in 
order to remove the thought and prevent the thought from becoming a reality. 
As a result, they repeat the phrase “I am a good person” alongside a Hail Mary 
(an example of a compulsion), three times, which reduces their feelings of 
anxiety for a short period of time.   
Obsessive intrusive thoughts: The continuum model 
Cognitive theories of OCD rest on the premise that OITs are 
experienced by everybody and exist on a continuum of severity (Abramovitch 
et al., 2014; Berry & Laskey, 2012). This continuum of OIT severity is 
sometimes referred to as the “continuum model” (Berry & Laskey, 2012).  
From a diagnostic perspective, severity corresponds closely to diagnosis, such 
that individuals who experience more severe OITs are more likely to be 
diagnosed with OCD, and individuals who experience less severe OITs are 
more likely to be from the general population. The continuum model posits that 
everybody experiences OITs of the same content, but they vary based on a 
range of associated variables (e.g. frequency, distress, intensity). Severity can 
therefore be thought of as a term used to describe these associated variables 
collectively.  As with cognitive theories more generally, identifying any 
inaccuracies, or potential areas for development, of the continuum model is 
important for furthering our understanding of OCD. In addition, the continuum 
model posits that all individuals experience OITs of the same kind, and this has 
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important methodological implications for research into OCD. More 
specifically, it suggests findings from OIT research which recruits nonclinical 
individuals is generalizable to understanding OITs in individuals with OCD 
(Abramowitz et al., 2014).  
A large body of literature currently supports the continuum model of 
OITs, by demonstrating that OITs of a similar content are experienced by all 
individuals (e.g. Rachman & de Silva, 1978; Abramovitch et al., 2014; 
Radomsky et al., 2014). Some of the earliest research in support of the 
continuum model came from a study by Rachman and de Silva (1978), who 
interviewed 124 individuals from the general population and found that 80% of 
the sample experienced OITs which were similar in content to individuals with 
a diagnosis of OCD. This was a seminal finding as it had previously been 
thought that OITs were pathological and not experienced by most people (e.g. 
Black, 1974; Lewis, 1936). Since 1978, this finding has been replicated many 
times, with reports of between 70% and 100% of the general population 
experiencing OITs (Belloch, Morillo, Lucero, Cabedo, & Carrió, 2004; 
Langlois, Freeston, & Ladouceur, 2000; Purdon & Clark, 1993; Radomsky, 
Alcolado, et al., 2014; Salkovskis & Harrison, 1984). In addition, it has also 
been demonstrated that OITs are common across cultures, when 84%-100% 
(average 94.3%) of students from 15 cities, in six different continents, reported 
experiencing at least one OIT in the past three months (Radomsky et al., 2014). 
Further evidence for the continuum model of OITs comes from 
questionnaire studies which demonstrate differences between nonclinical 
individuals and those with OCD on a range of OIT variables. In comparison to 
nonclinical individuals, those with a diagnosis of OCD report that their OITs 
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are more frequent, distressing, unacceptable and uncontrollable (Clark & 
Rhyno, 2005).  In addition, thoughts at the severe end of the continuum are 
more likely to be resisted, neutralized (a voluntarily initiated activity which 
aims to reduce discomfort associated with OIT; Salkovskis, 1989; e.g. 
internally repeating that you are not a bad person) and be accompanied by 
maladaptive thought-control strategies (e.g. thought suppression) (Clark & 
Rhyno, 2005). Individuals with OCD also report that their OITs are more 
intense and more difficult to dismiss than nonclinical individuals (Rachman & 
de Silva, 1978). Each of these variables are thought to vary continuously across 
the continuum; such that, for example, one individual may experience only a 
few OITs each month, barely resist them, and find them only slightly 
distressing – whereas a second individual may experience many OITs each 
month, heavily resist them, and find them extremely distressing. A third 
individual may exist somewhere in between these two individuals, in terms of 
frequency, resistance and distress.  
The idea that all individuals experience OITs of the same kind, but 
differing based on a range of associated variables, has important implications 
for research into OCD. More specifically, it suggests that research into 
nonclinical individuals can reveal important information about the 
development and maintenance of OCD. Indeed, a wealth of research has been 
conducted with nonclinical participants and this has greatly increased our 
understanding of OCD (Abramowitz et al., 2014). Moreover, there are even 
several advantages to using nonclinical individuals (compared to individuals 
with OCD) in OCD research. Research with nonclinical individuals is cheaper 
and more convenient than research with samples with OCD (Abramowitz et al., 
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2014). In addition, putative developmental and maintenance factors of OCD 
can be induced and manipulated in nonclinical participants, meaning they offer 
a more precise experimental control than individuals with OCD (who may 
already have been affected by such factors) (Abramowtiz et al., 2014). 
Research with nonclinical samples is also less likely to be prone to the influence 
of confounding variables (e.g. medication) (Gibbs, 1996) and provides 
opportunity to conduct longitudinal research to determine developmental 
factors of OCD (Abramowitz et al., 2014). Finally, research with nonclinical 
samples may be particularly useful for conducting preliminary research, to 
determine whether a particular line of research is worth pursuing in individuals 
with OCD (Abramowitz et al., 2014). 
Criticisms of cognitive theories of obsessive-compulsive disorder  
Cognitive theories currently offer the best scientific framework for 
understanding OCD, and this is reflected by the development of effective 
treatments that have been built upon these theories, such as cognitive-
behavioural therapy (CBT) (Freeston, Rheaume, & Ladouceur, 1996; Wilhelm 
et al., 2005). However, despite the large body of evidence that supports the 
cognitive theories of OCD, and the continuum model on which it is based, more 
recent reviews have challenged the ideas (e.g. Berry & Laskey, 2012; Cougle 
& Lee, 2014; Julien et al., 2007), suggesting revisions to the ideas may be 
necessary. In further support of the idea that revisions to current theories of 
OCD may be necessary, cognitive interventions are unhelpful for around half 
of individuals (Fisher & Wells, 2005), suggesting new interventions are needed 
to help these individuals. In order for new interventions to be developed, and 
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for our understanding of OCD to increase, new theoretical models, or 
elaborations on current cognitive theories, are needed (Kyrios, 2011).  
In a review of the literature, Cougle and Lee (2014) challenged a core 
claim of cognitive theories of OCD; that more frequent OITs are the result of 
negative appraisals and dysfunctional control strategies. Rather, the reviewers 
argued that that causality is in the opposite direction, such that individuals who 
experience more frequent OITs are more likely to negatively appraise, and 
attempt to control, OITs. In support of this position, Cougle and Lee (2014) 
cited evidence which demonstrated that a stress management intervention 
(which was not designed to alter an individual’s OIT appraisals) was just as 
effective at reducing symptoms of OCD as a cognitive intervention designed to 
target faulty appraisals (Whittal, Woody, McLean, Rachman, & Robichaud, 
2010). In addition, analysis of weekly assessments in the same trial 
demonstrated that the reduction of OITs predicted the subsequent reduction of 
negative appraisals, but the reduction of negative appraisals did not predict the 
reduction of OITs (Woody, Whittal, & McClean, 2011). If negative appraisals 
and dysfunctional control strategies do not lead to an increased frequency of 
OITs, the question remains as to what does cause the increase. In other words, 
why do some people experience more OITs than others? Further elaborations 
to cognitive theories of OCD must consider this question. 
A further question that is unanswered by cognitive theories of OCD is 
why particular control strategies, such as suppression, are often unsuccessful. 
For example, in a diary study, Purdon et al. (2007) found that individuals with 
OCD were only able to suppress thoughts on 11% of occasions. In addition, it 
is currently unclear why individuals vary in their ability to suppress OITs (e.g. 
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both nonclinical; Purdon & Clark, 2001; and those with OCD; Abramowitz, 
Tolin, Street, 2001). There is some evidence to suggest that ability to suppress 
OITs depends upon how upsetting the OIT is (Ólafsson et al., 2014; Edwards 
& Dickerson, 1987). In other words, individuals who experience more 
upsetting OITs (e.g. those with OCD) find them more difficult to suppress than 
individuals who experience less upsetting OITs. However, contrary to this, 
there is evidence to suggest that individuals with OCD have difficulty 
suppressing neutral thoughts, in comparison to nonclinical individuals and 
anxious controls (Tolin, Abramowitz, Przeworski, & Foa, 2002), suggesting 
some other mechanism is needed to explain variations in suppression ability. 
Future attempts to improve cognitive theories of OCD must therefore consider 
other explanations for variations in suppress ability. 
The continuum model has also received criticism and suggested 
improvements have been put forward (Berry & Laskey, 2012). In a review of 
the literature on OITs in the general population, Berry and Laskey (2012) 
argued that the continuum model does not account for differences in OIT 
content, trigger (what, if anything, elicits the OIT) and response strategy (how 
somebody reacts to the OIT once it has occurred). More specifically, Berry and 
Laskey (2012) presented research demonstrating that individuals with OCD 
were less likely to have an identifiable trigger for their OITs than individuals 
from the general population; in that the thoughts are less likely to be directly 
linked to their environment. Berry and Laskey (2012) also argued for some 
content differences; that individuals with OCD are more likely to experience 
bizarre or aggressive OITs than nonclinical individuals. Finally, Berry & 
Laskey (2012) argued that individuals with OCD are more likely to seek 
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reassurance for their OITs than individuals from the general population. 
Crucially, Berry & Laskey (2012) conclude that there still remains much 
overlap in each of these areas (e.g. individuals from the general population can 
still experience very bizarre or aggressive OITs), and so the continuum model 
should not be discarded. Rather, a renewed continuum model should be adopted 
which accounts for these further complexities. An important implication of this 
conclusion is that research with nonclinical individuals can still reveal 
important information about the development of OCD.  
A further variable that has not yet been considered by the continuum 
model of OITs is dismissibility; an individual’s ability to remove an OIT from 
consciousness. Dismissibility can be thought of as a form of thought 
suppression and has been measured in two ways: subjectively and objectively. 
First, subjective dismissibilty has been measured through the use of self-report 
questionnaires, which ask participants “how difficult is it for you to dismiss 
OITs”? (Rachman & de Silva, 1978; Salkvoskis & Harrison, 1984; Ólafsson et 
al. 2014). Second, objective dismissibility has been measured through 
experimental studies, which ask participants to dismiss OITs and indicate (e.g. 
using a keyboard) when they have dismissed the thought (Ólafsson et al. 2014; 
Purdon, Gifford, McCabe, & Antony, 2011). Overall, very little research has 
explored OIT dismissibility, but the limited findings suggest that symptoms of 
OCD are related to subjective OIT dismissibility (Rachman & de Silva, 1978; 
Salkvoskis & Harrison, 1984; Ólafsson et al. 2014) rather than objective OIT 
dismissibility (Ólafsson et al. 2014; Purdon et al., 2011). In other words, 
dismissing OITs may be a problem of perception of how difficult it is to remove 
thoughts, rather than actual difficulty removing them. However, this finding is 
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surprising, as it is unclear why subjective and objective dismissibility would 
not align. Due to the limited research in this area, further research is needed to 
clarify the relationship between symptoms of OCD and both subjective and 
objective dismissibility. Finding a relationship between symptoms of OCD and 
objective dismissibility would suggest that the continuum model needs to be 
updated further to account for differences in dismissibility.  
Subclinical obsessive-compulsive disorder  
The majority of current research into OCD is conducted on nonclinical 
individuals and those with a diagnosis of OCD. However, there are a lesser-
studied group of individuals who could reveal important information about the 
development and maintenance of OCD; those described as having “subclinical 
levels of obsessive-compulsive symptomatology”. Individuals with subclinical 
levels of obsessive-compulsive symptomatology may experience unpleasant 
OCD symptoms (such as upsetting OITs), but not to the same extent as 
individuals with a diagnosis of OCD (e.g. Gibbs, 1996; Goracci et al., 2007; 
Grabe et al., 2001). These individuals are sometimes described as having 
“subclinical OCD” (e.g. Grabe et al., 2001) or “subthreshold OCD” (e.g. 
Goracci et al., 2007). It is important to note that none of these subclinical labels 
are official diagnostic categories; rather, they are terms used in research to 
operationalise a broad set of obsessive-compulsive characteristics.  
Operationalising subclinical OCD in this way is useful for learning more about 
OCD. Indeed, it has been demonstrated that individuals with subclinical levels 
of obsessive-compulsive symptomatology are at increased risk of developing 
OCD (Black, Gaffney, Schlosser, & Gabel, 2003;  Fullana et al., 2009). Further 
research is therefore needed into this under-studied group of individuals. 
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 A clearer picture of subclinical OCD is created when considering how 
it fits within the continuum model of OITs.  Based on this model, the experience 
of OITs varies from nonclinical individuals, through to individuals with 
subclinical levels of obsessive-compulsive symptomatology, and further to 
individuals with clinical levels of OCD symptomatology (Abramowitz et al., 
2014). In other words, those individuals who fall into the category of 
subclinical OCD may score higher than nonclinical individuals on a range of 
OIT variables (e.g. more OIT frequency, intensity, distress etc.), but score 
lower than individuals with a diagnosis of OCD. Of course, the specific area on 
the continuum where subclinical OCD lies is best viewed as being approximate, 
rather than precise, and may vary between studies dependent upon the way that 
subclinical OCD has been operationalised. Indeed, this is the case with 
individuals with OCD; their experiences of OITs exist in an approximate area 
at the most severe end of the continuum. In other words, whilst it may look like 
operationalising subclinical OCD conflicts with the continuum model of OITs 
(as it is attempting to turn a dimensional experience into a discrete category), 
this is not the case, as the category lies in an approximate area of the continuum, 
and mainly serves as a useful descriptive tool in research.   
There is large variation in how subclinical OCD is operationalised, 
which makes it difficult to draw conclusions about what subclinical OCD is, 
and what it can tell us about OCD. Some studies have employed a diagnostic 
interview, where an individual’s obsessive-compulsive symptoms are assessed 
in relation to pre-defined criteria for subclinical OCD (e.g. Angst, 1993; Grabe 
et al., 2000). Other studies have categorised participants based on their scores 
on a self-report OCD symptom questionnaire (e.g. Obsessive-Compulsive 
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Inventory – Revised – OCI-R; Foa et al., 2002). Within these studies, there is 
variation in the cut-off scores used to operationalise subclinical OCD.  Some 
studies employ a conservative cut-off score, such as describing the highest 3% 
of scorers on an OCD measure as having subclinical OCD (e.g. Kim, Jang, 
Kim, 2009). Other studies have employed a more liberal cut-off score, such as 
conducting a median split on questionnaire scores and dividing the group into 
a “low OCD” and “subclinical OCD” group, based either on overall symptoms 
or a specific symptom subtype (e.g. checking; Harkin & Kessler, 2012; Harkin, 
Rutherford, & Kessler, 2011; Riskind, Abreu, Strauss, & Holt, 1997). Other 
studies have employed a cut-off score somewhere in between these liberal and 
conservative examples, such as recruiting participants who score within the top 
25% of an OCD symptom measure (Frost & Shows, 1993), or recruiting 
participants who score 1 S.D above the sample mean on an OCD symptom 
measure (Abramovitch, Shaham, Levin, Bar-Hen, & Schweiger, 2015). 
Currently there is no universally agreed upon method of how to 
operationalise subclinical OCD using self-report questionnaires, and each 
method has its own advantages and disadvantages. Liberal cut-off scores make 
the recruitment of larger sample sizes easier, but are less sensitive to OCD 
symptomatology and may therefore include many individuals who would more 
accurately be described as nonclinical (Mataix-Cols, Vallejo, & Sa, 2000). 
Conservative cut-off scores are more sensitive to OCD symptomatology, but 
increase the likelihood that individuals with undiagnosed OCD may be 
included in the sample (Mataix-Cols et al., 2000). Indeed, previous studies that 
have conducted diagnostic interviews following a conservative cut-off 
allocation have found that many of these participants meet clinical OCD 
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diagnostic criteria (Lee, Yost, & Telch, 2009 – 73%; Lee & Telch, 2010 – 
75%).  Recently Abramowitz et al. (2014) suggested a method for decreasing 
the likelihood of including individuals with undiagnosed OCD; that is, using 
pre-determined empirically derived cut-off scores for OCD questionnaires. For 
example, the OCI-R (Foa et al., 2002) is able to distinguish between individuals 
with and without OCD using a cut-off score of 21 (those who score 21 or higher 
are likely to have OCD). Excluding individuals who score over the clinical cut-
off score greatly decreases the likelihood of including individuals with 
undiagnosed OCD.  
Summary 
To summarise this chapter so far, cognitive theories of OCD argue that 
it is not OITs themselves that are problematic, but rather the way that they are 
appraised and responded to (Clark & Purdon, 1993; Rachman, 1997, 1998, 
2003; Salkovskis, 1985, 1989, 1999). Negative appraisals of OITs lead to 
dysfunctional control attempts, which increase the severity of OITs. Cognitive 
theories of OCD are based on the premise that OITs exist on a continuum, 
similar in content but varying in terms of a range of associated variables, such 
as frequency, distress, resistance, intensity, and perceived dismissibility (Clark 
& Rhyno, 2005). Nonclinical individuals may experience less frequent, 
distressing, and intense OITs than individuals with subclinical levels of 
obsessive-compulsive symptomatology, who in turn may experience less 
frequent, distressing, and intense OITs than individuals with clinical OCD. This 
continuum model has important implications for research into OCD, as it 
suggests findings from nonclinical samples, and individual with subclinical 
levels of obsessive-compulsive symptomatology, can provide useful 
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information about the development and maintenance of OCD (Abramowitz et 
al., 2014).  
More recently, cognitive theories of OCD have been challenged, and 
modifications have been suggested (e.g. Berry & Laskey, 2012; Cougle & Lee, 
2014). More specifically, Cougle and Lee (2014) argued that negative 
appraisals and dysfunctional response strategies do not lead to an increase in 
the number of OITs experienced, leaving the question open as to what does lead 
to an increase in OITs. It is also unclear why OIT suppression is often 
unsuccessful, and why individuals vary in their ability to suppress OITs 
(Abramowitz, Tolin, Street, 2001; Purdon et al., 2007; Purdon & Clark, 2001). 
Finally, there are reasons to believe that the continuum model should account 
for differences in objective dismissibility, as well as subjective dismissibility 
(Purdon et al., 2011). In order to increase our understanding of the development 
and maintenance of OCD, research should aim to investigate these contested 
claims.  
1.3: The role of executive functions in obsessive-
compulsive disorder and subclinical obsessive-
compulsive disorder 
 Research that integrates neuropsychological findings with cognitive 
theories of OCD may help to resolve some of the current contested issues in 
OCD research (Kyrios, 2011). Increasingly, the role of executive functions 
(EFs) in OCD is being investigated and offers potential for increasing our 
understanding of OCD. Broadly speaking, there are two lines of evidence that 
suggest that research into EFs may help to increase our understanding of the 
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disorder, and, more specifically, resolve some of the contested issues within 
cognitive theories of OCD. First, there is evidence that demonstrates that 
individuals with OCD have poorer EF than nonclinical individuals 
(Abramowitz, & Mittelman, 2013; Shin, Lee, Kim, & Kwon, 2014; Snyder, 
Kaiser, Warren, & Heller, 2014). Second, there is evidence that links EFs with 
OCD-relevant mechanisms, such as thought suppression (e.g. Brewin & 
Beaton, 2002; Brewin & Smart, 2005), suggesting a direct role of EF in the 
experience of OITs. Although the empirical evidence linking EFs to OCD-
relevant mechanisms is sparse, there are also theoretical reasons to suggest that 
EFs may play a role in OCD.   
Defining and measuring executive functions 
Currently there is a lack of consensus within the literature as to how 
many EFs there are, however, Miyake, Friedmann, Emerson, Witzki, & 
Howerter’s (2000) 3-factor model is the most widely used and influential 
model. Miyake et al.’s (2000) model posits that there are three related but 
separable EFs: information updating and monitoring (often referred to as 
working memory), inhibition of prepotent responses (often referred to as 
inhibition) and mental set-shifting (often referred to as cognitive flexibility). 
Working memory involves updating and monitoring relevant 
information; this includes replacing non-relevant information with relevant 
information, where appropriate (Morris & Jones, 1990). As a real world 
example, working memory is required when an individual attempts to 
remember a phone number that someone has told them, whilst they look for a 
pen to write it down. Some of the most frequently used measures of working 
memory are the n-back task (Kirchner, 1958) and the Backward Digit Span 
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Task (BDS; Wechsler Adult Intelligence Scale, 3rd edition; WAIS III; The 
Psychological Corporation, 1997). For the n-back task, participants are 
presented with a sequence of letters or shapes. Participants are required to 
indicate when the relevant stimulus matches the stimulus n-trials before (e.g. 2 
trials previous). For the BDS task, participants are required to remember a list 
of numbers, which increases in length, and recall the numbers in reverse order. 
In both of these tasks, participants are required to hold, manipulate and update 
information. 
Inhibition refers to the ability to deliberately suppress dominant, 
automatic, or prepotent responses (Heeren, Van Broeck, & Philippot, 2009; 
Miyake et al., 2000). The children’s game “Simon says” provides a real-world 
example of a task, in which success requires inhibition. In this game, 
instructions are to be followed only if preceded by “Simon says”. Hearing an 
instruction, such as “touch your nose”, often causes participants to touch their 
nose; inhibition is required to stop this action. Inhibition is often measured 
using the Stroop task  (Stroop, 1935) and the Flanker task (Eriksen & Eriksen, 
1974) . For the Stroop task, participants are presented with a range of colour 
words (e.g. blue) which are displayed in a range of different colours (e.g. the 
word “blue” is in red font/ink). Participants are required to indicate what the 
word says, and not the colour of which the word is presented.  For the Flanker 
task, participants are presented with a row of arrows and they are required to 
indicate the direction of the central arrow. For some of these trials, the central 
arrow is pointing in the opposite direction to the surrounding arrows.  In both 
of these tasks, participants are required to stop, or inhibit, a prepotent response. 
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Cognitive flexibility refers to the process of changing behaviour based 
on alterations in, and feedback from, the environment (Vriend & Wit, 2013). 
This process includes attention-switching; the ability to disengage from 
irrelevant stimuli and attend to relevant stimuli. As a real world example, 
cognitive flexibility is involved in an individual’s ability to switch between 
using a PC and a Mac. Some examples of tasks used to measure cognitive 
flexibility, include the Wisconsin Card Sorting Test (WCST; Heaton, 1981) 
and the Switching Inhibition and Flexibility Task (SwIFT; FitzGibbon, Cragg 
& Carroll, 2014). For the WCST, participants are given cards which vary based 
on three characteristics; colour (e.g. red), shape (e.g. triangle), and number (e.g. 
two). Participants are required to sort the cards based on an unknown rule (e.g. 
colour), by deducing the correct answer from “correct” or “incorrect” responses 
from the experimenter.  The sorting rule is changed frequently by the 
experimenter, without warning. For the SwIFT, participants are presented with 
bivalent stimuli which vary based on colour and shape. Participants are also 
presented with a rule (typically either “Sort by colour” or “Sort by shape”) and 
are required to sort the bivalent stimuli based on the rule. Both of these tasks 
require participants to switch their attention based on different rules/criteria.  
Executive functions in obsessive-compulsive disorder 
Individuals with OCD have poorer EF than nonclinical individuals; 
reflected by poorer performance on a range of tasks measuring working 
memory, inhibition, and cognitive flexibility (amongst other cognitive 
variables; Abramovitch et al. 2013; Shin et al. 2014; Snyder et al. 2014). In 
other words, individuals with OCD demonstrate EF deficits. However, the 
literature is not consistent, and often studies utilising the same task and sample-
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type find contradictory results (Abramovitch & Cooperman, 2015). The 
evidence for EF deficits in individuals with OCD comes from three separate 
meta-analyses, which found broadly similar results (Abramovitch et al. 2013; 
Shin et al. 2014; Snyder et al. 2014). In their review, Abramovitch et al. (2013) 
presented effect sizes based on EF domains (e.g. cognitive flexibility) rather 
than on EF tasks (e.g. WCST), whereas Shin et al. (2014) presented effect sizes 
for EF tasks rather than EF domains.  Snyder et al (2014) presented both task 
and domain effect sizes.  Individuals with OCD performed significantly worse 
than nonclinical controls on tasks measuring visuospatial working memory 
(Shin et al., 2014; g = -.45 to -.74; Abramovitch et al., 2013; d = -.37; Snyder 
et al., 2014; d = .47), inhibition (Shin et al., 2014; g = -.45 to -.55; Abramovitch 
et al., 2013; d = -.49; Snyder et al., 2014; d = .40), and cognitive flexibility 
(Shin et al., 2014; g = -.31 to -.49; Abramovitch et al., 2013; d = -.51; Snyder 
et al., 2014; d = .49). However, findings related to verbal working memory 
were mixed, with two meta-analyses finding small differences between the two 
groups (Abramovitch et al., 2013; d = -.34; Snyder et al., 2014; d = .22) and 
one meta-analysis finding no significant difference (Shin et al., 2014; g = .11). 
This difference is likely due to variation in tasks included in the meta-analyses, 
as Shin et al (2014) only included one verbal working memory task (digit span). 
These reviews suggest that individuals with OCD have deficits in the areas of 
working memory, inhibition, and cognitive flexibility. Differences in verbal 
working memory, however, appear small or non-existent.  
The finding that individuals with OCD demonstrate EF deficits has led 
to the suggestion that EF deficits may be endophenotypes of OCD; that is, trait 
markers that links genes to symptoms of OCD (Taylor, 2012; Gottesman & 
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Gould, 2003). Clarifying whether EF deficits are endophenotypes of a disorder 
is crucial for several reasons. First identifying endophenotypes can help 
improve current diagnostic classification systems, by offering a further variable 
to assess (Lilienfeld, 2014). In addition, identifying endophenotypes can reveal 
important information about the causes and mechanisms of a disorder. There 
are five criteria used to define endophenotypes: i) associated with causes of the 
disorder, ii) trait-like (i.e. state independent; occurs in the individual even if 
they do not display the disorder) iii) heritable iv) co-segregation between the 
endophenotype and illness within families v) presence in unaffected relatives 
at a higher rate than the general population (Gottesman & Gould, 2003; Gould 
& Gottesman, 2006).  
If EF deficits were endophenotypes of OCD, this would have important 
implications for our understanding of OCD. More specifically, it could suggest 
that symptoms of OCD (e.g. obsessions and/or compulsions) are caused 
directly by EF deficits. If this is the case, research into EFs may help resolve 
some of the contested issues with cognitive theories of OCD, such as helping 
to explain why some individuals experience more OITs than others, and why 
individuals vary in their suppression success. Alternatively, it could be that EF 
deficits, and symptoms of OCD are caused by a shared third factor (which could 
be a neurobiological factor, such as pre-frontal cortex dysfunction) which leads 
to both EF deficits and OCD symptoms (Snyder et al., 2014). In support of the 
idea that EF deficits are endophenotypes of OCD is evidence demonstrating 
that EFs do not change after receiving treatment for OCD (e.g. Kim et al., 2002; 
Nielen & Den Boer, 2003; Roh et al., 2005). In addition, unaffected first degree 
relatives of individuals with OCD also demonstrate EF deficits (e.g. Cavedini, 
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Zorzi, Piccinni, Cavallini, & Bellodi, 2010; Chamberlain & Menzies, 2009; 
Rajender et al., 2011). In other words, these findings suggest that EF deficits 
are heritable and trait-like, two of the previously discussed criteria used to 
define endophenotypes (Gottesman & Gould, 2003; Gould & Gottesman, 
2006). 
Executive functions in subclinical obsessive-compulsive disorder  
Finding EF deficits in individuals with subclinical OCD would support 
the view that EFs deficits are endophenotypes of OCD. Alternatively, not 
finding EF deficits in individuals with subclinical OCD may suggest either that 
EF deficits are not endophenotypes of OCD, or that intact EFs represent a 
protective factor against the development of OCD. Research investigating the 
role of EFs in subclinical OCD is extremely sparse, with varied methodologies, 
and inconsistent findings, making it difficult to draw strong conclusions. 
Surprisingly, individuals with subclinical OCD have been found to have better 
working memory than nonclinical individuals (on the Spatial Working Memory 
Task; SWMT - Johansen & Dittrich, 2013). Whereas individuals with 
subclinical OCD have been found to have poorer inhibition than nonclinical 
individuals (Go/No Go Task, Abramovitch et al., 2015). Finally, those with 
subclinical OCD have been found to have poorer cognitive flexibility than 
nonclinical individuals (WCST, Kim et al. 2009; Goodwin & Sher, 1992; Berg 
Card Sorting Task; BCST, Berg, 1948; Sternheim, Van Der Burgh, Berkhout, 
Dekker & Ruitter, 2014) and not different from nonclinical individuals 
(Intra/Extradimensional Shift Test, Sahakian and Owen, 1992; Johansen & 
Dittrich, 2013; WCST, Mataix-Cols, Barrios, Sánchez-Turet, Vallejo, Junqué, 
1999).  
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A large contributing factor to the inconsistent findings in studies 
looking at EF in subclinical OCD is likely due to variations in how researchers 
have operationalised subclinical OCD. Indeed, this variation is made apparent 
by the large differences in OCD symptom severity of samples with subclinical 
levels of obsessive-compulsive symptoms. Sternheim et al. (2014) and 
Abramovitch et al. (2015) both used the Obsessive-Compulsive Inventory-
Revised (OCI-R; Foa et al., 2002) to measure symptom severity in their sample 
of individuals with subclinical OCD. However, the mean OCD symptom score 
in Sternheim et al. (2014) was 24.4 (out of a total score of 72) the mean 
symptom score in Abramovitch et al (2015) was 36.6. Here, two studies have 
both recruited samples of individuals with subclinical OCD, but one of the 
samples is experiencing a much more severe level of symptomatology. A 
related (and previously discussed) issue here is that previously individuals with 
OCD generally score around 28.00 on the OCI-R (e.g. Foa et al., 2002). Sample 
means higher than 28.00 (e.g. in Abramovitch et al., 2015) are therefore likely 
to have included individuals with undiagnosed OCD. In other words, EF 
deficits in some studies may be representative of deficits in OCD, rather than 
subclinical OCD (Lee et al., 2009; Lee & Telch, 2010). 
 Further research is needed to clarify whether individuals with 
subclinical levels of obsessive-compulsive symptomatology demonstrate EF 
deficits, whilst taking care not to include individuals with undiagnosed OCD 
(this is the aim of chapter two).  
Executive functioning and obsessive intrusive thoughts 
 If EF deficits do represent endophenotypes of OCD, one possibility is 
that the deficits directly cause the symptoms of OCD. If it was shown that EFs 
Investigating the relationship between obsessive-compulsive symptomatology and executive functions. 
 
33 
 
are related to symptoms of OCD in this way, this would help to resolve some 
of the issues surrounding cognitive theories of OCD (e.g. why are OITs more 
frequent in some individuals than others? And why do people vary in their 
suppression ability?). Although there is little empirical research exploring the 
link between EFs and symptoms of OCD, there has been some speculation on 
the relationship. Executive functions help to direct the thoughts that we 
experience and the behaviours we conduct, and so it seems reasonable to 
hypothesise that they may have an impact upon the symptoms of OCD. 
Working memory involves monitoring and updating information, and the 
removal of unwanted material (Rosen & Engle, 1998). Inhibition is the ability 
to inhibit a prepotent motor or attentional response. Poor working memory and 
inhibition, therefore, may prevent an individual from successfully suppressing 
OITs or inhibiting behavioural compulsions, causing symptoms to persist 
(Chamberlain, Blackwell, Fineberg, Robbins, & Sahakian, 2005; Grisham & 
Williams, 2013). Cognitive inflexibility, or an inability to switch attention from 
one stimulus (e.g. an OIT) to another (e.g. the task at hand),  may partially 
explain the repetitive OITs found in individuals with OCD (Abramovitch & 
Cooperman, 2015). In other words, individual differences in EFs may explain 
differences in suppression success and in the number of OITs experienced by 
different individuals. 
In support of the idea that working memory may be implicated in the 
successful suppression of OITs, Brewin and Smart (2005) found that better 
working memory predicted fewer OITs in a suppression task, in a nonclinical 
student sample. Similarly, a nonclinical student sample who completed a 
working memory training intervention experienced fewer OITs during a 
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suppression task than participants who did not complete the intervention 
(Bomyea & Amir, 2011). These findings offer preliminary evidence for the idea 
that individual differences in working memory may explain differences in 
suppression success, an idea not currently accounted for by cognitive theories 
of OCD. Further research is needed to investigate this relationship between 
working memory and suppression success. An interesting extension on these 
studies would be to investigate whether working memory is related to the 
dismissal of OITs, rather than in preventing them from occurring in the first 
place (this is the aim of chapter 4).  
Are executive function deficits epiphenomena of obsessive-compulsive 
disorder?  
 An alternative explanation for EF deficits in individuals with OCD, is 
that they represent epiphenomena of OCD, rather than endophenotypes of the 
disorder. In other words, rather than EF deficits causing the symptoms of OCD, 
it may be the symptoms of OCD that are causing apparent EF deficits. Showing 
that EF deficits are epiphenomena of obsessive-compulsive symptoms, such as 
OITs, has important implications for our understanding of OCD. More 
specifically, it suggests that individual differences in EFs cannot explain 
differences in an individual’s ability to suppress OITs. If EF deficits are the 
result of symptom interference, this also has important implications for the 
treatment of OCD, as it suggests that treating the symptoms would also alleviate 
the EF deficits (rather than teaching compensatory strategies for the EF deficits, 
Snyder et al., 2014).   
Three lines of research support the idea that EF deficits may be 
epiphenomena of OCD. First, there is evidence that state factors, such as 
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anxiety, have a negative impact on cognitive performance (e.g. Eysenck, 
Derakshan, Santos & Calvo, 2007). Second, individuals with OCD are more 
likely to report interference from a range of OCD symptoms (e.g. obsessions 
or compulsions) during a range of neuropsychological tasks, than nonclinical 
controls (Moritz, Hottenrott, Jelinek, Brooks, & Scheurich, 2012). Third, 
research has found improvements in EF test performance following treatment 
for OCD (Kuelz et al., 2006; Moritz, Kloss, Katenkkamp, Birkenr, & Hand, 
1999; Nakao et al., 2005).  Overall, it seems plausible that state factors, 
including OITs or compulsions, could account for the EF deficits found in 
individuals with OCD.  
The Executive Overload Model of OCD was developed to explain the 
impact of state factors on EFs (Abramovitch, Dar, Hermesh & Schweiger, 
2012). This model posits that an “overflow” of OITs in individuals with OCD, 
consumes cognitive resources and impairs performance on EF tasks. However, 
the model is in its infancy and to date, no studies have tested the claims of the 
model. Further research is therefore needed to test the Executive Overload 
Model of OCD, and to assess the impact of state variables on EF performance 
more generally (this is the aim of chapter three). 
1.4: Thesis overview 
This thesis investigates how EFs relate to obsessive-compulsive 
symptomatology. Three unresolved questions are addressed that may help to 
elucidate the relationship between EFs and OCD, and provide information 
which can be used to update cognitive theories of OCD: 1) Do individuals with 
subclinical OCD demonstrate EF deficits? (chapter two) 2) Can OITs lead to 
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observable deficits in EFs? (chapter three) 3) Do individual differences in EF 
predict an individual’s ability to dismiss OITs? (chapter four). 
Chapter 2: Executive functioning in subclinical obsessive-compulsive disorder 
Chapter two presents an experimental study which investigates the EF 
profile of individuals with subclinical OCD. Nonclinical individuals and 
individuals with subclinical OCD performed a range of EF tasks. To ensure the 
sample represented individuals with subclinical levels of obsessive-compulsive 
symptomatology, individuals who may have had undiagnosed OCD were 
carefully excluded using empirically derived clinical cut-off scores on a 
measure of OCD symptomatology (OCI-R).  No differences were found 
between individuals with subclinical OCD and nonclinical individuals on tasks 
measuring working memory, inhibition, or cognitive flexibility. One possible 
explanation for these findings is that EF deficits found previously in individuals 
with OCD may be caused by symptom interference. Symptoms experienced by 
individuals with subclinical OCD, in the current study, may not have been 
severe enough to cause interference in the EF tasks. 
Chapter 3: Mechanisms of OCD: Do obsessive-intrusive thoughts impair 
working memory? 
Chapter three reports an experimental study which investigates whether 
OCD symptom interference (particularly OITs) can lead to deficits in EF 
(specifically, in working memory). This study was designed to investigate 
whether EF deficits are epiphenomena of OCD symptoms. More specifically, 
the study was designed to test a key prediction of the Executive Overload 
Model of OCD: does an increase in OITs lead to working memory deficits? A 
nonclinical sample was recruited; one group were primed with OITs and 
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another group were not. Following this, all participants completed a working 
memory task. No differences were found in working memory between the two 
groups. These findings do not support the Executive Overload Model of OCD, 
and suggest that an increase in OITs does not lead to working memory deficits.  
Chapter 4: The relationship between working memory and obsessive intrusive 
thought dismissibility. 
Chapter four presents a study which investigates the mechanism that 
may link EF deficits (specifically working memory) to OCD symptoms. More 
specifically, the study aimed to investigate whether individual differences in 
working memory explained differences in an individual’s ability to dismiss 
OITs. Participants completed a working memory task and a thought 
dismissibility task, where they were asked to dismiss OITs by replacing them 
with neutral thoughts. Based on limited previous research it was predicted that 
OIT dismissal would be related to working memory capacity; however, this 
hypothesis was not supported. This finding suggests that working memory is 
not implicated in an individual’s ability to dismiss OITs.  
Chapter 5: General discussion  
Chapter 5 provides a summary and discussion of the results from this thesis. In 
particular, the lack of support for both the trait and state account of EF deficits 
on OCD is discussed. Future directions are suggested and include further 
testing of the Executive Overload Model of OCD, and the investigation of EFs 
in individuals with different sub-types of OCD. 
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Chapter 2: Executive functioning in subclinical 
obsessive-compulsive disorder 
The current chapter aims to investigate the question of whether 
individuals experiencing subclinical levels of obsessive-compulsive 
symptomatology (or subclinical OCD, for short) demonstrate executive 
function (EF) deficits. First I will describe why it is important to find out more 
about the EF profiles of individuals with subclinical OCD. Next, I will present 
evidence which has investigated EFs in individuals with subclinical OCD, and 
explain why it is difficult to draw strong conclusions from the available 
evidence. Finally, I will introduce the present study, and describe how it will 
overcome some methodological issues found in previous studies. 
The importance of investigating executive functioning in subclinical obsessive-
compulsive disorder 
Research into subclinical OCD is important as it can reveal information 
about the development and maintenance of OCD. There is a small amount of 
evidence to suggest that individuals with subclinical OCD are at increased risk 
of developing OCD (Black, Gaffney, Schlosser, & Gabel, 2003;  Fullana et al., 
2009). Based on this, it would be expected that any proposed endophenotypes 
of OCD would also be found in individuals with subclinical OCD. 
Endophenotypes are any variable that links genes to symptoms of a given 
disorder, and could be biochemical, neuropsychological, neuroanotomical, or 
cognitive variables, amongst others (Cannon & Keller, 2006; Gottesman & 
Gould, 2003). In other words, endophenotypes of OCD are variables that 
increase an individual’s risk of developing OCD. Identifying endophenotypes 
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of OCD, therefore, has important implications for early intervention into OCD. 
Research which finds proposed endophenotypes for OCD in individuals with 
subclinical OCD would support the idea that proposed endophenotypes are in 
fact endophenotypes whereas research which does not demonstrate the 
presence of proposed endophenotypes of OCD in individual with subclinical 
OCD would suggest that they are not endophenotypes.  
Importantly, the evidence suggesting individuals with subclinical OCD 
are at increased risk of developing OCD is weak and has mainly looked at 
subclinical obsessive-compulsive symptoms in children (Black et al., 2003;  
Fullana et al., 2009). It therefore cannot be concluded, with confidence, that 
those with subclinical OCD are at increased risk of developing clinical OCD. 
It may be that in those with subclinical OCD, symptoms either persist at a 
subclinical level, or reduce further to a nonclinical level over time. If 
individuals with subclinical OCD are not at increased risk of developing OCD, 
then this would have important implications for research looking for candidate 
endophenotypes in those with subclinical OCD. More specifically, it would 
suggest that not finding a candidate endophenotype of OCD in those with 
subclinical OCD does not necessarily mean that it is not an endophenotype. It 
may suggest, for example, that a lack of the candidate endophenotype in 
individuals with subclinical OCD serves as a protective factor from developing 
the disorder. Identifying such protective factors could help inform interventions 
designed to prevent the development of OCD.  
Executive function deficits have been proposed as candidate 
endophenotypes of OCD, and would therefore be useful to investigate in 
individuals with subclinical OCD (e.g. Chamberlain, Blackwell, Fineberg, 
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Robbins, Sahakian, 2005; Taylor, 2012). Executive functions (EFs) are a set of 
cognitive control abilities that allow individuals to regulate their thoughts and 
behaviours (e.g. Miyake & Friedman, 2012).  In support of the idea that EFs 
are endophenotypes of OCD is a large body of research that has demonstrated 
EF deficits in individuals with OCD (Abramovitch, Abramowitz, & Mittelman, 
2013; Shin, Lee, Kim, & Kwon, 2014; Snyder, Kaiser, Warren, & Heller, 
2014). Further support for this idea comes from the finding that EF deficits do 
not improve after treatment for OCD (e.g. Kim et al., 2002; Nielen & Den Boer, 
2003; Roh et al., 2005). If it was the case that EF deficits were also found in 
individuals with subclinical OCD, this would add further weight to the idea that 
EF deficits are endophenotypes of OCD. 
In contrast to this, if EF deficits were not found in individuals with 
subclinical OCD, then the interpretation of the finding is more difficult, as it 
could suggest one of (at least) two things. First, that EF deficits are not 
endophenotypes of OCD. If EF deficits are not endophenotypes of OCD, it may 
be that they are caused by severe symptom interference, which would be 
present in clinical OCD but not subclinical OCD. In other words, troublesome 
symptoms, such as OITs, may interfere with EF task performance (e.g. by 
increasing anxiety), leading to apparent EF deficits. An alternative explanation 
would be that EF deficits are endophenotypes of OCD, but they are not present 
in individuals with subclinical OCD, as intact EFs serve as protective factors 
from the development of OCD. In other words, although individuals with 
subclinical OCD experience troubling symptoms of OCD, these symptoms 
either persist, or improve, due to better EFs (compared to those who develop 
OCD).  
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Clarifying the EF profile of individuals with subclinical OCD clearly 
has important implications for our understanding of the development and 
maintenance of OCD. However, relatively little research has investigated EFs 
in those with subclinical OCD. Studies in this area are generally conducted in 
a similar manner; two groups of participants are recruited (nonclinical and 
subclinical OCD) and their performance on a range of EF tasks is compared. 
Despite these similarities, the method of measuring EF varies between studies, 
as does the method of operationalising OCD. As a result, it is currently difficult 
to draw strong conclusions about the EF profiles of individuals with subclinical 
OCD. There are theoretical reasons to expect that individuals with subclinical 
OCD would demonstrate EF deficits. More specifically, although not an official 
diagnostic category, subclinical OCD can be thought of as a milder form of 
OCD (e.g. Gibbs, 1996; Grabe et al., 2000), and so it would be surprising if the 
cognitive profiles of individuals with subclinical OCD and clinical OCD 
differed. Indeed, there is evidence demonstrating a range of OCD-relevant 
variables exist on a continuum, rather than as discrete categories (e.g. OCD vs 
nonclinical) (e.g. Abramovitch et al., 2014; Berry & Laskey, 2012; Clark & 
Rhyno, 2005).  Despite these theoretical reasons to expect individuals with 
subclinical OCD would demonstrate EF deficits, findings from this area are 
largely inconsistent and contradictory.  
Are there executive function deficits in subclinical obsessive-compulsive 
disorder? 
 In support of the idea that individuals with subclinical OCD 
demonstrate EF deficits, Abramovitch, Shaham, Levin, Bar-hen, and 
Schweiger (2015) compared inhibition abilities of twenty-seven individuals 
Investigating the relationship between obsessive-compulsive symptomatology and executive functions. 
 
42 
 
with subclinical OCD and twenty-seven nonclinical individuals. Individuals 
allocated to the subclinical OCD group were those who scored more than one 
standard deviation above the sample mean on an OCD symptom measure 
(Obsessive-Compulsive Inventory-Revised, OCI-R; Foa et al., 2002). 
Individuals in the nonclinical group were those who scored less than one 
standard deviation below the sample mean score on the OCI-R. Inhibition was 
measured using the Expanded Go/No Go Task (Neurotrax, 2003), whereby 
participants were required to respond as quickly as possible to a sequence of 
coloured squares by clicking a mouse button. Participants were also given a 
rule that instructed them not to click on a particular coloured square, and 
therefore had to inhibit this prepotent response. Individuals with subclinical 
OCD performed poorer on the Expanded Go/No Go task than nonclinical 
indivuals. This finding suggests that, similarly to individuals with OCD, 
individuals with subclinical OCD have inhibitory deficits.  
Further support for the idea that individuals with subclinical OCD 
demonstrate EF deficits comes from a range of studies demonstrating poorer 
cognitive flexibility in individuals with subclinical OCD than nonclinical 
individuals (Wisconsin Card Sorting Task, WCST; Kim et al. 2009; Goodwin 
& Sher, 1992; Berg Card Sorting Task; BCST, Berg, 1948; Sternheim, Van Der 
Burgh, Berkhout, Dekker & Ruitter, 2014). For example, Kim, Jang, and Kim 
(2009) recruited twenty-one individuals with subclinical OCD and twenty 
nonclinical individuals. Individuals allocated to the subclinical OCD group 
were those who scored in the top three percent on two OCD symptom measures 
(Padua Inventory, PI, Sanavio, 1998; Maudsley Obsessive Compulsive 
Inventory, MOCI, Hodgson & Rachman, 1977) out of a sample of 670 students. 
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Those allocated to the nonclinical group were those who received “average” 
scores on the two measures. Cognitive flexibility was measured using the 
WCST (Kim et al., 2009); whereby participants were required to sort cards 
based on an unknown rule. Each card varied based on shape, colour, and 
number, and participants were required to deduce the currently appropriate 
sorting rule based on “correct” or “incorrect” feedback from the experimenter. 
Those with subclinical OCD performed poorer than the nonclinical individuals 
on the WCST. This finding suggests that, similarly to individuals with OCD, 
those with subclinical OCD demonstrate cognitive flexibility deficits.  
 In contrast to the research demonstrating EF deficits in individuals with 
subclinical OCD, there is evidence suggesting no differences between EFs in 
those with subclinical OCD and nonclinical individuals (Johansen & Dittrich, 
2013; Mataix-Cols, et al., 1999, Sahakian and Owens, 1992; Spitznagel & Suhr, 
2002). Further to this, there is some evidence, surprisingly, demonstrating 
superior EF in those with subclinical OCD than nonclinical individuals 
(Johansen & Dittrich, 2013; Soref et al., 2008). Johansen and Dittrich (2013) 
administered a working memory task (Spatial Working Memory Task; SWMT 
from the Cambridge Neuropsychological Test Automated Battery; CANTAB) 
to twenty-six individuals with subclinical OCD and twenty-three nonclinical 
individuals. Individuals were allocated to the subclinical OCD group if they 
had scored above the sample mean on a measure of OCD symptomatology 
(Yale-Brown Obsessive-Compulsive Scale, Y-BOCS; Goodman et al., 1989) 
and a measure of cognitive and executive impairments associated with OCD 
(Cognitive Assessment Instrument of Obsessions and Compulsions, CAOIC; 
Dittrich, Johansen, & Fineberg, 2011). Individuals with subclinical OCD 
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performed better on the SWMT than the nonclinical individuals. This finding 
suggests that individuals with subclinical OCD have superior working memory 
to nonclinical individuals. Such a finding differentiates those with subclinical 
OCD from those with clinical OCD, as those with clinical OCD demonstrate 
working memory deficits (e.g. Snyder et al., 2014).  
 In contrast to evidence demonstrating inhibition deficits in individuals 
with subclinical OCD (Abramovitch et al., 2015), there is evidence 
demonstrating individuals with subclinical OCD have better inhibitory abilities 
than nonclinical individuals. Soref, Dar, Argov, and Meiran (2008) recruited 
ten individuals with subclinical OCD and ten nonclinical individuals. All 
participants were administered the letter version of the flanker task (Eriksen & 
Eriksen, 1974). Participants were allocated to the subclinical OCD group if they 
had scored within the top quartile of scores on an OCD symptom measure (the 
OCI-R; Foa et al., 2002), from a sample of 171 students. Nonclinical 
individuals had all scored within the bottom quartile of scores on the same OCD 
symptom measure. For the flanker task, participants were required to classify a 
letter (H or S) which was flanked by compatible (e.g. HHHHH) or incompatible 
(e.g. SSHSS) letters. Individuals with subclinical OCD performed better on the 
flanker task than nonclinical individuals, reflected by lower inhibition 
interference costs (i.e. response time of incompatible trials minus response time 
of the compatible trials). This finding suggests that individuals with subclinical 
OCD demonstrate superior inhibitory abilities than nonclinical individuals. 
Such a finding differentiates those with subclinical OCD from those with 
clinical OCD, as those with clinical OCD demonstrate inhibitory deficits (e.g. 
Snyder et al., 2014). 
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 There is also evidence demonstrating no difference between nonclinical 
individuals and those with subclinical OCD in cognitive flexibility, 
contradicting the previously discussed findings which showed a deficit in those 
with subclinical OCD (Intra/Extradimensional Shift Test, Sahakian and Owens, 
1992; Johansen & Dittrich, 2013; WCST, Mataix-Cols, Barrios, Sánchez-
Turet, Vallejo, Junqué, 1999, Spitznagel & Suhr, 2002). For example, Mataix-
Cols et al. (1999) administered the WCST (Heaton, 1981) to thirty-five 
individuals with subclinical OCD and thirty-six nonclinical individuals. 
Individuals were included in the subclinical OCD group if they scored more 
than one standard deviation above the sample mean on a measure of OCD (PI, 
Sanavio, 1998) and were included in the nonclinical group if they scored more 
than one standard deviation below the sample mean on the same measure. There 
was no difference on the WCST performance between the two groups. This 
finding suggests that individuals with subclinical OCD do not demonstrate 
cognitive flexibility deficits. Such a finding differentiates those with subclinical 
OCD from those with clinical OCD, as those with clinical OCD demonstrate 
cognitive flexibility deficits (e.g. Snyder et al., 2014) 
 Evidently, the state of EF profiles in individuals with subclinical OCD 
is currently unclear, reflected by a range of contradictory findings. 
Methodological variations within the literature make it even more difficult to 
draw strong conclusions about the state of EFs in subclinical OCD. Interpreting 
the available research whilst accounting for these variations in methodology is 
crucial for gaining a deeper understanding of executive functioning in 
individuals with subclinical OCD.  
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One factor that may explain some of the contradictory findings in this 
area is that some groups with subclinical OCD may have included individuals 
with undiagnosed OCD. In other words, it may well be that individuals with 
subclinical OCD do not demonstrate EF deficits, but they sometimes appear to 
show EF deficits due to the inclusion of large numbers of individuals with 
OCD. In support of this idea, Kim et al. (2009) found individuals with 
subclinical OCD performed poorer on the WCST than nonclinical individuals, 
but Mataix-Cols et al. (1999) did not find such a difference when using the 
same task. However, Kim et al. (2009) operationalised subclinical OCD using 
a more conservative cut-off score than Mataix-Cols et al. (1999)  (top 3% of 
scorers on two OCD measures: MOCI; Hodson & Rachman, 1977, & PI; 
Sanavio, 1998 vs one standard deviation above sample mean on the PI). It is 
therefore highly likely that Kim et al. (2009) included many more individuals 
with undiagnosed OCD than Mataix-Cols et al. (1999), thus potentially 
skewing the results to more closely reflect EF profiles in OCD than subclinical 
OCD. Indeed, previously it has been found that around three-quarters of 
individuals, who fall in the top three percent of scorers on a measure of OCD, 
have  OCD (Lee, Yost, & Telch, 2009; Lee & Telch, 2010). To the author’s 
knowledge, no studies investigating the executive functioning of individuals 
with subclinical OCD have attempted to exclude individuals with undiagnosed 
OCD. Future research investigating EFs in subclinical OCD, therefore, needs 
to carefully exclude individuals with undiagnosed OCD.  
To summarise the evidence so far, the relatively small number of studies 
that have investigated EFs in subclinical OCD have produced a range of 
contradictory findings, making it impossible to draw strong conclusions. One 
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strong possibility is that individuals with subclinical OCD do not demonstrate 
EF deficits, and this would become apparent if individuals with undiagnosed 
OCD were excluded from studies. If this were the case, it would suggest that 
intact EFs serve as a protective factor against the development of OCD, or that 
previous EF deficits found in OCD were caused by severe symptom 
interference (e.g. a large number of OITs; Abramovitch, Dar, Hermesh, & 
Schweiger, 2012). However, another strong possibility is that individuals with 
subclinical OCD do demonstrate EF deficits, and findings which demonstrate 
otherwise are spurious. Indeed, there are many other similarities between 
subclinical OCD and clinical OCD (e.g. appraisals, OIT frequency, etc. 
Abramowitz et al., 2014) and it would be plausible that there are also 
similarities in EF profiles. If individuals with subclinical OCD do demonstrate 
deficits, this would support the idea that EF deficits are endophenotypes of 
OCD. Further research is clearly needed to investigate the EF profiles of 
individuals with subclinical OCD. 
Important methodological considerations 
Given the lack of consistency concerning EFs in subclinical OCD, it is 
particularly important that studies in this area carefully consider a range of 
methodological factors, which have varied significantly throughout the 
literature. One such consideration is how best to operationalise OCD (as 
previously discussed). More specifically, it is important that studies exclude 
individuals with undiagnosed OCD, so that the samples more accurately 
represent subclinical OCD. One convenient method of doing this is to exclude 
individuals who score over empirically derived clinical cut-off scores of 
questionnaire measures (Abramowitz et al., 2014). These clinical cut-off scores 
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have been empirically derived and are able to distinguish between individuals 
with OCD and the rest of the general population. For example, individuals who 
score 21 or over on the OCI-R (Foa et al., 2002) are likely to have OCD. Future 
studies, therefore, could quickly exclude individuals with OCD by excluding 
all individuals who score 21 or over on the OCI-R.  
A second methodological consideration for future studies investigating 
the EF profiles of individuals with subclinical OCD is choosing accurate and 
stringent EF measures. Some of the tasks used previously to measure EFs are 
broad in measurement, capturing several EFs in the same task, and making it 
difficult to draw conclusions about specific EFs. Of note, is the commonly used 
WCST, which not only requires cognitive flexibility, but also abstract thinking 
and concept formation (Barcelo, 2001) as well as working memory and 
inhibition (Cinan & Tanör, 2002). Based on this, it cannot be concluded 
whether individuals with subclinical OCD who perform poorer on the WCST 
than nonclinical individuals (e.g. Kim et al., 2009), are demonstrating cognitive 
flexibility deficits, or deficits in some other area, such as working memory. A 
more stringent measure of cognitive flexibility is the Switching, Inhibition and 
Flexibility Task (SwIFT; FitzGibbon, Cragg & Carroll, 2014). For this task, 
participants are required to sort stimuli by either shape or colour, on a computer. 
This task differs from the WCST, in that participants do not have to infer the 
rule by which they are required to sort; they are told what the rule is. This 
reduces ambiguity and incidental demands of the task, and means that it is a 
more stringent measure of cognitive flexibility than the WCST. Future studies 
looking to measure cognitive flexibility, therefore, should use a more stringent 
task such as the SwIFT.  
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 A third consideration for future studies in this area is the impact of 
confounding variables. In particular, depression and anxiety have been found 
to moderate neuropsychological test performance (e.g. Basso, Bornstein, 
Carona, & Morton, 2001; Moritz, Fricke & Hand, 2001; Bédard, Joyal, 
Godbout, & Chantal, 2009; Eysenck, Derakshan, Santos & Calvo, 2007) and 
should therefore be accounted for when comparing EFs between two groups. 
However, a recent review of the literature concluded that there are no factors 
which have reliably demonstrated a confounding effect on EFs (Abramovitch 
& Cooperman, 2015). In addition, those studies that have controlled for 
depression when comparing EFs in individuals with subclinical OCD and 
nonclinical individuals, have found significant differences between the groups, 
suggesting depressive symptoms do not explain the differences (Abramovitch 
et al., 2015; Kim et al., 2009). Due to the lack of clarity surrounding the impact 
of depression and anxiety on EF performance, it is vital that future research 
takes full account of depressive and anxious symptomatology. 
The present study 
The present study aims to investigate the EF profiles of individuals with 
subclinical OCD. The key question of the present study, therefore, is whether 
individuals with subclinical OCD demonstrate poorer EFs than nonclinical 
individuals. This question will be answered by comparing individuals with 
subclinical OCD, and a group of nonclinical individuals, on tasks assessing 
working memory, inhibition, and cognitive flexibility. Efforts were made to 
exclude individuals with undiagnosed OCD. Executive function tasks were 
carefully selected to represent stringent measures of each construct, and 
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confounding variables (depression and anxiety) were measured and controlled 
for. 
Working memory was assessed by the Digit Span Backward Subscale 
of WAIS (WAIS DSB - The Psychological Corporation, 1997). For this task, 
participants are required to remember a list of numbers and then recall the same 
list, backwards. Although individuals with OCD generally demonstrate 
working memory deficits (e.g. Snyder et al., 2014), no differences in 
performance between individuals with OCD and nonclinical individuals have 
repeatedly been found on the WAIS DSB (e.g. Snyder et al., 2014; Segalas et 
al., 2008; Krishna et al., 2011). Due to the similarities between subclinical OCD 
and clinical OCD, it was therefore hypothesised that there would be no 
differences between individuals with subclinical OCD and nonclinical 
individuals on the WAIS DSB.  
Inhibitory control was assessed by the arrow version of the flanker task 
(Eriksen & Eriksen, 1974). This task differs slightly to the flanker task used by 
Soref et al. (2008), in that the central stimuli is an arrow (rather than a letter), 
flanked by arrows either facing in the same direction or in the opposite 
direction. Based on the wealth of evidence that individuals with OCD 
demonstrate inhibition deficits (Abramovitch et al., 2013; Shin et al., 2014; 
Snyder et al., 2014), it was hypothesised that individuals with subclinical OCD 
would perform poorer than nonclinical individuals on the flanker task.  
Cognitive flexibility was assessed using the Switching, Inhibition and 
Flexibility Task (SwIFT; FitzGibbon, Cragg & Carroll, 2014). This task has 
not yet been used with individuals with OCD or those with subclinical OCD. 
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Based on the wealth of evidence demonstrated cognitive flexibility deficits in 
individuals with OCD (Abramovitch et al., 2013; Shin et al., 2014; Snyder et 
al., 2014), it was hypothesised that individuals with subclinical OCD would 
perform poorer than nonclinical individuals on the SwIFT task. 
To summarise the study’s hypotheses: 
Hypotheses: 
There will be no difference in working memory between individuals with 
subclinical OCD and nonclinical individuals. 
Individuals with subclinical OCD will demonstrate poorer inhibition than 
nonclinical individuals. 
Individuals with subclinical OCD will demonstrate poorer cognitive flexibility 
than nonclinical individuals. 
2.1: Method 
Design 
The experiment had a one-way, independent samples design. The independent 
variable was obsessive-compulsive symptom group, with two levels: 
nonclinical and subclinical. There were five primary dependent variables: one 
working memory variable (total score on the Digit Span Backward Subscale of 
WAIS: WAIS DSB; The Psychological Corporation, 1997), two cognitive 
flexibility variables (reaction time and accuracy scores on the Switching 
Inhibition and Flexibility Task, SwIFT; FitzGibbon, Cragg & Carroll, 2014), 
and two inhibition variables (reaction time and accuracy scores on the flanker 
task; Eriksen & Eriksen, 1974). Control variables were depression and anxiety 
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scores (as measured on the Depression Anxiety and Stress Scale, DASS; 
Lovibond & Lovibond, 1995).  
Participants 
Staff and students from The University of Sheffield were invited to take part in 
the study via e-mail. Three hundred and four participants showed interest in 
participating in the study. Before the study began, all participates were screened 
for the study based on their scores on the Obsessive-Compulsive Inventory-
Revised (OCI-R; Foa et al., 2002). Individuals were invited to participate in the 
study if they scored below the empirically derived clinical cut-off of 21 on the 
OCI-R (Foa et al., 2002) and reported no previous diagnosis of OCD. This 
exclusion criterion was used to ensure that the sample represented subclinical 
OCD and nonclinical samples, and not samples of individuals with OCD. As a 
result of the screening procedure 195 were invited to participate in the study. 
Of these participants, 54 (19 males, 34 females, 1 ‘other’ but did not specify; 
mean age = 24 years; age range = 18-48 years) agreed and completed the study. 
A median split of OCI-R scores created two groups (based on a median OCI-R 
score of 11): a subclinical OCD group (n = 27; mean age = 22 years; 14 males, 
12 females, 1 other) and a nonclinical group (n = 27; mean age = 26 years; 5 
males, 22 females). See table 1 for further comparisons between the two groups. 
Participants provided informed consent and received either course credits or £5 
cash reimbursement for their time.  
Materials 
Questionnaires 
The Obsessive Compulsive Inventory – Revised (OCI-R; Foa et al., 
2002) is an 18-item measure used to assess OCD symptoms. The OCI-R 
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comprises a list of symptoms (e.g. “I check things more often than necessary”) 
for which participants indicate on a scale from 0 (“not at all”) to 4 (“extremely”) 
how distressed the symptoms have made them in the past month. Items cover 
six sub-scales: (a) washing, (b) checking/doubting, (c) obsessing, (d) mental 
neutralizing, (e) ordering, and (f) hoarding. Total score of the OCI-R was 
calculated by summing all the items. Scores on the OCI-R range from 0-72 with 
higher scores indicating higher levels of OCD symptomatology. The 
recommended cut-off score for the OCI-R is 21, with scores at or above this 
level indicating the likely presence of OCD (Foa et al., 2002). The OCI-R has 
demonstrated good psychometric properties in nonclinical participants; 
excellent internal consistency (α = .89), good test-retest reliability (1 week – r 
= .84), and convergent validity (significant positive correlations were found 
with the OCI-R and a range of OCD measures; Foa et al., 2002). Discriminant 
validity was mixed, with high correlations between the OCI-R and Beck 
Depression Inventory (BDI; r = .7); however, this is common across all OCD 
symptom measures (Foa et al., 2002). The internal consistency of the OCI-R, 
in this study, was α = .48. The internal consistency of the OCI-R subscales was: 
washing, α = .61; checking/doubting, α = .53; obsessing, α = .88; mental 
neutralizing, α = .47; ordering, and hoarding, α = .77.  
The Depression Anxiety and Stress Scale (DASS; Lovibond & 
Lovibond, 1995) is a 42-item measure of depression, anxiety and stress. 
Participants were presented with statements (e.g. “I found myself getting upset 
by quite trivial things”) and were required to indicate how much each statement 
applied to them in the past month, on a scale from 0 (“did not apply to me at 
all”) to 3 (“applied to me very much or most of the time”). Scores for 
Investigating the relationship between obsessive-compulsive symptomatology and executive functions. 
 
54 
 
depression, anxiety, and stress are calculated by summing the items for each 
subscale, with higher scores indicating higher levels of each construct. Scores 
on the depression subscale range from 0-42 (0-9 = normal; 10-13 = mild; 14-
20 = moderate; 21-27 = severe; 28-42 = very severe), scores on the anxiety 
subscale range from 0-42 (0-7 = normal; 8-9 = mild; 10-14 = moderate; 15-19 
= severe; 20-42 = very severe), and scores on the stress subscale range from 0-
42 (0-14 = normal; 15-18 = mild; 19-25 = moderate; 26-33 = severe; 34-42 = 
very severe). The DASS has demonstrated excellent internal consistency (α 
=.92 -.97 for a sample of individuals with OCD and nonclinical individuals; 
Antony, Bieling, Cox, Enns, & Swinson, 1998), and good convergent and 
divergent validity (when compared with other measures of depression and 
anxiety in nonclinical individuals and those with OCD; Antony et al., 1998). In 
this study, the internal consistency for each subscale was: depression (α = .95), 
anxiety (α = .91), & stress (α = .94).  
Executive function tasks  
A computerised version of the flanker task (Eriksen & Eriksen, 1974) 
was used to measure inhibition. The flanker task was completed on a computer 
with a 17-inch monitor and running E-Prime 2.0 software (Psychology 
Software Tools, Inc., Pittsburgh, PA).  Participants were required to indicate 
the direction that a central arrow was pointing in (either left or right), by 
pressing a key. The arrow was surrounded by either 1) four arrows pointing in 
the same direction (congruent trials), 2) four arrows pointing in the opposite 
direction (incongruent trials), or 3) four Xs (neutral trials). Participants 
completed 18 practice trials followed by 144 experimental trials (48 congruent, 
48 incongruent, 48 neutral). Stimuli were presented in a pseudorandomized 
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order. Two dependent variables were computed for the flanker task: reaction 
time interference cost, and accuracy interference cost. Interference costs were 
calculated as the difference in reaction times between congruent and 
incongruent flanker trials. This interference cost reflects an individual’s ability 
to inhibit a prepotent response to the distractor arrows, such that a higher 
interference cost represents poorer inhibition. 
The Switching, Inhibition and Flexibility Task (SwIFT; FitzGibbon, 
Cragg & Carroll, 2014) was used to measure cognitive flexibility. The SwIFT 
was completed on a computer with a 17-inch monitor and running E-Prime 2.0 
software (Psychology Software Tools, Inc., Pittsburgh, PA).  Participants were 
required to sort bivalent stimuli by one of two rules (colour or shape) by 
pressing one of two keys. The rules were pseudo-randomized so that on 50% 
of trials participants would have to match stimuli on the same rule as the 
previous trial (e.g. “shape” then “shape”) and on 50% of trials participants 
would have to match stimuli on a different rule to the previous trial (e.g. 
“colour” then “shape”). Participants completed three mixed blocks of 48 trials 
each. Two dependent variables were computed for the SwIFT: reaction time 
switch cost and accuracy switch cost. Switch costs were calculated as the 
difference between non-switch trials and switch trials. This switch cost reflects 
an individual’s ability to adapt to the changing rules of the task, such that a 
higher switch cost represents poorer cognitive flexibility.  
The Digit Span Backward Subscale of WAIS (WAIS DSB - The 
Psychological Corporation, 1997) was used to assess working memory. The 
experimenter read out a series of short strings of digits to the participant (e.g. 
3, 8, 4) who was then required to repeat back each string in a backwards order 
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(e.g. 4, 8, 3). Participants were presented with seven blocks of two trials each. 
The length of the strings of digits increased throughout each block, beginning 
with two digits and finishing with eight digits. The task ended when 
participants made two errors on a single block. Participants scored 1 mark for 
each trial that they answered correctly. The maximum possible score was 14. 
Procedure 
Individuals were first screened online, using the survey platform Qualtrics, 
where they completed the OCI-R (Foa et al., 2002) and the DASS (Lovibond 
& Lovibond, 1995). Individuals who were eligible, and willing, to participate 
in the study (those who scored lower than the clinical cut-off on the OCI-R) 
attended the laboratory to complete the flanker task, followed by the SwIFT 
and WAIS DSB. The order of the tasks was the same for all participants. 
Participants sat approximately 80 cm from the screen. 
2.2: Results 
Demographic characteristics 
Demographic and clinical characteristics of the nonclinical and subclinical 
OCD groups are provided in Table 1. Between-group differences in 
demographic information were examined with analysis of variance (ANOVA; 
age, OCI-R score, DASS depression score, DASS anxiety score, DASS stress 
score) or Pearson’s chi-square analysis (gender), as appropriate. The 
subclinical OCD group scored significantly higher on the OCI-R than the 
nonclinical group, demonstrating that the groups differed significantly in their 
OCD symptoms. The nonclinical group were significantly older than the 
subclinical OCD group and had significantly fewer males than the subclinical 
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OCD group. In addition, the subclinical OCD group scored significantly higher 
on the depression subscale of the DASS. No significant differences were found 
between the two groups on the anxiety or stress subscales of the DASS.  
Table 1 - Demographic and clinical characteristics  
 Nonclinical (n = 
27) 
Subclinical OCD 
(n = 27) 
Analysis 
 Mean (SD) Mean (SD)   
Age (years) 25.85 (7.87) 22.15 (4.06) F(1, 52) = 
4.72, p = 0.03, 
η² = .083 
Male: Female 5: 22 14: 12a χ²(1) = 7.18, p 
= -.007b 
OCI-R Total  
(Max score 72; 
clinical cut-off < 
21)  
7.86 (1.75) 15.4 (2.25) F(1, 52) = 
189.1, p < 
0.001, η² = .78 
DASS 
Depression 
Total 
(Max score 42; 
normal; 0-9; 
moderate 14-20; 
extremely severe 
28+) 
11.56 (7.32) 17.04 (10.41) F(1, 52) = 
5.01, p = 0.03, 
η² = .088 
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DASS Anxiety 
Total 
(Max score 42 
normal 0-7 
moderate 10-14; 
extremely severe 
20+) 
9.7 (6.78) 12.26 (8.16) F(1, 52) = 
1.57, p = .216, 
η² = .029 
DASS Stress 
Total 
(Max score 42; 
normal 0-14; 
moderate 19-25; 
extremely severe 
34+) 
13.41 (7.59) 18.26 (10.83) F(1, 52) = 
3.64, p = .062, 
η² = .065 
 
* = significant at p = 0.05 level 
a = 1 participant stated gender as “other” (not specified) 
b = excluded “other” as this participant does not identify as a male or 
female and therefore cannot be included in the gender comparison 
analysis. 
Relationship between depression, anxiety, gender and executive functions 
As differences were found in depression, age, and gender scores 
between those in the subclinical OCD group and the nonclinical group, a series 
of Pearson’s correlation analyses and point-biserial correlation analyses were 
run to explore the relationships between depression, anxiety, gender, age, and 
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cognitive flexibility (SwIFT reaction time switch cost and SwIFT accuracy 
switch cost), inhibition (flanker reaction time interference cost and flanker 
reaction time interference cost), and working memory (BDS total score). No 
significant relationships were observed between any of the variables. More 
specifically, no significant relationships were observed between depression and 
SwIFT reaction time switch cost (r[54] = .26, p = .054); depression and SwIFT 
accuracy switch cost (r[54] = -.06, p = .666); depression and flanker reaction 
time interference (r[54] = -.09, p = .497); depression and flanker accuracy 
interference cost (r[54] = .01, p = .922); or depression and BDS total score 
(r[54] = -.17, p = .22).  
As with depression, no significant relationships were found between 
anxiety and SwIFT reaction time switch cost (r[54] = .09, p = .521); anxiety 
and SwIFT accuracy switch cost (r[54] = -.18, p = .19); anxiety and flanker 
reaction time interference (r[54] = -.16, p = .244); anxiety and flanker accuracy 
interference cost (r[54] = .11, p = .44); or depression and BDS total score (r[54] 
= -.16, p = .25 ).  
As with depression and anxiety, no significant relationships were found 
between gender and SwIFT reaction time switch cost (rpb = -.01, n = 54, p = 
.93); gender and SwIFT accuracy switch cost (rpb = .06, n = 54, p = .66); gender 
and flanker reaction time interference (rpb = .01, n = 54, p = .92); gender and 
flanker accuracy interference cost (rpb = .03, n = 54, p = .83); or depression and 
BDS total score (rpb = -.18, n = 54, p = .19).  
Finally, no significant relationships were found between age and SwIFT 
reaction time switch cost (r[54] = -.23, p = .095); age and SwIFT accuracy 
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switch cost (r[54] = .21, p = .121); age and flanker reaction time interference 
(r[54] = .01, p = .94); age and flanker accuracy interference cost (r[54] = -.21, 
p = .13); or age and BDS total score (r[54] = -.17, p = .209). Due to the lack of 
relationships between depression, anxiety, gender, and age, and each of the EF 
measures, none of the variables were controlled for in the following analyses. 
Are there working memory differences between individuals with subclinical 
obsessive-compulsive disorder and nonclinical individuals? 
In order to explore whether there were any differences in working memory 
between the subclinical OCD group and the nonclinical group, a one-way 
ANOVA was conducted. Backward digit span total score was entered as a 
dependent variable. ANOVA confirmed no significant differences in BDS 
scores between the subclinical OCD group (M = 7.74, SD = 2.10) and the 
nonclinical group (M = 7.52, SD = 2.23), F(1, 52) = .142, p = 0.708. 
Are there inhibition differences between individuals with subclinical obsessive-
compulsive disorder and nonclinical individuals? 
In order to explore whether there were any differences in inhibition between 
the subclinical OCD group and the nonclinical group, a MANOVA was 
conducted. Flanker reaction time interference cost and flanker accuracy 
interference cost were entered as dependent variables. Using Pillai’s trace, there 
were no significant inhibition differences between individuals with subclinical 
obsessive-compulsive disorder and nonclinical individuals, V = .022, F (2, 51) 
= .583, p = .56.   
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Are there cognitive flexibility differences between individuals with subclinical 
obsessive-compulsive disorder and nonclinical individuals?  
In order to explore whether there were any differences in cognitive flexibility 
between the subclinical OCD group and the nonclinical group, a MANOVA 
was conducted. SwIFT reaction time switch-cost scores and SwIFT accuracy 
switch-cost were entered as dependent variables. Using Pillai’s trace, there 
were no significant cognitive flexibility differences between individuals with 
subclinical obsessive-compulsive disorder and nonclinical individuals, V = 
.101, F (2, 51) = 2.86, p = .07.   
Are there any relationships between obsessive-compulsive symptoms and 
executive functions? 
Relationships between OCD symptoms and each of the EF tasks were explored 
using Pearson’s correlation analysis. No significant relationships between OCD 
symptoms and any of the EF variables were found. A Bonferroni correction 
was made to correct for multiple comparisons, and P-values of <.0125 (.05/4) 
were considered to be significant. No significant relationships were found 
between OCI-R score and SwIFT reaction time switch cost (r[54] = .28, p = 
.04),  SwIFT accuracy switch cost (r[54] = -.14, p = .28), flanker reaction time 
interference cost (r[54] = .14, p = .31), flanker accuracy interference cost (r[54] 
= .09, p = .54), or Backward Digit Span (r[54] = .03, p = .82).  See Appendix 
A for scatter plots of the relationships between OCD symptoms and executive 
functions. 
 Relationships between OIT frequency (as measured by the INPIOS) and 
each of the EF tasks were explored using Pearson’s correlation analysis. No 
significant relationships were found between INPIOS total score and SwIFT 
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reaction time switch cost (r[54] = .048, p = .73),  SwIFT accuracy switch cost 
(r[54] = -.114, p = .41), flanker reaction time interference cost (r[54] = -.125, 
p = .37), flanker accuracy interference cost (r[54] = -.192, p = .16), or Backward 
Digit Span (r[54] = .176, p = .20).  
Are there any executive function differences between individuals with 
subclinical obsessive-compulsive disorder and nonclinical individuals when 
grouped based on a more reliable scale? 
All previous analyses were carried out on individuals with subclinical OCD and 
nonclinical individuals who had been grouped based on their total score of the 
OCI-R. However, in the current study, the internal consistency of the OCI-R 
was low (α = .48). A second set of analyses was therefore conducted whereby 
individuals were grouped based on their scores on an OCI-R subscale 
(obsessing) which had demonstrated a high internal consistency in the current 
study (α = .88). A median split of OCI-R obsessing scores created two groups 
(based on a median score of 2): a subclinical OCD group (n = 25; mean age = 
25 years; 10 males, 15 females) and a nonclinical group (n = 29; mean age = 
23 years; 9 males, 19 females, 1 other). The previously conducted analyses 
(ANOVA, MANOVA, Pearson’s correlation) were carried out on the new 
groups. However, again, no significant differences or relationships were found. 
ANOVAs and MANOVAs revealed no significant differences between 
individuals with subclinical OCD and nonclinical individuals in working 
memory (p = .59), inhibition (p =.09), or cognitive flexibility (p = .82). In 
addition, no significant relationships were found between total scores on the 
obsessing subscale and working memory (p = .40), inhibition (p = .36, p = 44), 
or cognitive flexibility (p = .06, p = 94).  
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2.3: Discussion 
The present study aimed to determine whether individuals with 
subclinical OCD demonstrate EF deficits. In order to determine this, a group of 
individuals with subclinical OCD and a group of nonclinical individuals 
completed three EF tasks. Care was taken to overcome methodological issues 
that had previously been found in research in this area. Specifically, individuals 
who may have had OCD were excluded, stringent tests of each EF were chosen, 
and potential confounding variables were accounted for. Results across three 
separate measures of EF performance indicated that there were no differences 
in EFs between nonclinical and subclinical groups. In contrast to the study 
predictions, no differences were found between individuals categorised as 
having subclinical OCD and nonclinical controls in the areas of cognitive 
flexibility or inhibition. In line with predictions, no differences were found 
between individuals categorised as having subclinical OCD and nonclinical 
controls in working memory. In addition, no relationships were found between 
symptoms of OCD and any of the EF tasks.  
 The lack of difference in inhibition between individuals with subclinical 
OCD and nonclinical individuals is contrary to previous research in the area 
(Abramovitch et al., 2015; Soref et al., 2008). Abramovitch et al. (2015) found 
poorer inhibition with individuals with subclinical OCD (compared to 
nonclinical individuals), Soref et al (2008) found superior inhibition in 
individuals with subclinical OCD (and also used the flanker task). These 
contradictory findings create a complicated picture of inhibition in subclinical 
OCD. However, the findings from the current study are arguably more reliable 
than those found previously, as the sample recruited in the current study is more 
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representative of individuals with subclinical OCD than the samples recruited 
previously. In support of this idea, the mean OCD symptom scores in 
Abramovitch et al. (2015) and Soref et al. (2008) are much higher than the 
clinical cut-off for each measure (36.6 and 31.3 respectively, vs 21) and even 
higher than mean symptom scores of individuals with OCD (28.01; Foa et al., 
2002).  In other words, the sample of individuals with subclinical OCD in 
Abramovitch et al. (2015) and Soref et al. (2008) were conceivably much more 
likely to have included individuals with undiagnosed OCD than the present 
study. Their findings should therefore be interpreted in that light. In addition, 
the sample size of the present study was substantially larger than use in Soref 
et al.’s (2008) study (n = 20), meaning the present finding is less likely to be a 
spurious result.  
The finding that individuals with subclinical OCD do not have cognitive 
flexibility deficits is contrary to some previous research (Goodwin & Sher, 
1992; Kim et al., 2009; Sternheim, et al., 2014). As with the case of inhibition 
in subclinical OCD, this is likely due to the inclusion of many individuals with 
clinical OCD, rather than subclinical OCD. Indeed, none of these studies 
attempted to exclude individuals with undiagnosed OCD from the subclinical 
OCD sample. In fact, Sternheim et al. (2014) only included individuals if they 
scored over the clinical cut-off on an OCD symptom measure (OCI-R). In a 
study which operationalised subclinical OCD using a liberal cut-off criterion 
(i.e. there were likely fewer individuals with undiagnosed OCD included), 
Johansen and Dittrich’s (2013) findings aligned with those of the present study. 
In other words, it seems that individuals with subclinical obsessive-compulsive 
symptoms do not demonstrate cognitive flexibility deficits, and the findings 
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from some previous studies may have been due to the inclusion of individuals 
with undiagnosed OCD.  
Further indications that the current findings accurately represent the 
state of cognitive flexibility in subclinical OCD comes from the fact that the 
current study used a more stringent measure of cognitive flexibility (the 
SwIFT) than several of the previous studies in this area (e.g. the WCST, which 
assesses a number of cognitive abilities in addition to cognitive flexibility). As 
a result, more confidence can be placed in the finding that individuals with 
subclinical OCD do not demonstrate cognitive flexibility deficits. Previous 
findings demonstrating deficits on the WCST in individuals categorised as 
having subclinical OCD (e.g. Kim et al., 2009), may in fact represent deficits 
in another area, such as concept formation (Barcelo, 2001), as the task is broad 
in measurement (Snyder et al., 2014).  
In summary, it would appear that the EF deficits that characterise 
clinical OCD (Abramovitch et al., 2013; Shin et al., 2014; Snyder et al., 2014) 
are not present in those categorised as having subclinical OCD. Although EF 
deficits have previously been found in subclinical OCD, the samples in these 
studies – intended to reflect subclinical OCD – may conceivably have included 
large numbers of individuals with undiagnosed clinical OCD. In contrast, the 
present study deliberately sought to recruit a sample specifically representative 
of individuals with subclinical obsessive-compulsive symptoms (individuals 
who score highly on measures of OCD but do not meet diagnostic criteria for 
clinical OCD), in order to address previous problems of unrepresentative 
sampling.  
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The finding that individuals with subclinical OCD do not demonstrate 
EF deficits could plausibly suggest one of two things. First, that EF deficits are 
endophenotypes of OCD, but individuals with subclinical OCD are not at 
increased of developing OCD, and therefore do not show EF deficits. Although 
there is some evidence that individuals with subclinical levels of obsessive-
compulsive symptomatology are at increased risk of developing OCD, this has 
only been found in children (Black et al., 2003;  Fullana et al., 2009). In other 
words, children with subclinical OCD may be at increased risk of developing 
OCD, but not adults. Indeed, the average age of the sample with subclinical 
OCD in the current study was 22, and most individuals with OCD develop the 
disorder much earlier than this (e.g. Millet et al., 2004). If this is the case, the 
lack of EF deficits in adults with subclinical OCD may serve as a protective 
factor from the development of OCD.  Intact inhibition and working memory 
may help an individual suppress upsetting OITs (e.g. Brewin & Smart, 2005). 
Intact cognitive flexibility may help an individual re-direct their attention from 
an upsetting OIT to a less upsetting thought.  
A second, and arguably more plausible, possibility is that EF deficits do 
not represent endophenotypes of OCD. Rather, EF deficits found in OCD may 
have been caused by state factors relating to clinical OCD, such as the 
experience of OITs (Abramovitch et al., 2011; Abramovitch et al., 2014; 
Snyder et al., 2014).  For example, repeated checking of task responses may 
lead to underperformance on such tasks (Moritz, Hottenrott, Jelinek, Brooks, 
& Scheurich, 2012) and experiencing distressing OITs during an EF task may 
lead to impaired performance in those with OCD (Abramovitch et al., 2012; 
Teasdale, Proctor, Loyd, & Baddeley, 1993). Indeed, experiencing task-
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unrelated thoughts during an EF task can also lead to impaired performance 
(Cheyne, Solman, Carriere, & Smilek, 2009; Smallwood & Schooler, 2006; 
Smallwood et al., 2004).  Individuals with subclinical OCD experience less 
functional impairment than individuals with OCD (de Bruijn et al., 2010) and 
may therefore be less vulnerable to symptom interference whilst completing an 
EF task. If EF deficits were the result of symptom interference, this could 
explain the consistent finding that individuals with OCD do not underperform 
on the WAIS DSB (The Psychological Corporation, 1997; Snyder et al., 2014), 
as the task is much shorter than other working memory tasks, leaving little time 
for symptom interference. However, whether EF deficits are the cause or 
consequence of OCD cannot be determined with confidence from cross-
sectional studies, and would instead require longitudinal or experimental 
designs. Future studies could begin to address this question directly, for 
example, by inducing OITs in participants to determine whether it causes 
interference with EF task performance. Finding task underperformance on 
individuals who were induced with OITs would suggest that apparent EF 
deficits are caused by state factors.  
There are several limitations of the current study that should be 
considered. First, there were differential methods of reimbursement; some 
participants received course credit and others received £5 cash. However, the 
data on which participants received which form of reimbursement was not 
recorded, meaning comparisons between the two methods of reimbursement 
cannot be made. It may be, for example, that those who are paid cash perform 
better on the EF tasks, as the cash reimbursement increases motivation more 
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than course credit. There may have been more cash payments made to those 
with subclinical OCD, thus increasing their motivation and EFs in turn.  
Second, although care was taken to recruit a sample with subclinical 
obsessive-compulsive symptoms, and to exclude those with undiagnosed OCD, 
it is possible that the sample may have more closely represented a nonclinical 
sample. Indeed, the OCI-R score of the subclinical OCD group is only 
marginally higher than nonclinical participants, found previously (15.4 vs 14.9; 
Abramowitz et al., 2014). Future studies may take care to recruit participants 
who score under, but closer to, the clinical cut-off for OCD (21 on the OCI-R; 
Foa et al., 2002), in order to more closely represent individuals with subclinical 
obsessive-compulsive symptoms. While this would be methodologically 
challenging and labour intensive, it would nevertheless increase confidence in 
the representativeness of the experimental sample. Alternatively, studies could 
recruit individuals who score highly on measures of OCD symptomatology, 
and then exclude individuals with OCD via diagnostic interviews. 
Third, a priori power analysis was not conducted, meaning the study 
may have been underpowered to detect EF differences between individuals 
with subclinical OCD and nonclinical individuals. Although executive function 
differences have been found in studies of a similar sample size (e.g. n = 52 in 
Abramovitch et al., 2015; n = 43 in Kim et al., 2009 vs n = 54 in the current 
study), such a sample size is only adequately powered to detect large effect size 
differences. As moderate effect size EF differences are generally found 
between individuals with OCD and nonclinical individuals (e.g. Snyder et al., 
2014), future studies investigating EFs in subclinical OCD should ensure that 
they are adequately powered to also detect moderate, or small, effect sizes.  
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Finally, in the current study individuals were not screened for clinical 
DSM disorders, psychotropic medication, or neurological disorders and it was 
therefore not possible to check for the effect of these variables. Each of these 
other variables has been linked to underperformance on EF tasks (Abramovitch 
& Cooperman, 2015). Future research should control for these variables. 
In conclusion, the present study shows that individuals with subclinical 
OCD do not demonstrate EF deficits. Previous research has demonstrated EF 
deficits in those with OCD, and so a lack of EF deficits appears to be a 
differentiating factor between those with OCD and those with less severe, 
subclinical symptoms. It is plausible that previously found deficits in EF in 
individuals with OCD may be caused by state factors, such as OIT interference. 
Future research would benefit from finding out whether state factors can 
interfere in EF task performance. Indeed, this is what the study presented in the 
next chapter aims to test. 
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Chapter 3: Mechanisms of OCD: Do obsessive-intrusive 
thoughts impair working memory? 
The overarching question of the current chapter is whether a range of 
OCD-relevant state factors (e.g. obsessive intrusive thoughts; OITs, excessive 
checking, poor effort, etc.) have a negative impact on working memory. This 
research question was generated from the findings of the previous chapter. One 
explanation for why individuals with subclinical OCD do not demonstrate 
executive function (EF) deficits (chapter 2) but individuals with OCD do 
demonstrate EF deficits (e.g. Snyder, Kaiser, Warren, & Heller, 2014), is that 
the deficits are the result of OCD-relevant state factors, of which individuals 
with OCD are more prone to. The focus of this chapter is on working memory, 
rather than EFs more generally, as it appears to be particularly relevant to OCD 
(Snyder et al., 2014).  
 In this chapter, first, I will introduce two accounts of working memory 
deficits in OCD: the trait account and the state account. Next I will provide 
evidence for both accounts, and describe how there is a growing body of 
evidence in favour of the state account. I will then introduce The Executive 
Overload Model of OCD, created to explain the impact of OITs on working 
memory. Next, I will explain how state factors are likely to have a larger impact 
on particular types of working memory task than others. Finally, I will 
introduce the current study, and explain how i) it aims to provide the first 
empirical test of The Executive Overload Model of OCD and ii) it also aims to 
investigate the role of a range of other state factors on working memory 
performance.  
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Executive function deficits have been demonstrated in individuals with 
OCD (Abramovitch, Abramowitz, & Mittelman, 2013; Shin, Lee, Kim, & 
Kwon, 2014; Snyder et al., 2014), the largest of which appears to be in working 
memory (Snyder et al., 2014). Working memory is a temporary storage system 
that allows for the manipulation of verbal and visual information (Baddeley, 
2000; Baddeley & Hitch, 1974), and that underpins a range of goal-oriented 
behaviours. According to the influential Baddeley and Hitch model, working 
memory comprises a central executive, episodic buffer and two sub-domains: 
verbal working memory and visuospatial working memory. The central 
executive is responsible for controlling and regulating other cognitive 
processes. Verbal working memory is responsible for the storage and 
manipulation of verbal information; for example, when manipulating numbers 
for mental arithmetic. Visuospatial working memory is responsible for the 
storage and manipulation of visual and spatial information; for example, 
remembering a route through a maze. The episodic buffer is responsible for 
integrating information from the verbal and visuospatial domains. In support of 
the idea that the largest EF deficit in OCD is in working memory, Snyder et al. 
(2014) conducted a meta-analysis which compared performance between 
individuals with OCD and nonclinical individuals on a range of EF tasks. The 
largest deficit found in the meta-analysis was on a working memory task (the 
n-back task; d = .71).   
Are executive function deficits caused by state factors? 
Broadly, there are three accounts to explain working memory deficits 
in OCD: the trait account, and the state account, or a combination of the trait 
and state account. The trait account posits that working memory deficits are 
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endophenotypes of OCD; trait markers that link clinical symptoms with genetic 
contributions (Gottesman & Gould, 2003). In other words, individuals will 
demonstrate EF deficits before developing OCD, and these deficits will remain 
after treatment for OCD. The trait view of OCD is supported by research 
demonstrating unchanged working memory performance after treatment for 
OCD (e.g. on the Spatial Span task of the Wechsler Memory Scale - III, or 
WMS-III: Rao, Reddy, Kumar, Kandavel, & Chandrashekar, 2008). According 
to trait view of EF deficits, OCD symptoms are caused by either deficits in 
working memory (alongside other EF deficits), or a shared third factor, such as 
pre-frontal cortex dysfunction, that leads to both working memory deficits and 
OCD symptoms (Snyder et al., 2014). 
More recently, evidence has been building for an alternative account of 
working memory deficits in OCD; the state account. According to this idea, 
working memory deficits are epiphenomena, rather than endophenotypes, of 
OCD. Symptoms of OCD, such as OITs or compulsive checking, may be a 
cause of working memory impairments rather than a consequence. For 
example, an individual may underperform on a working memory task because 
OITs are distracting them, or increasing anxiety. According to this idea, 
individuals with OCD do not have an underlying, persistent deficit in working 
memory. Rather, they appear to have deficient working memory, due to the 
task interference caused by state factors (e.g. OITs).  
If working memory deficits in individuals with OCD are caused by state 
factors, this would have important implications for the treatment and 
understanding of OCD. More specifically, it would suggest that interventions 
designed to improve EFs, such as cognitive remediation, are unnecessary for 
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individuals with OCD. Rather, treating the symptoms of OCD would lead to 
improvements in executive functioning. In addition, if it could be demonstrated 
that EF deficits were caused by state factors, this could reduce the stigma 
experienced by individuals with OCD. Biogenetic explanations of mental 
health issues (such the trait account of EF deficits in OCD) increase the 
perception that individuals with mental health issues are dangerous and less 
likely to recover (Kvaale, Haslam, & Gottdiener, 2013). Finding that EF 
deficits are caused by state factors, therefore, may increase optimism regarding 
treatment, and self-esteem, in individuals with OCD.  
Several lines of research support the state account of working memory 
deficits in OCD. First, although several meta-analyses have demonstrated EF 
deficits in individuals with OCD (Abramovitch et al., 2015; Shin et al., 2014; 
Snyder et al., 2014); for many domains (including working memory), the 
evidence is mixed and deficits are not consistently demonstrated (Abramovitch 
& Cooperman, 2015). If working memory deficits were a trait marker of OCD, 
it would be expected that deficits would be consistently found in individuals 
with OCD. However, if working memory deficits were caused by state factors, 
then it is plausible that the findings would vary dependent upon a variety of 
incidental factors such as the testing environment, the attitude of the 
experimenter (e.g. strict vs empathetic), the framing of the study (e.g. 
participant motivation may be lower if they are told beforehand that individuals 
with OCD demonstrate EF deficits) (Moritz, Hottenrott, Jelinek, Brooks, & 
Scheurich, 2012) etc. Each of these factors may impact on anxiety and OCD 
symptoms, thus leading to variable task interference.  
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In further support of the state account of working memory deficits is 
evidence that demonstrates that symptoms of depression and anxiety have a 
negative impact on cognitive performance (e.g. Basso, Bornstein, Carona, & 
Morton, 2001; Moritz, Fricke & Hand, 2001; Bédard, Joyal, Godbout, & 
Chantal, 2009; Eysenck, Derakshan, Santos & Calvo, 2007). Higher levels of 
depression and anxiety have been found in individuals with OCD (e.g. Grisham 
& Williams, 2013; Yap, Mogan, & Kyrios, 2012), and these symptoms may 
interfere with working memory. In other words, symptoms of depression and 
anxiety found in individuals with OCD may explain why these individuals 
demonstrate poorer EFs than nonclinical individuals. 
Further evidence to suggest that working memory deficits may be 
caused by state factors comes from a study which demonstrated OCD 
symptoms directly interfered in neuropsychological task performance (Moritz 
et al., 2012). Moritz et al. (2012) asked sixty individuals with OCD and thirty 
nonclinical controls to complete a range of neuropsychological tasks (including 
a working memory task, the Corsi Block Tapping Task). Following this, all 
participants were asked to complete a questionnaire which assessed 
interference from a range of OCD-relevant symptoms; for example, whether 
touching the keyboard bothered the participant (due to contamination fears), 
whether OITs interfered in performance, or whether the participant exerted a 
lot of effort into task. Individuals with OCD were more likely to report 
interference from a range of OCD symptoms during the neuropsychological 
tasks than nonclinical individuals. Poor effort during the task, in particular, had 
a negative impact on working memory. This study highlights how OCD-
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relevant state factors can interfere in working memory task performance and 
lead to apparent EF deficits.   
In further support of the state account of working memory deficits in 
OCD is evidence which suggests working memory resources are required for 
the processing of OITs (e.g. Eysenck, 1992; Levinson, Smallwood, & 
Davidson, 2012; Teasdale, Proctor, Lloyd, & Baddeley 1993; Teasdale et al., 
1995). According to this idea, individuals with OCD experience more OITs 
than nonclinical individuals, and experiencing more OITs during a working 
memory task is likely to consume (finite) working memory resources. If fewer 
working memory resources are available for the task at hand, this will 
inevitably lead to poorer task performance.  Evidence for this idea comes 
mainly from research into task-unrelated thoughts (a broad term for 
spontaneous thoughts, which may include OITs). It has been demonstrated that 
when working memory load is high, fewer task-unrelated thoughts are 
experienced in nonclinical individuals (Teasdale et al., 1993; Teasdale et al., 
1995). Memory load refers to the task difficulty, such that higher-load tasks 
require the maintenance and manipulation of larger amounts of information 
(e.g. letters). Higher memory load is associated slower reaction times and 
poorer accuracy (e.g. Jonides et al., 1997). When task-unrelated thoughts do 
occur during a task that relies on working memory, performance declines 
(Cheyne, Solman, Carriere, & Smilek, 2009; Smallwood et al., 2004), 
suggesting that maintaining task-unrelated thoughts consumes working 
memory resources.  
 In an attempt to extend these findings on task-unrelated thoughts, and 
to account for the impact of OITs on working memory, Abramovitch, Dar, 
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Hermesh and Schweiger (2012) developed the Executive Overload Model of 
OCD. The model posits that an “overflow”, or excessive number of OITs, 
accompanied by constant control attempts, consume working memory (and 
other EF resources) and thus impairs performance on working memory (and 
other EF) tasks. More specifically, the model suggests that an overflow of OITs, 
which is associated with hyperactivity of the frontostriatal system, is a result of 
repeated attempts to control automatic processes. These OITs overload the 
executive system and, in doing so, lead to EF impairments. The model also 
posits that individuals with OCD possess a general fear of impulsivity, which 
leads them to increase their attempts to control behaviour, which in turn leads 
to an increase in OITs, resulting in a vicious cycle of more OITs and poorer 
EFs. The model does not offer any further theoretical detail on how OITs may 
impact upon specific EFs, such as working memory. However, as an analogy, 
the model suggests that “an overflow of OITs overloads the executive system 
in a way which is similar to having numerous open programs on a personal 
computer that overloads the RAM memory and causes the primary program to 
operate more slowly… resulting in neuropsychological deficits” (Abramovitch 
& Cooperman, 2015, pp. 31). 
 One further possible explanation for working memory deficits in OCD 
is a combination of both the trait and the state account. In other words, small 
working memory deficits may be a trait marker of OCD. This working memory 
deficit may, in turn, make individuals with OCD more susceptible to state 
factors, such as OITs, as posited by the Executive Overload Model of OCD 
(Abramovitch et al., 2012; Abramovitch & Cooperman, 2015). However, 
evidence for this dual state-trait of working memory deficits in OCD is lacking. 
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In addition, this account does not explain why task-unrelated thoughts, which 
include OITs, lead to poorer working memory performance in nonclinical 
individuals (Cheyne et al., 2009; Smallwood et al., 2004). 
Differential effects of state factors on working memory 
The evidence presented so far suggests that state factors could plausibly 
lead to working memory deficits in all cases. However, there are reasons to 
believe that state factors may have differential effects on working memory, 
dependent upon the task and load. If the impact of state factors on working 
memory does vary, then recognising the conditions under which state factors 
will have an impact is an important methodological consideration for future 
studies to address. In support of the idea that state factors may have differential 
effects on working memory, deficits appear to be larger in individuals with 
OCD on high (vs low) memory load working memory tasks (Abramovitch & 
Cooperman, 2015). More specifically, several studies have demonstrated 
reduced performance on the n-back task in individuals with OCD, but only on 
higher memory load trials, and particularly on visuospatial tasks (3-back; de 
Vries et al., 2013; van der Wee et al., 2003) and several reviews have argued 
for the same pattern (Abramovitch & Cooperman, 2015; Harkin & Kessler, 
2011). If working memory deficits are caused by state factors, then this finding 
would suggest that state factors have a disproportionately negative impact on 
high-load, visuospatial working memory tasks.  
An experimental study confirmed that OCD-relevant state factors 
(anxiety) can have a larger impact on visuospatial working memory than verbal 
working memory. Vytal, Cornwell, Letkiewicz, Arkin and Grillon (2013) asked 
twenty-seven nonclinical individuals to complete both a verbal and a 
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visuospatial n-back task. For the n-back task, participants are presented with a 
sequence of stimuli (letters for the verbal version of the task, and shapes for the 
visuospatial version of the task) on a computer screen, and must indicate when 
the currently displayed stimulus matches the stimulus presented n trials ago. 
For half of the trials, anxiety was induced in participants, by putting them at 
risk of receiving an electrical shock. Performance during the shock trials was 
significantly lower than the no-shock trials on the verbal 1-back and 2-back 
tasks, and for the visuospatial 1-back, 2-back, and 3-back tasks. The authors 
concluded that these results not only demonstrate the negative impact of 
anxiety on cognitive performance, but also that visuospatial working memory 
is more vulnerable to the negative effects of anxiety than verbal working 
memory.  
 It is conceivable from the evidence presented that OCD-relevant state 
factors lead to the largest working memory deficits on high-load, visuospatial 
working memory tasks. However, the question remains as to why that may be 
the case. Research into task-unrelated thoughts provides one possible 
explanation.  Levinson, Smallwood & Davidson (2012) argued that that if a 
working memory task is demanding (e.g. if it has a high memory load) and 
prioritised (i.e. OITs are experienced and are more salient and emotional valent 
than the task), fewer task-unrelated thoughts are experienced, as working 
memory helps to maintain task focus and inhibit task-unrelated thoughts. 
However, if the task is not demanding (e.g. it has a low memory load) or 
prioritised then working memory resources allow the task and task-unrelated 
thoughts to co-occur. Support for this idea comes from the finding that 
participants report more frequent intrusive cognitions during low-difficulty and 
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high-difficulty (but not medium-difficulty) cognitive tasks (Hyman et al., 
2013). When task-unrelated thoughts are experienced at the same time as the 
task, the thoughts are likely to distract from the task and lead to poorer 
performance, particularly on difficult (high-load) tasks, where even small 
distractions may lead to problems. In the context of OCD, according to this 
idea, individuals may experience more OITs during low-load (e.g. 1-back task) 
and high-load (e.g. 3-back task) visuospatial tasks. As OITs are often 
considered threatening, they are likely to be prioritised over the task, due to 
their salience and emotional valence. Therefore, experiencing OITs during 
high-load (but not low-load) tasks may have a negative impact on task 
performance. 
 In summary, there is a range of evidence that supports the state account 
of working memory deficits in OCD. First, there is evidence that a range of 
symptoms relevant to OCD (e.g. OITs, contamination fears, depression, 
anxiety, etc.) have a negative impact on neuropsychological task performance 
(e.g. Basso et al., 2001; Bédard et al., 2009; Eysenck et al., 2007; Moritz et al.,  
2001; Moritz et al., 2012). Second, there is evidence to suggest that OITs 
consume working memory resources, leaving fewer resources available to 
complete the task at hand, leading to poorer performance (e.g. Eysenck, 1992; 
Levinson, et al., 2012; Teasdale, et al., 1993; Teasdale et al., 1995). The 
Executive Overload Model of OCD was developed to account for the impact 
of OITs on working memory (and other EFs), positing that an increase in OITs 
will lead to a decrease in working memory (Abramovitch et al., 2012).  
 Despite the promising evidence in support of the state account of 
working memory deficits, there are several reasons to suggest further 
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investigation is required. First, the evidence regarding the impact of anxiety 
and depression on neuropsychological task performance is inconsistent, with 
many studies showing no negative impact (Abramovitch & Cooperman, 2015). 
Second, only one study has investigated the impact of OCD-specific 
phenomena on neuropsychological task performance, and of all the state factors 
measured, only poor effort was associated with poorer working memory 
(Moritz et al., 2012). Third, much of the evidence to suggest working memory 
resources are consumed by OITs comes from research into task-unrelated 
thoughts, rather than OITs specifically. The Executive Overload Model of OCD 
provides an invaluable extension of these task-unrelated thought findings into 
the domain of OCD (Abramovitch et al., 2012). However, this model is 
currently in its infancy and no known studies have been conducted to directly 
test its predictions. If OITs do impact upon working memory, the largest 
negative impact is likely on high-load visuospatial tasks (e.g. Levison et al., 
2012). 
The present study 
The main aim of the current study, therefore, is to test a key prediction 
of The Executive Overload Model of OCD: whether an increase in OITs will 
impair working memory. Demonstrating that an increase in OITs leads to an 
increase in working memory deficits would increase confidence in the state 
account of working memory deficits, and in the Executive Overload Model 
itself. For this study, nonclinical participants were recruited and completed the 
n-back task. Half of participants were primed with OITs before the task; half 
were not. Priming OITs is a widely used experimental method of inducing OITs 
(e.g. Purdon, 2001; Purdon & Clark, 2001; Purdon, Rowa & Anthony, 2005). 
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Participants were first asked to think in detail about an upsetting OIT; this is 
known to lead to an increase in OIT frequency in the minutes following the 
prime. Priming OITs allows for the measurement of OIT responses in real-time. 
It was predicted that those participants in the primed condition would perform 
poorer on the 3-back task than those in the non-primed condition; but that there 
would be no difference between the two conditions on the 1-back task.  
 Secondary aims of the current study are to test the relationship of other 
state variables to working memory. More specifically, depressive and anxious 
symptoms will be controlled for. In addition, the impact of a range of OCD-
relevant phenomena on working memory (e.g. self-reported OIT interference, 
excessive checking, effort, etc.) will be measured. It is expected that depressive 
and anxious symptoms will be negatively related to working memory. In 
addition, it is expected that self-reported effort will be related to working 
memory (i.e. replication the findings of Moritz et al., 2012). Based on the 
predictions of the Executive Overload Model of OCD, it is also expected that 
higher self-reported OIT interference will also be related to poorer working 
memory.  Demonstrating the relationship between any of these symptom 
variables and working memory would increase confidence in the state account 
of working memory deficits.  
To summarise the study’s hypotheses: 
Hypotheses: 
Individuals primed with OITs (primed condition) will perform poorer on the 3-
back task than individuals in the non-primed condition.  
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There will be no difference between individuals in the OIT primed condition 
and non-primed condition on the 1-back task. 
Depression and anxiety will be negatively correlated to working memory. 
Self-reported effort will be related to working memory. 
Higher self-reported OIT interference will be related to poorer working 
memory. 
 
3.1: Method  
Design 
The experiment used a one-way, independent samples design. The independent 
variable was OIT prime condition, with two levels (primed vs non-primed). 
There were four primary dependent variables (all measuring working memory: 
accuracy on 1-back task; reaction time on 1-back task; accuracy on 3-back task, 
reaction time on 3-back task). Other dependent variables were depression and 
anxiety (as measured on the Depression Anxiety and Stress Scale, DASS; 
Lovibond & Lovibond, 1995), obsessive-compulsive symptom scores (as 
measured by the Obsessive Compulsive Inventory – Revised, OCI-R; Foa et 
al., 2002), retrospective OIT frequency (as measured by part 1 of the 
Obsessional Intrusive Thoughts Inventory; Original Spanish Version: 
“Inventario de Pensamientos Intrusos Obsesivos”, INPIOS; García-Soriano, 
Belloch, Morillo & Clark, 2011). In addition, a range of symptom interference 
was measured, including perceived OIT interference (measured on a 101-point 
scale).  
Investigating the relationship between obsessive-compulsive symptomatology and executive functions. 
 
83 
 
Participants  
According to a priori power analysis, with a medium effect size (f ² [V]= .0675), 
an α =.05 and a power of .8, a sample of 146 participants was needed in total. 
One hundred and forty-four participants were recruited, via e-mail, from a 
staff/student pool at The University of Sheffield. Nine participants were 
excluded for not completing all tasks, leaving a sample of 135 participants (32 
males, 102 females, 1 ‘other’ but did not specify; mean age = 24 years; age 
range = 18-59 years). Individuals who reported that they had received a 
diagnosis of OCD were not eligible to participate in the study, as such 
individuals have been found to perform poorer than nonclinical individuals on 
a range of executive function tasks (e.g. Snyder et al., 2014). Participants were 
systematically assigned to either the primed condition (n = 65; mean age = 24 
years; 19 males, 45 females, 1 other) or non-primed condition (n = 70; mean 
age = 23 years; 13 males, 57 females), such that the first participant was 
allocated to the primed condition, the second participant to the non-primed 
condition, and so on. Participants received either course credits or £5 cash 
reimbursement for their time.  
Materials 
Questionnaires 
The Obsessive Compulsive Inventory – Revised (OCI-R; Foa et al., 
2002) is an 18-item measure used to assess OCD symptoms. The OCI-R 
comprises a list of symptoms (e.g. “I check things more often than necessary”) 
for which participants indicate on a scale from 0 (“not at all”) to 4 (“extremely”) 
how distressed the symptoms have made them in the past month. Items cover 
six sub-scales, (a) washing, (b) checking/doubting, (c) obsessing, (d) mental 
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neutralizing, (e) ordering, and (f) hoarding. Total scores on the OCI-R are 
calculated by summing the items. Scores range from 0-72 with higher scores 
indicating higher levels of OCD symptomatology. The recommended cut-off 
score for the OCI-R is 21, with scores at or above this level indicating the likely 
presence of OCD (Foa et al., 2002). The OCI-R has demonstrated good 
psychometric properties in nonclinical participants; excellent internal 
consistency (α = .89), good test-retest reliability (1 week – r = .84), and 
convergent validity (significant positive correlations were found with the OCI-
R and a range of OCD measures; Foa et al., 2002). Discriminant validity was 
mixed, with high correlations between the OCI-R and Beck Depression 
Inventory (BDI; r = .7); however, this is common across all OCD symptom 
measures (Foa et al., 2002). In this study the internal consistency for the OCI-
R was α =.89.   
The Depression Anxiety and Stress Scale (DASS-21; Lovibond & 
Lovibond, 1995) is a 21-item measure of depression, anxiety and stress. 
Participants were presented with statements (e.g. “I found myself getting upset 
by quite trivial things”) and were required to indicate how much each statement 
applied to them in the past month, on a scale from 0 (“did not apply to me at 
all”) to 3 (“applied to me very much or most of the time”). Scores for 
depression, anxiety, and stress are calculated by summing the items for each 
subscale, with higher scores indicating higher levels of each construct. Scores 
on the depression subscale range from 0-21 (0-4 = normal; 5-6 = mild; 7-10 = 
moderate; 11-13 = severe; 14-21 = very severe), scores on the anxiety subscale 
range from 0-21 (0-3 = normal; 4-5 = mild; 6-7 = moderate; 8-9 = severe; 10-
21 = very severe), and scores on the stress subscale range from 0-21 (0-7 = 
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normal; 8-9 = mild; 10-12 = moderate; 13-16 = severe; 17-21 = very 
severe).The DASS-21 has demonstrated good psychometric properties; 
excellent internal consistency (α =.87 -.94 for a sample of individuals with 
OCD and nonclinical individuals; Antony, Bieling, Cox, Enns, & Swinson, 
1998), and good convergent validity (when compared with other measures of 
depression and anxiety; Antony et al., 1998; Henry & Crawford, 2005). In this 
study, the internal consistency for each subscale was: depression (α = .90), 
anxiety (α = .80), & stress (α = .87).  
Part one of the Obsessional Intrusive Thoughts Inventory (Original 
Spanish Version: “Inventario de Pensamientos Intrusos Obsesivos”, INPIOS; 
García-Soriano, Belloch, Morillo & Clark, 2011) assesses the frequency with 
which participants experience 48 OITs (e.g. “The documents, papers, etc. are 
out of order or not in their place”) using a seven-point Likert scale ranging from 
0 (“never”) to 6 (“always”). Part one also includes two open-ended items (“I 
also have these other intrusions…”), which allow participants to report any 
idiosyncratic OITs. Total scale scores for part one of the INPIOS are calculated 
by dividing the total score by the number of items with a frequency ≥ 1 (see 
García-Soriano et al., 2011). Scores range from 0-6 and higher scores on the 
INPIOS correspond to more frequent OITs. Part one of the INPIOS has 
demonstrated good internal reliability (α = .94) and test-retest reliability (7-14 
days, r = .97) (García-Soriano et al., 2011) in a non-clinical sample. The 
questionnaire also demonstrated adequate convergent and divergent validity 
with INPIOS total scores being more strongly correlated with OCD measures 
than with measures of depression, anxiety or worry (García-Soriano et al., 
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2011). In the current study the internal consistency for part 1 total score was α 
= .93. 
Following all tasks, participants rated the frequency of OITs that they 
experienced during the task. Those in the primed condition were asked two 
questions: “Roughly how many times did you experience your most 
upsetting/unpleasant intrusive thought during the task?”, and “Did you 
experience any other intrusive thoughts of the following themes?” The OIT 
themes which are covered by the INPIOS were listed (contamination, 
aggression, sex, religion, order/symmetry, doubts, superstition) and answers 
were rated on a scale (1 = 1-3 times; 2 = 4-6 times; 3 = 7-10 times; 4 = 10+ 
times). Those in the non-primed condition were only asked one question, “Did 
you experience any intrusive thoughts of the following themes?” with the same 
theme options and scale responses as given to the primed condition.  
A nine-question retrospective-performance questionnaire was used, 
similar to the questionnaire used by Moritz et al. (2012), to assess perceived 
task interference from a range of OCD-relevant phenomena. Participants 
indicated on a scale from 0 (‘not at all’) to 100 (‘extremely’) how: 1) much they 
were bothered by touching objects; 2) much they checked their responses; 3) 
much OITs interfered with their performance; 4) much compulsions interfered 
with their performance; 5) much they guessed their responses; 6) much they 
paid attention to the task; 7) careful and accurate they were during the task 8) 
they felt slowed during the task; 9) they tried when completing the task. This 
measure of interference is designed to capture the subjective impact of 
symptoms on task performance. 
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Neuropsychological tasks 
The n-back task was used to assess visuospatial working memory. The 
n-back task was completed on a computer with a 17-inch monitor and running 
E-Prime 2.0 software (Psychology Software Tools, Inc., Pittsburgh, PA). 
Participants were presented with a series of images all featuring a star 
positioned either on the left, right, top or bottom of a diamond shape, on a 17-
inch computer monitor. For each image, participants were required to indicate, 
by pressing the space bar on a keyboard, when the position of the star matched 
that of the star either a) directly before it (1-back, 51 trials) or b) three stars 
before it (3-back, 51 trials). One third of trials involved a match. The order of 
the trials was fixed for all participants.  
Dependent variables for the n-back task were i) percentage of correct 
answers and ii) reaction time for correct answers. False alarm scores were 
accounted for by adding correct positive responses to correct negative 
responses. For example, if a participant correctly indicated a match on 13/17 
trials, but incorrectly indicated a match on 3/34 trials, their total accuracy score 
would be 44/51 (or an accuracy of 86%). 
Obsessive Intrusive Thought Prime Task 
Participants in the primed condition were primed with OITs, with the aim of 
making them experience more frequent OITs during the n-back task. 
Participants first completed part one of the INPIOS (García-Soriano et al., 
2011) in the laboratory, which took between 5-10 minutes to complete. 
Secondly, participants identified their most “unpleasant, uncomfortable or 
upsetting” OIT from the list in the INPIOS. Following this, they were instructed 
to “imagine a scene involving your most unpleasant OIT for 60 seconds”. This 
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method of priming OITs has been widely used in previous research (e.g. 
Purdon, 2001; Purdon & Clark, 2001; Purdon, Rowa & Anthony, 2005).  
Procedure 
 Participants first completed the Obsessive-Compulsive Inventory – 
Revised (OCI-R; Foa et al., 2002), part one of the Obsessional Intrusive 
Thoughts Inventory (INPIOS; Garcia-Soriano et al., 2011) and the Depression 
Anxiety and Stress Scale (DASS-21; Lovibond & Lovibond, 1995) online 
using survey platform, Qualtrics. Following this, participants attended the 
laboratory (3 – 10 days after questionnaire completion) and were systematically 
allocated to one of two conditions: the primed condition (n = 65), or the non-
primed condition (n = 70). In the primed condition, participants completed the 
OIT priming task before completing the n-back task. In the non-primed 
condition, participants only completed the n-back task. Participants sat 
approximately 80 cm from the screen. Following the n-back task, participants 
were asked to report the number of OITs experienced and to complete the nine-
item retrospective performance questionnaire. Informed consent was obtained 
from all participants and the study was granted ethical approval by the 
University’s psychology ethics committee. 
3.2: Results  
Demographic Characteristics  
Baseline demographic and clinical characteristics of participants in the two 
conditions are provided in Table 1. In order to test whether there were any 
significant demographic or clinical characteristic differences between 
conditions, a range of ANOVAs were conducted on the data (age; sex; OCD, 
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depression and anxiety symptomatology; obsessive intrusive thoughts 
frequency). Those in the primed condition scored significantly higher on 
depression and anxiety (as measured by the DASS), and experienced 
significantly more OITs in general (as measured by the INPIOS) than those in 
the non-primed condition. No significant differences were found between the 
two conditions in age, gender or OCD symptomatology (as measured by the 
OCI-R).   
 Mean OCI-R score of the full sample was 16.63 (SD = 11.2), which 
compares to 28.01 (SD = 13.53) found previously in samples with OCD and 
18.82 found in nonclinical samples (SD = 11.10) (Foa et al. 2002). One third of 
the sample (45/135) scored over the suggested clinical cut-off of the OCI-R; 
the score which is used to differentiate individuals with OCD and nonclinical 
individuals (Foa et al., 2002). This finding suggests that the current sample was 
partially representative of individuals with OCD. 
Table 1 – Demographic and clinical characteristics  
 Primed (n = 65) Non-primed (n = 
70) 
Analysis 
 Mean (SD) Mean (SD)   
Age (years) 22.98 (8.12) 23.77 (8.46) F(1, 133) = .30, 
p = .58, η² = 
.002 
Male: Female 19: 45 a 13: 57 χ²(1) = 3.36, p 
= .187b 
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OCI-R Total 
(Max score 72; 
clinical cut-off < 
21)  
18.07 (11.77) 15.29 (10.56) F(1, 133) = 
2.11, p = .149, 
η² = .016 
DASS 
Depression Total 
(Max score 21; 
normal 0-4; 
moderate 7-10; 
extremely severe 
14+) 
6.65 (5.48) 4.67 (4.21) F(1, 133) = 
5.56, p = .02, η² 
= .040 
DASS Anxiety 
Total 
(Max score 21 
normal 0-3; 
moderate 6-7; 
extremely severe 
10+) 
4.95 (3.93) 3.6 (3.6) F(1, 133) = 
4.35, p = .04, η² 
= .032 
DASS Stress 
Total 
(Max score 21 
normal 0-7; 
moderate 10-12; 
extremely severe 
17+) 
7.56 (5.03) 6.96 (4.97) F(1, 133) = 
.479, p = .49, η² 
= .004 
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INPIOS OIT 
Frequency Total 
c 
(Max score 6) 
2.35 (.781) 2.09 (.711) F(1, 133) = 
3.96, p = .049, 
η² = .029 
 
a = 1 participant stated gender as “other” (not specified) 
b = excluded “other” as this participant does not identify as a male or 
female and therefore cannot be included in the gender comparison analysis. 
c = not actual frequency, corresponds to OITs being experienced 0 = 
never – 6 = frequently, every day 
 
Preliminary Analyses 
Are there any effects of reimbursement method on n-back performance? 
In the current study, some participants were compensated with cash (£5; n = 
34) and others with course credit (n =101). In order to explore whether there 
were any effects of differential reimbursement, a series of ANOVAs were 
conducted, comparing n-back performance (1-back accuracy and RT; 3 back 
accuracy and RT) between those who received cash and those who received 
course credit. No significant differences were found between the two 
conditions on n-back performance. More specifically, no significant accuracy 
differences were found between those compensated with cash (M = 95.82%, 
SD = 8.10) and those compensated with credit (mean = 96.12%, SD = 4.92) on 
the 1-back task [F(1, 133) = 0.04, p = 0.84, η² = .000]. Similarly, no significant 
RT differences were found between those compensated with cash (M= 
439.00ms, SD = 141.44) and those compensated with credit (mean = 461.97ms, 
SD = 162.76) on the 1-back task [F(1, 133) = 0.62, p = 0.43, η² = .005]. 
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In addition, no significant accuracy differences were found between 
those compensated with cash (M = 79.73%, SD = 10.74) and those compensated 
with credit (M = 78.32%, SD = 8.90) on the 3-back task (F(1, 133) = 0.46, p = 
0.50, η² = .004). Similarly, no significant RT differences were found between 
those compensated with cash (M = 607.97ms, SD = 234.94) and those 
compensated with credit (M = 633.27ms, SD = 190.32) on the 3-back task [F(1, 
133) = 0.32, p = 0.57, η² = .002]. 
Manipulation Check 
Were there any differences in obsessive intrusive thought frequency between 
the primed and non-primed conditions? 
Total OIT frequency scores, from the OIT question “Did you experience any 
other intrusive thoughts of the following themes?” completed after n-back task 
(measured on the following scale: 1 = 1-3 times; 2 = 4-6 times; 3 = 7-10 times; 
4 = 10+ times) were compared between the two conditions, using a one-way 
ANOVA. Those in the primed condition (M = 1.72, SD = 2.08) experienced 
significantly more OITs than those in the non-primed condition (M = 1.04, SD 
= 1.44; F[1, 133] = 4.94, p = .028). Participants in the primed condition reported 
an additional mean of 1.77 (SD = 2.51) OITs in the category of their primed 
thought, which corresponds to between 1-3 OITs. These findings confirm that 
the OIT prime was successful in making those in the primed-condition 
experience more OITs than those in the non-primed condition. 
Were there any differences in perceived obsessive intrusive thought 
interference between the primed and non-primed conditions? 
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An ANOVA was conducted to compare perceived intrusive thought 
interference between the primed and non-primed conditions. Individuals in the 
primed condition reported significantly more interference in their task 
performance (M = 32.98, SD = 27.12) than individuals in the non-primed 
condition (M = 22.77, SD = 28.65; F[1,131] = -2.11, p = .037). 
Relationships between depression, anxiety and n-back performance 
As differences were found in depression and anxiety scores between the primed 
and non-primed conditions, a series of Pearson’s correlations was run to 
explore the relationship between depression and n-back performance (1-back 
accuracy; 1-back RT; 3-back accuracy; 3-back RT) and anxiety and n-back 
performance (1-back accuracy and RT; 3-back accuracy and RT). No 
significant relationships were found between any of the variables. More 
specifically, no significant relationships were found between depression and 1-
back accuracy (r[135] = - 0.01, p = .90); depression and 1-back RT (r[135] = 
.09, p = .31); depression and 3-back accuracy (r[135] = -.9, p = .30); or 
depression and 3-back RT (r[135] = .08, p = .38), suggesting that working 
memory was not affected by depression.  
In addition, no significant relationships were found between anxiety and 
1-back accuracy (r[135] = -.05, p = .59); anxiety and 1-back RT (r[135] = -.01, 
p = .94); anxiety and 3-back accuracy (r[135] = -.02, p = .81); or anxiety and 
3-back RT (r[135] = -.09, p = .28), suggesting anxiety did not have an impact 
on working memory performance.  Due to the lack of relationships between 
depression, anxiety and n-back performance, depression and anxiety were not 
controlled for in subsequent analyses.  
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Did priming obsessive intrusive thoughts affect working memory 
performance? 
Figures 1 and 2 illustrate n-back accuracy and reaction time in both conditions 
and for both tasks (1-back and 3-back).  In order to explore whether there 
were any differences in 1-back performance between the primed condition 
and non-primed condition, a MANOVA was conducted, with 1-back reaction 
time and 1-back accuracy entered as dependent variables. Using Pillai’s trace, 
there were no significant 1-back differences between individuals in the 
primed condition and the non-primed condition, V = .011, F (2, 132) = .732, p 
= .48.   
In order to explore whether there were any differences in 3-back 
performance between the primed condition and the non-primed condition, a 
MANOVA was conducted, with 3-back reaction time and 3-back accuracy 
entered as dependent variables. Using Pillai’s trace, there were no significant 
3-back differences between individuals in the primed condition and non-primed 
condition, V = .002, F (2, 132) = .128, p = .88.   
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Fig. 1. Response times (mean ± standard error) for primed and non-primed 
participants in both task conditions (1-back and 3-back).  
 
Fig. 2. Accuracy (mean ± standard error) for primed and non-primed 
participants in both 1-back and 3-back tasks.  
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Were primed OITs related to working memory performance? 
A Spearman’s rank correlation analysis was conducted to investigate 
the relationship between the number of primed OITs experienced during the 
working memory task and working memory performance. No relationship was 
found between primed OITs and 3-back reaction time (rs[135] = -.08, p = .35). 
In addition, no relationship was found between primed OITs and 3-back 
accuracy (rs[135] = -.09 , p = .32).  
Were OCD-relevant phenomena related to working memory performance? 
Pearson’s correlation analysis was conducted to explore the relationship 
between self-reported symptom interference and working memory. A 
Bonferroni correction was made to correct for multiple comparisons, and P-
values of <.001 (.05/36) were considered to be significant. No significant 
relationships were found between any of the self-reported symptom measures 
and working memory (r ranged from -.184 to .136; p values ranged from .033 
to .987; see Appendix B for a correlation matrix). 
3.3: Discussion  
The main aim of the current study was to test a key prediction of The 
Executive Overload Model of OCD (Abramovitch et al., 2012): whether an 
increase in OITs would impair working memory. To address this question, two 
groups of participants completed a low-load (1-back) and high-load (3-back) 
working memory task, after one group had been primed with OITs. As 
predicted, no differences were found between the two groups on the 1-back 
task. However, contrary to predictions, no differences were found between the 
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two groups on the 3-back task. These findings suggest that an increase in OITs 
does not lead to working memory impairments in a nonclinical sample. 
Secondary aims of the current study were to test the impact of other 
state variables on working memory. More specifically, depressive and anxious 
symptoms were measured. Contrary to predictions, no relationships were found 
between depressive or anxious symptoms and performance on the 1-back or 3-
back task. In addition, a range of OCD-relevant phenomena (e.g. self-reported 
OIT interference, excessive checking, effort, etc.) were measured. Contrary to 
predictions, none of these state factors were related to performance on the 1-
back or 3-back task. Taken together, these findings suggest that a range of state 
factors associated with OCD, do not lead to working memory impairments in a 
nonclinical sample.  
 One surprising finding to come out of the present study was that, despite 
no working memory differences between those in the primed and non-primed 
condition, there was a difference between the conditions in perceived 
interference. Participants who were primed with OITs reported that OITs 
interfered with their performance more than participants who were not primed 
with OITs. This finding is interesting, as it would seem plausible that perceived 
interference and objective interference would align, such that individuals who 
reported more perceived interference would also demonstrate poorer working 
memory. However, this was not found to be the case. One possible explanation 
for this finding is that those participants in the primed condition needed to work 
harder than those in the non-primed condition in order to prevent task 
performance from deteriorating. However, an ANOVA conducted after the 
completion of the study suggested no differences between the two conditions 
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in self-reported effort (p = .39). A second possible explanation is that 
individuals higher in obsessive-compulsive symptomatology are simply more 
likely to believe that OITs interfere with their performance than nonclinical 
individuals, even when they do not cause objective interference. That is, 
interference is a problem of perception, rather than demonstrable interference. 
A final possible explanation for the finding is that it is result of demand effects; 
participants who were primed with OITs may believe that the experimenter 
expected them to impact upon performance, and made their self-reports 
accordingly. 
The current findings do not support one prediction of the Executive 
Overload Model of OCD (Abramovitch et al., 2012): that OITs will lead to 
impairments in working memory. However, it was beyond the scope of the 
current study to investigate whether OITs lead to impairments in other EFs, 
such as inhibition and cognitive flexibility. Working memory was chosen in the 
current study due to the finding that the largest EF deficit was found on the n-
back (Snyder et al., 2014). However, individuals with OCD also demonstrate 
deficits in the areas of inhibition and cognitive flexibility (e.g. Snyder et al., 
2014). It would seem surprising if OITs lead to deficits in inhibition or 
cognitive flexibility deficits, but not working memory deficits. However, future 
studies, testing the impact of OITs on other neuropsychological tests, are 
required to provide further valuable insights into the validity of the Executive 
Overload Model of OCD (Abramovitch et al., 2012). 
One possible explanation for the current findings is that although an 
increase in OIT frequency did not lead to working memory deficits, an increase 
in OIT duration may have led to working memory deficits. The Executive 
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Overload Model of OCD (Abramovitch et al., 2012) does not make predictions 
about OIT duration, however, it would seem unlikely for five fleeting OITs, 
lasting less than a second each, to have a negative impact on working memory. 
On the other hand, it would seem more likely that five OITs, each lasting 10 
seconds each, would have a negative impact on working memory. Obsessive 
intrusive thought duration was not measured in the present study, and so this 
hypothesis could not be tested. Future studies looking to test the impact of OITs 
on working memory should aim to measure OIT duration. Finding OIT duration 
(but not frequency) has a negative impact on working memory may suggest the 
Executive Overload Model of OCD should be revised to account for duration. 
 Overall, the findings from the present study do not support the state 
account of working memory deficits. That is, a range of state factors which 
might plausibly be thought to lead to impaired performance on a working 
memory task, do not in fact lead to such an impairment. Previously, depression 
and anxiety had been shown to impair neuropsychological performance (e.g. 
Basso et al., 2001; Bédard et al., 2009; Eysenck et al., 2007; Moritz et al., 2001) 
and self-reported effort was associated with better working memory (Moritz et 
al., 2012); however, the present study did not replicate those findings. In 
addition, there were strong theoretical reasons to believe that OITs consumed 
working memory resources and would lead to working memory deficits 
(particularly high-load visuospatial working memory tasks). This idea was 
captured by the Executive Overload Model of OCD (Abramovitch et al., 2002). 
However, the present study found evidence against the Executive Overload 
Model of OCD. 
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 If working memory deficits are not caused by state factors, then the 
question remains as to why individuals with OCD demonstrate working 
memory deficits (e.g. Snyder et al., 2014). The answer to this question is 
beyond of the scope of the data from the present study, however, one possibility 
is that working memory deficits are endophenotypes of OCD. In support of this 
idea, working memory of individuals with OCD remains unchanged after 
treatment for OCD (e.g. Rao et al., 2008). In addition, non-affected relatives of 
individuals with OCD demonstrate working memory deficits (e.g. Rajender et 
al., 2011). However, if working memory deficits are endophenotypes of OCD, 
then it is not clear why deficits are not consistently found in individuals with 
OCD (Abramovitch & Cooperman, 2015) and why state factors have 
previously been shown to impact upon working memory performance (Bédard 
et al., 2009).  
 A further possible explanation for why individuals with OCD 
demonstrate working memory deficits, if not due to state factors, is that deficits 
are confined to a sub-group of individuals with OCD (e.g. Hwang et al., 2007; 
Lee & Telch, 2010). Obsessive-compulsive disorder is a heterogeneous 
condition, and individuals can present with a wide variety of symptoms 
(Markarian et al., 2010; McKay et al., 2004). If it was the case that working 
memory deficits are only found in a sub-group of individuals, this would 
explain why working memory deficits are found in some studies, but not others. 
That is, large numbers of individuals from the sub-group with working memory 
deficits may have unintentionally been included in those studies where deficits 
have been found. To the author’s knowledge, there is no available empirical 
evidence to support the idea that sub-groups of individuals with OCD 
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demonstrate working memory deficits. However, there is evidence that sub-
groups of individuals show deficits in other EF domains. For example, Hwang 
et al. (2007) found that individuals with late-onset OCD demonstrated deficits 
on a complex executive function task (Rey-Osterrieth Complex Figure Test), 
but those with early-onset OCD did not. Future studies would benefit from 
recruiting individuals with the same OCD presentation (e.g. experiencing 
aggressive OITs), and assessing their working memory in comparison to 
nonclinical individuals, or an alternative sub-group (e.g. contamination OITs). 
Such a study would allow the hypothesis (that subgroups of individuals with 
OCD demonstrate working memory deficits) to be tested. 
One final possible explanation for why individuals with OCD 
demonstrate working memory deficits is that state factors lead to EF deficits in 
individuals with OCD because of some pre-existing vulnerability, such as 
neurobiological deficits (Snyder et al., 2014). In support of this idea is evidence 
demonstrating neurobiological differences in areas thought to subserve EFs 
(the prefrontal cortex) between individuals with OCD and nonclinical 
individuals (e.g. Menzies et al., 2008) and unaffected relatives of individuals 
with OCD and nonclinical individuals (e.g., Cavedini, Zorzi, Piccinni, 
Cavallini, & Bellodi, 2010; Menzies, Williams, et al., 2008; Rajender et al., 
2011). Extending the previous analogy used to describe the Executive Overload 
Model of OCD, individuals with OCD may have less RAM available than 
nonclinical individuals, making them more vulnerable to interference from 
other computer programs (e.g. OITs). Whereas it may only take a small increase 
in OITs to cause deficits in individuals with OCD, it may take many more to 
lead to deficits in nonclinical individuals. The present study recruited a 
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nonclinical sample and was therefore unable to investigate this idea. Future 
behaviour-genetic research testing for shared genetic influence on EF and 
OCD, or longitudinal studies following at-risk children (e.g. who have parents 
with OCD), may help to elucidate whether individuals with OCD demonstrate 
a pre-existing vulnerability to EF deficits (Snyder et al., 2014). 
  One limitation of the current study is the use of nonclinical participants. 
Nonclinical participants offer a relevant and widely used method of studying 
OCD-related phenomena, particularly for preliminary research which is 
looking to investigate new ideas and models, such as the Executive Overload 
Model of OCD (Abramowitz et al., 2014). However, there are several 
potentially relevant differences between OITs experienced by nonclinical 
individuals and individuals with OCD that may influence the amount 
interference that they cause. Notably, OITs experienced by individuals with 
OCD tend to be more intense, distressing, enduring and bizarre than those 
experienced by nonclinical individuals (Rachman & de Silva, 1978; Berry & 
Laskey, 2012). As a result, clinical OITs may capture an individual’s attention 
more readily, and mean that the thoughts are more likely to be prioritized over 
the working memory task, due to their salience and emotional valence. When 
OITs capture an individual’s attention in this way, working memory deficits 
are more likely to be found (Cheyne et al., 2009; Levinson et al., 2012; 
Smallwood et al., 2004).   
 A second important difference between OITs experienced by 
individuals with OCD, and nonclinical individuals, is that clinical OITs are 
more likely to be suppressed than nonclinical OITs (Berry & Laskey, 2012), a 
process that may depend on working memory resources (Brewin & Smart, 
Investigating the relationship between obsessive-compulsive symptomatology and executive functions. 
 
103 
 
2005). It may be, therefore, that working memory deficits found in individuals 
with OCD (e.g. Snyder et al., 2014) arise specifically from attempts to control 
and suppress OITs. If this were the case, then such working memory deficits 
would not be found in the current study, as the sample was nonclinical and 
therefore would be less likely to suppress the OITs that they experienced. 
However, research in this area is limited, and further research is needed to 
investigate the relationship between working memory and thought suppression.  
 There are several other limitations of the current study that should be 
considered. First, following the n-back task, participants in the primed group 
were asked two questions regarding their experience of OITs (“Roughly how 
many times did you experience your most upsetting/unpleasant intrusive 
thought during the task?”, and “Did you experience any other intrusive thoughts 
of the following themes?”) and non-primed participants were asked one 
question regarding their experience of OITs (“Did you experience any intrusive 
thoughts of the following themes?”). The higher number of OITs experienced 
by the primed group could conceivably be the result of demand characteristics, 
whereby participants in the primed group reported more OITs because they 
were asked on more occasions how many they experienced. However, previous 
studies have demonstrated that such a priming method leads to statistically 
significant differences in the number of OITs experienced by primed and non-
primed groups, (e.g. Purdon, 2001; Purdon & Clark, 2001; Purdon, Rowa & 
Anthony, 2005). It would be expected, therefore, that differences in OIT 
frequency would have been found, regardless of the questions asked. 
 Similarly, it may be that the OIT prime led to a higher number of OITs 
experienced on the 1-back task than the 3-back task, as that was the order in 
Investigating the relationship between obsessive-compulsive symptomatology and executive functions. 
 
104 
 
which the tasks were completed; however, this was not assessed in the present 
study. In other words, the 1-back task was conducted directly after the OIT 
prime, whereas the 3-back task was conducted following the OIT prime and 
the 1-back task, and the effect of the prime may have therefore decreased or 
worn off as the task progressed. Future studies might consider re-priming OITs 
between each set of trials (e.g. directly before the 1-back and 3-back tasks). 
Alternatively, future studies may prime OITs in the same way as the present 
study, but assess the number of OITs experienced, retrospectively, after the 1-
back and 3-back task. 
Finally, in the current study individuals were not screened for clinical 
DSM disorders, psychotropic medication, or neurological disorders. It was 
therefore not possible to assess the impact of these variables on task 
performance. Indeed, each of these variables have been linked to 
underperformance on EF tasks (Abramovitch & Cooperman, 2015). Future 
research should control for these variables. 
 In conclusion, data from the present study indicate that an increase in a 
range of OCD-relevant state factors do not impair working memory in 
nonclinical individuals. In particular, an increase in OITs does not impair 
working memory in nonclinical individuals. The findings from the present 
study do not provide evidence for a key prediction of the Executive Overload 
Model of OCD. Future research would benefit from investigating the impact of 
OITs on inhibition and cognitive flexibility, as such research would provide 
more evidence in favour, or against, the Executive Overload Model of OCD. 
The current findings suggest that EF deficits found in individuals with OCD 
may only be found in a sub-group of such individuals. Future research 
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investigating working memory performance in different sub-groups of 
individuals with OCD would help to answer this question.  
The findings from chapter two and chapter three do not support the trait 
or state account of working memory deficits in OCD, leaving a confusing 
picture of the relationship between working memory deficits and the symptoms 
of OCD. One area that has not been investigated in this thesis, so far, is the 
relationship between working memory and OCD-relevant thought control 
strategies. Executive functions, including working memory, are responsible for 
the control of other cognitive processes, including thoughts (Banich, 2009). 
Future research that investigates the relationship between working memory and 
the control of OITs may reveal important information about the development 
and maintenance of OCD.  Indeed, the next chapter aims to investigate this 
relationship. 
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Chapter 4: The relationship between working memory 
and obsessive intrusive thought dismissibility. 
The current chapter aims to investigate the question of whether working 
memory is implicated in the suppression of obsessive intrusive thoughts 
(OITs). More specifically, the chapter aims to assess whether individual 
differences in working memory predict the ability to dismiss OITs. The studies 
presented in the thesis so far provide no evidence for the state or trait account 
for working memory deficits in OCD. However, none of these studies have 
investigated the relationship between working memory and thought control 
strategies, despite the importance of such strategies to our understanding of 
OCD. This chapter, therefore, aims to investigate the relationship between 
working memory and thought suppression.  
In this chapter, first, I will introduce thought suppression and discuss its 
relevance to the maintenance and development of obsessive-compulsive 
disorder (OCD). Next, I will discuss some of the problems with most thought 
suppression research and explain how measuring thought dismissibility is a 
more comprehensive measure of suppression success than thought frequency. 
Finally, I will discuss how working memory may be implicated in the 
suppression of thoughts, and introduce the current study. 
Current cognitive theories of OCD posit that a key factor in the 
development and maintenance of OCD is unsuccessful thought control attempts 
(Rachman 1997, 1998). Most individuals experience OITs (e.g. see Radomsky 
et al., 2014), but individuals with OCD are more likely to appraise the thoughts 
in negative ways, such as by thinking the thought is an indication that 
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something will happen which they must prevent (Salkovskis, 1985; 1999). Such 
negative appraisals of OITs motivate individuals to attempt to control their 
thoughts (often unsuccessfully), to try to reduce distress and prevent negative 
outcomes (Rachman 1997, 1998).  
One method of thought control that has been implicated in the 
maintenance and development of OCD is thought suppression (Clark & 
Purdon, 1993; Salkovskis & Campbell, 1994). Thought suppression can be 
defined as the effortful process of attempting to remove a thought (Wegner, 
1989) such as by saying ‘stop’ to oneself or by attempting to mentally replace 
the thought with another (Purdon, Rowa, & Antony, 2007). Based on this 
definition, it could be said that individuals are ‘successful’ at suppressing 
thoughts when they are able to remove the thought from consciousness, or 
prevent a thought from reoccurring. Although individuals with OCD are more 
likely to suppress OITs than nonclinical individuals (Belloch, Morillo, García-
Soriano, 2007; García-Soriano & Belloch, 2013), most of these attempts are 
unsuccessful (Purdon, Rowa, & Antony, 2007). In addition, suppression 
attempts are often strenuous and time-consuming (Purdon et al., 2007), and 
therefore have a significant negative impact on functioning.  
In a seminal study on thought suppression, Wegner (1987) found that 
not only are suppression attempts often unsuccessful, but they actually lead to 
an increase, rather than decrease in the suppressed thought. In the study, 
nonclinical individuals who were instructed not to think of a white bear 
experienced more thoughts of white bears than individuals who were not asked 
to suppress the thoughts (Wegner, 1987). The findings of this study lead to the 
development of the “ironic process theory” (Wegner, 1994). The central idea 
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of the theory is that not only is thought suppression unsuccessful, but it also has 
a paradoxical effect: it causes the number of suppressed thoughts to increase. 
Support for the ironic process theory of thought suppression comes 
from a meta-analysis that looked at the effect of thought suppression in 
nonclinical individuals and those with OCD (Abramowitz, Tolin, & Street, 
2001). The meta-analysis found a small post-suppression effect (‘the rebound 
effect’; estimated d = .30); that is, suppressed thoughts were experienced more 
frequently in the period after attempting to suppress them. However, the meta-
analysis did not find an overall effect of thought suppression, nor did it find 
that suppression lead to an increase in thoughts whilst actively suppressing 
(‘thought enhancement effect’). In other words, individuals are, to some extent, 
able to keep thoughts out of consciousness whilst actively trying to suppress 
them. However, once suppression efforts are relaxed, individuals experience 
significantly more thoughts than individuals who were not instructed to 
suppress in the first place. 
Despite the lack of support for a thought enhancement effect in 
Abramowitz et al. (2001), it is clear that individuals are often unsuccessful at 
suppressing thoughts whilst attempting to suppress them, and also that they 
vary in their suppression ability. These two points are demonstrated by OIT 
frequency means of more than zero in suppression studies (e.g. with nonclinical 
participants; Purdon & Clark, 2001; with individuals diagnosed with OCD; 
Abramowitz, Tolin, Street, 2001). For example, Purdon and Clark (2001) 
instructed nonclinical individuals to suppress OITs over a six-minute period, 
and found that the mean number of OITs reported by the group was 6.47 (with 
a standard deviation of 5.54). Understanding the mechanisms behind these 
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individual differences in suppression success would reveal important 
information about the persistence of OITs, and ultimately, about the 
maintenance and development of OCD.  
Problems with previous thought suppression research 
In order to understand the mechanisms underlying individual 
differences in thought suppression success, it is important that thought 
suppression is measured accurately. However, there are methodological 
problems with the majority of previous research on thought suppression which 
means that strong conclusions cannot be drawn about the findings. One 
problem with the majority of previous research on suppression success is that 
these studies have generally considered thought frequency (also referred to as 
‘thought onset’, or the number of times a thought enters consciousness; 
Lambert, Hu, Magee, Beadel, & Teachman, 2014) as a primary dependent 
variable of suppression success, rather than thought dismissibility (also referred 
to as ‘thought duration’; Lambert et al., 2014; ‘thought persistence’; Purdon, 
2004; and ‘thought removal’; Ólafsson et al., 2014). Whereas thought 
frequency represents the number of OITs experienced during a suppression 
task, thought dismissibility represents the length of time that OITs are attended 
to during a suppression task. The problem with measuring thought frequency 
as a measure of suppression success is that frequency is confounded with 
duration, meaning only a partial picture of suppression success is provided 
(Purdon, 2004). In contrast, measuring thought dismissibility is able to account 
for both frequency and duration.  
The fact that frequency is often confounded with duration in the 
majority of suppression studies can be demonstrated by briefly describing how 
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suppression success is typically measured. Participants are first primed with 
OITs, so that they experience OITs during the experimental period and are 
therefore able to attempt to suppress them. Priming OITs is often achieved by 
asking a participant to think about an OIT for a period of time. (e.g. 30 seconds; 
Purdon & Clark, 2001). Following the prime, participants are asked to suppress 
the OIT for a period of time (e.g. “try as hard as you can to suppress the… 
thought”, Grisham & Williams, 2009). During this suppression attempt, the 
number of OITs that the participant experiences are measured (e.g. by pressing 
a computer key; Purdon & Clark, 2001). Fewer OITs during the suppression 
task are thought to represent more successful thought suppression; and 
therefore better mental control. A participant who records only one thought 
occurrence during the suppression task might appear to be more successful at 
suppressing thoughts than someone who reports five thought occurrences. 
However, the former participant may have failed to dismiss the OIT for the 
entire duration of the task, whereas the latter participant may have successfully 
dismissed each of the five OITs (Purdon, Gifford, McCabe & Antony, 2011). 
Here, the participant who experienced five OITs may feel more in control of 
their thoughts (and feel like they are having more success suppressing) than the 
participant who experienced one OIT, but the majority of suppression tasks are 
unable to detect or demonstrate this crucial distinction.  
It is important to note that some studies may have collected data on 
thought duration but chose not to report the data. That is, some studies assessed 
target thought frequency using a stream of consciousness verbalization (e.g. 
Brewin & Smart, 2005), whereby participants verbally state any thoughts that 
come into their head whilst attempting to suppress the target thought (e.g. “I 
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wonder what I should have for dinner later… that was irritating earlier when 
the bus drove off even though the driver saw me” etc.). Participants are also 
asked to ring a bell whenever the target thought comes into mind.  This 
verbalization is later coded by the experimenter for the number of times that 
the individual mentions the target thought and rings the bell. However, as 
previously mentioned, this data on thought duration is very rarely reported, and 
may no longer be available (e.g. if duration was not coded originally and 
recordings have been destroyed). In addition, this may be a problematic 
measure of suppression success because people may feel self-conscious about 
reporting thought occurrences when they have been instructed to suppress it 
(Purdon, 2004), particularly when the target thought covers a taboo topic, such 
as sex or aggression. 
 In contrast to studies that only measure thought frequency, studies that 
measure thought dismissibility do not suffer from the same problems with 
confounding frequency/duration. As with frequency studies, participants are 
also first primed with a thought/OIT.  However, the suppression instructions 
differ to those in frequency studies: participants are typically asked to replace 
this thought with a neutral thought (e.g. try to replace the OIT with the thought 
of a houseplant; Purdon et al., 2011) and to indicate when they were successful 
in doing this (e.g. by pressing a computer key; Purdon et al., 2011). Quicker 
dismissal times are thought to represent greater suppression success. It is 
important to note that such studies are also able to measure thought frequency 
(e.g. the number of keyboard key presses) in addition to thought dismissibility, 
making the method of measurement more comprehensive than measuring 
frequency alone. Using this method of measuring suppression success captures 
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both frequency and duration, and so a more complete picture of thought 
suppression is captured.  
A further advantage of measuring thought dismissibility over thought 
frequency is that it may reveal important information about OCD. Indeed, it is 
currently unclear whether OCD is a problem of thought return (i.e., frequency) 
or of an inability to get rid of a thought once it occurs (i.e., dismissibility; 
Purdon et al., 2011). Measuring thought dismissibility alongside OCD 
symptoms will help to answer such questions. It may be, for example, that OIT 
dismissibility is a further characteristic that should be considered within the 
continuum model of OITs (Clark & Rhyno, 2005). The continuum model of 
OITs suggests that OITs are experienced by everybody but differ based on a 
range of other variables, such as frequency and appraisals (Clark & Rhyno, 
2005; Berry & Laskey, 2012). It may be, therefore, that OITs at one extreme 
end of the continuum are harder to dismiss than those toward the other end of 
the continuum. 
Another methodological issue with the majority of previous thought 
suppression studies is that they cannot determine whether low frequency of 
OITs reflects poor suppression success or difficulties with selecting an 
appropriate suppression strategy (Ólafsson et al., 2014). Participants are 
typically instructed to try to suppress the thought (e.g. “it is very important that 
you try as hard as you can to suppress the… thought”, Grisham & Wlliams, 
2009), leaving the participant to decide upon the most effective suppression 
strategy. However, possible options for thought suppression could include 
saying “stop” to oneself, replacing the thought with another thought, trying to 
relax, keeping busy, distracting oneself physically, or avoiding something that 
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may trigger the thought, amongst others (Purdon et al., 2007). Each of these 
suppression strategies vary in how effective they are (although none are 
particularly effective; Purdon et al., 2007). In contrast, dismissibility tasks 
typically provide participants with a strategy to use (e.g. “if the basket thought 
comes to mind… immediately try to replace the thought of a basket with the 
thought of a houseplant”; Purdon et al., 2011). Providing participants with a 
suppression strategy means that difficulties with selecting appropriate 
strategies can be ruled out as an explanation of the findings. It can therefore be 
inferred that poor dismissibility scores reflect unsuccessful suppression (or 
poor mental control). 
In summary, the problems with previous thought suppression studies 
could be overcome in future studies by adopting a thought dismissibility 
measure of suppression, rather than a thought frequency measure, for four 
reasons. First, thought frequency measures confound frequency with duration, 
whereas thought dismissiblity measures do not. Second, dismissibility 
measures offer a more comprehensive measure of suppression success, as they 
capture both frequency and dismissibiltiy. Third, thought dismissibility 
measures offer a clear suppression strategy for participants to use, ruling out 
the possibility that findings are due to difficulties choosing a suppression 
strategy. Fourth, thought dismissibility measures may reveal previously 
unknown information about OCD. 
Thought dismissibility studies 
Despite the clear advantages of measuring OIT dismissibility over OIT 
frequency alone, few studies have taken this approach (Edwards & Dickerson, 
1987; Magee & Teachman, 2012; Purdon et al., 2011; Ólafsson et al., 2014; 
Investigating the relationship between obsessive-compulsive symptomatology and executive functions. 
 
114 
 
Lambert et al., 2014). Broadly speaking, dismissibility has been measured in 
two ways: subjectively and objectively. Subjective dismissibility has been 
measured through the use of self-report questionnaires, and refers to perceived 
difficulty in dismissing OITs (Rachman & de Silva, 1978; Salkvoskis & 
Harrison, 1984; Ólafsson et al. 2014). Objective dismissibility has been 
measured through experimental studies, and refers to actual ability in 
dismissing OITs. Of those studies that have been conducted into OIT 
dismissibility, although there are many methodological similarities, there are 
also some key differences. That is, the studies vary in priming method and in 
the way dismissibility data is captured (physical/manual vs computerised). In 
order to inform future studies on OIT dismissibility, it is therefore important to 
not only consider the key findings, but also the strengths and weakness of each 
methodology. 
In the first study to measure objective OIT dismissibility, 43 nonclinical 
participants were assessed on their ability to dismiss an OIT by replacing it with 
a neutral thought (unspecified) (Edwards & Dickerson, 1987). Participants 
were first asked to think of an upsetting OIT (for an unspecified period of time, 
chosen from the Intrusive Thoughts Questionnaire; Edwards, 1985) and to 
press a reaction time buzzer when they had formed the thought. Following this, 
a tone sounded and participants were required to replace their OIT with a 
neutral thought (and vice versa) and to press a reaction time buzzer when they 
had successfully replaced the thought. Time taken to replace one thought with 
another served as a measure of objective dismissibility. The key finding was 
that participants took longer to dismiss OITs than neutral thoughts. This was 
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the first study to find an association between OCD symptoms and thought 
dismissibility.  
The finding that OITs take longer to dismiss than neutral thoughts was 
later replicated with a computerised version of the dismissibility task (Ólafsson 
et al. 2014; experiment 1). To begin, sixty-one female participants were 
presented with a blank screen and sound cue. On the cue, participants were 
asked to form an image of either i) a personal OIT (selected from the 
Interpretation of Intrusions Inventory, III; Obsessive Compulsive Cognitions 
Working Group, 2005), ii) a standard OIT (“you hit a six-year-old girl with 
your car”), or iii) a neutral thought (“you are bicycling when you see a middle-
aged man in a green scarf”). Participants were then instructed to hold the 
thought in mind for 15 seconds, before replacing the thought with a neutral 
thought (“sitting on a bench, waiting for a bus to arrive”), and indicating when 
they had done so. This process of thinking of a thought, holding it for 15 
seconds, then replacing it, was repeated six times for each target thought (18 
times in total). The time taken to replace the thought was used as the 
participant’s objective dismissal score. Personal OITs (but not standard OITs) 
took longer to dismiss than neutral thoughts. In addition, both personal OITs 
and standard OITs were reported as being more difficult to dismiss than neutral 
thoughts (subjective dismissibility). However, this study did not find that 
symptoms of OCD were related to objective dismissibility times, suggesting 
that OCD symptoms cannot explain individual differences in OIT 
dismissibility. 
The second part of the same experiment (Ólafsson et al. 2014; 
experiment 2), looked to investigate the relationship between OCD symptoms 
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and objective dismissibility further. Forty university students (32 female) were 
recruited and divided into a “high OCD” and “low OCD” group, based on their 
OCD symptom scores (Obsessive Compulsive Inventory-Revised; Foa et al., 
2002). All participants completed a shorter version of the dismissiblility task 
that was used in experiment 1. In line with the study’s first experiment, there 
was no difference between the high OCD group and the low OCD group in 
objective OIT dismissibility (mean latency to dismiss OITs). However, the high 
OCD group reported poorer subjective dismissibility than the low OCD group. 
The findings from experiment 1 and 2 suggest that OCD symptomatology is 
related to perceived, rather than actual, difficulty with OIT dismissal. 
While the evidence presented so far suggests that OCD 
symptomatology may not be related to poorer objective thought dismissal, only 
one study has looked directly at this phenomenon in individuals with OCD 
(Purdon et al., 2011). In this study, 25 participants with a diagnosis of OCD 
were first primed with their most upsetting OIT, and 25 participants with a 
diagnosis of panic disorder were primed with their most upsetting panic-related 
thought. The prime involved thinking about the thought in vivid detail for 30 
seconds. Following the OIT prime, all participants were given a computerized 
thought replacement task, where they were first given a neutral thought and 
then asked to replace the neutral thought (e.g. shoebox) with their most 
upsetting OIT or panic related thought, and vice versa. Participants sat at a 
computer for two eight-minute intervals and were asked to indicate using a key 
on a keyboard each time they had experienced the target thought and then each 
time they had successfully replaced the thought. This measure of dismissibility 
captured four different variables: thought frequency, objective thought 
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dismissibility, time taken for the OIT to return, and the total amount of time 
spent thinking about the OIT. Individuals with OCD experienced more frequent 
OITs and experienced them for a longer total period of time than individuals 
with panic disorder (with panic-related thoughts). However, there were no 
differences between the groups in time taken to dismiss thoughts, suggesting 
thought dismissibility alone is not a problem that is specific to OCD. 
In addition to these experimental studies of objective thought 
dismissibility, several studies have measured subjective dismissibility alone 
(Parkinson & Rachman, 1981; Rachman & de Silva, 1978; Salkovskis & 
Harrison, 1984). The general finding from these questionnaire studies is that 
individuals with OCD report more difficulty dismissing OITs than nonclinical 
individuals. These findings are in line with some of those previously discussed 
(Ólafsson et al. 2014; experiment 1 and 2). However, self-report questionnaires 
suffer from “memory effects”, enhanced or impaired recollection of memories 
due to the time delay between the experience and the self-report, meaning 
participants may not be accurately reporting their experiences. It is important, 
therefore, that these findings are not interpreted as representing poorer OIT 
dismissibility in individuals with OCD. Rather, the findings represent poorer 
perceived difficulty with dismissing OITs in individuals with OCD. 
There are several important methodological limitations in the thought 
dismissibility literature that should be considered. Most dismissibility studies, 
barring one (Edwards & Dickerson, 1987) utilised computerized versions of the 
suppression task, which are superior to non-computerized versions, due to ease 
of administration, superior time measurement accuracy, and reduced demand 
effects (as the experimenter does not need to be in the same room as the 
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participant). There is also variation in the method used to prime OITs, with 
some studies only asking participants to briefly think of an OIT (Edwards & 
Dickerson, 1987) and some asking participants to think of pre-selected OIT for 
40 seconds (Magee & Teachmann, 2012). The problem with asking participants 
to “think” about OITs for a period of time is that some participants may fail to 
actually do it; either due to poor motivation or an unwillingness to think about 
an upsetting thought. A superior method of priming OITs would be to ask 
participants to write about their OITs for a period of time, thus forcing them to 
engage with the task. Very few studies have used this method of priming (e.g. 
Najmi, Riemenn, & Wegner, 2009; Bomyea & Amir, 2011) and no studies have 
used this method of priming when measuring OIT dismissibility. It would 
therefore be methodologically superior to use computerized tasks and a writing 
OIT prime.  
To summarise, although the research on thought dismissibility is scarce 
and varies methodologically, current findings suggest that symptoms of OCD 
are related to poorer subjective thought dismissibility, but not poorer objective 
thought dismissibility. It is not surprising that perceived difficulty with 
dismissing OITs is related to OCD symptomatology, as it has been found 
previously that individuals with OCD are more likely to appraise OITs as being 
uncontrollable (Cartwright-Hatton & Wells, 1997; Clark, Purdon, & Wang, 
2003). It is more surprising that there is no relationship between objective 
dismissibility and OCD symptoms. Overall, it seems that symptoms of OCD 
cannot explain differences in thought dismissibility, however, further research 
is needed to clarify the relationship.  
Investigating the relationship between obsessive-compulsive symptomatology and executive functions. 
 
119 
 
Working memory and suppression 
In addition to OCD symptomatology, a further possible explanation for 
individual differences in suppression success is variations in working memory. 
Indeed, several studies have implicated working memory in the successful 
suppression of thoughts, both neutral and OITs (Brewin & Beaton, 2002; 
Brewin & Smart, 2005; Bomyea & Amir, 2011; Rosen & Engle, 1998). In the 
first study to investigate the relationship between working memory and thought 
suppression, Rosen and Engle (1998; experiment 2) recruited 120 nonclinical 
participants. Participants completed a working memory task (a variation of the 
operation span task; OSPAN, Turner & Engle, 1989) and a word learning task. 
The word learning task involved learning three lists, each containing 12 pairs 
of words.  The initial word in each list was the same, but the paired word 
changed from list 1 to list 2 and then back to the original in list 3 (e.g., bird-
bath, bird-dawn, bird-bath). The idea behind this set of lists was to create 
interference, so that the paired words in list 1 would interfere with learning list 
2. The key finding from the study was that individuals with better working 
memory were slower to re-learn the list 3 pairs, suggesting they had more 
successfully suppressed the words in order to learn the words on list 2.  This 
finding suggests that the working memory system is responsible for controlled 
attention to a range of stimuli, which includes the exclusion of irrelevant or 
unwanted material. 
Another study that suggested individual differences in working memory 
may explain differences in suppression success was carried out by Brewin and 
Beaton (2002). Sixty nonclinical participants were asked to complete a working 
memory task (operation span task; OSPAN, Turner & Engle, 1989) and a 
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thought suppression task. The OSPAN task is a prototypical working memory 
task whereby participants are asked to remember and recall a sequence of 
letters, each of which is separated by an arithmetic problem. The thought 
suppression task followed a standard “white bear” paradigm (Wegner et al., 
1987); whereby participants were instructed not to think of a white bear and to 
express, via bell rings, when the thought of a white bear entered consciousness. 
The study found that working memory was negatively associated with number 
of thoughts experienced during an active suppression attempt. That is, 
participants with better working memory were more successful at suppressing 
thoughts than participants with poorer working memory. This finding 
implicated the working memory system in the successful suppression of 
thoughts.  
There are several limitations to Brewin & Beaton (2002) that may limit 
its generalizability (Erskine, Georgiou, Joshi, Deans, & Colegate, 2017). More 
specifically, the mean number of intrusions experienced over a five-minute 
active suppression period was 15.53 (SD = 11.27), which is much higher than 
the usual frequency reported across studies (Erskine et al., 2017). It is possible 
that this high frequency of thoughts represents an immediate enhancement 
effect, which is rarely found within the literature (Erskine et al., 2017). In 
addition, the average IQ of the sample in the study was 119, much higher than 
the average European IQ range of 95-100 (Gelade, 2008). This could be 
problematic as IQ is positively associated with working memory capacity 
(Ackerman, Beier, & Boyle, 2005) and may therefore explain the high number 
of thoughts reported during the suppression task (Erskine et al., 2017). 
However, this seems unlikely as the study found that working memory was 
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related to fewer, not more, thoughts during suppression. Despite these 
limitations, the findings from the study suggest a relationship between working 
memory and the successful suppression of thoughts (Erskine et al., 2017). 
The findings of Brewin and Beaton (2002) were later replicated by 
Brewin and Smart (2005), but with OITs instead of thoughts of a white bear. 
All participants completed a suppression task and a working memory task 
(OSPAN). Before completing the suppression task, participants were primed 
with their most upsetting OIT (chosen from the Revised Obsessional Intrusions 
Inventory; Purdon & Clark, 1994) and were asked to suppress this thought for 
the next five-minute period. Again, OSPAN scores were found to correlate 
negatively with suppression success, such that participants with better working 
memory also experienced fewer OITs during the suppression task. Again, these 
findings implicated the working memory system in the successful suppression 
of thoughts.   
The findings from these two correlational studies that suggest working 
memory plays a role in thought suppression were later supported by a working 
memory intervention study (Bomyea & Amir, 2011). Fifty nonclinical student 
participants were recruited, and half of the participants were given a working 
memory training intervention. Next, participants completed a working memory 
task (OSPAN; Turner & Engle, 1989). Participants were then primed with 
negative personal memories relating to OITs, by writing down a negative 
personal experience that had led to the experience of an OIT, for three minutes. 
Following this, participants were asked to suppress thoughts of their upsetting 
memory. Those participants in the intervention condition performed better on 
the working memory task. Crucially, they also reported fewer upsetting 
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memories in the suppression condition than participants who did not receive 
working memory training. This experimental finding highlighted the role of 
working memory in the suppression of upsetting thoughts. 
In sum, although research is sparse, these findings suggest that working 
memory may be implicated in the successful suppression of OITs. That is, 
individual differences in thought-suppression abilities may be explained by 
differences in working memory. However, these studies have all measured 
thought frequency (rather than dismissibility) as a key measure of suppression 
success, which is problematic for reasons previously discussed.  It would be 
informative to investigate whether working memory is related to an 
individual’s ability to dismiss OITs. Whereas in the case of OIT frequency, 
working memory may serve to maintain attention to a distractor thought, in the 
case of OIT dismissibility, working memory may serve to shift attention away 
from the suppressed thought and to a distractor thought. Indeed, it may be that 
working memory is implicated more closely in dismissing OITs once they 
occur, rather than preventing them from reoccurring. To date, no studies have 
investigated the relationship between working memory and OIT dismissibility. 
The effect of mood on suppression 
In addition to OCD symptomatology and working memory, a further 
possible individual difference that may explain suppression success is mood. 
Indeed, some of the previously discussed suppression studies found a 
relationship between mood and suppression. For example, Brewin and Smart 
(2005) found a relationship between depression and the number of OITs 
experienced during a suppression task. Wentzlaff and Wegner (2000) argued 
that anxiety and depression are associated with poorer suppression success, 
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because suppression often involves searching for a distractor thought, and 
distractor thoughts may trigger the recurrence of OITs because of similar 
negative content. In line with this idea, individuals experiencing dysphoria have 
more difficulty suppressing negative thoughts than positive thoughts (Conway, 
Howell, & Giannopoulos, 1991) and individuals who are not experiencing 
dysphoria have more difficult suppressing positive thoughts than negative 
thoughts (Howell & Conway, 1992). However, much of the thought 
suppression literature has failed to account for the effects of depression and 
anxiety. Other studies have measured mood but have failed to find a 
relationship. For example, Ólafsson et al. 2014 did not find a relationship 
between depression and objective OIT dismissibility. Despite this contradictory 
finding, there is some evidence to suggest a relationship between mood and 
suppression success, and future studies should therefore consider the role of 
mood in suppression studies.  
The present study  
 The main aim of the present study is to investigate whether individual 
differences in working memory predict an individual’s ability to dismiss 
OITs. It was expected that individuals with better working memory will also 
be quicker at dismissing OITs once they occur. A further aim of the current 
study is to investigate whether individual differences in working memory 
predict the ability to prevent OITs from reoccurring/occurring in the first 
place. Based on previous findings (Brewin & Beaton, 2002; Brewin & Smart, 
2005), it was predicted that individuals with better working memory will also 
experience fewer OITs during a suppression task. A final aim of the current 
study is to investigate the relationship between OIT dismissibility (subjective 
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and objective) and OCD symptoms. It was predicted that subjective 
dismissibility, but not objective dismissibility, will be related to OCD 
symptoms. Each of these aims will be investigated in a nonclinical sample. As 
discussed in previous chapters, the use of nonclinical participants offers a 
valid method of studying these phenomena due to the dimensional experience 
of obsessive-compulsive symptoms (Abramowitz et al., 2014). These aims 
will be investigated by asking participants to complete a working memory 
task (OSPAN) and a dismissibility task on a computer.  In addition, 
participants will complete several questionnaires measuring mood and OITs.  
The current study will measure working memory using the OSPAN task 
(Turner & Engle, 1989) for two reasons. First, previous studies that have 
investigated working memory and suppression have utilised the task (e.g. 
Brewin & Beaton, 2002; Brewin & Smart, 2005), meaning more confident 
conclusions can be drawn from between-study comparisons. Second, the 
OSPAN has been associated with emotion regulation, such that individuals who 
scored higher on the OSPAN suppressed expressions of negative emotion (from 
watching a gruesome film) better than individuals who scored lower on the 
OSPAN (Schmeichel, Volokhov, & Demaree, 2008). It seems plausible, 
therefore, that the OSPAN may also be related to the suppression of OITs 
(Grisham & Williams, 2013). Objective OIT dismissibility will be measured 
using a computerized version of a thought dismissibility task (a shortened 
version of the task used by Purdon et al., 2011) and a two-minute OIT writing 
prime. That is, participants will first write about an upsetting OIT for two 
minutes. Following this, participants will sit at a computer and will be 
instructed to think of whatever they like, but to suppress (using a thought 
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replacement strategy) the selected OIT each time it enters consciousness. 
Participants will be asked to indicate, using assigned keyboard keys, i) when 
the thought has come into consciousness and ii) when the thought has 
successfully been replaced with a neutral thought. Distress related to the OIT 
will be controlled for, as distressing OITs are more difficult to dismiss than 
neutral thoughts (Edwards & Dickerson, 1987; Ólafsson et al., 2014). 
Depression and anxiety will also be controlled for, as there is evidence to 
suggest that that these states have a negative impact on suppression success 
(Wentzlaff & Wegner, 2000). 
To summarise the study’s hypotheses: 
Hypotheses: 
Better working memory will predict quicker objective OIT dismissibility (when 
controlling for depression and OIT distress). 
Better working memory will predict less frequent OITs (after controlling for 
depression and OIT distress). 
Obsessive intrusive thought dismissibility will not be related to OCD 
symptomatology. 
Subjective OIT dismissibility will be related to OCD symptomatology. 
4.1: Method 
Design 
The study used a within-subjects design. The primary predictor variable was 
working memory performance (as measured by the Operation Span task, 
OSPAN; Unsworth et al., 2005). The primary outcome variables were objective 
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OIT dismissibility (mean latency to dismiss OITs) and subjective OIT 
dismissibility (perceived difficulty in dismissing OITs) (on a 101-point scale). 
Distress associated with the primed OIT, and depression scores (as measured 
on Depression Anxiety and Stress Scale, DASS-21; Lovibond & Lovibond, 
1995) were entered as control variables. Other variables were depression, 
anxiety and stress scores (as measured on the Depression Anxiety and Stress 
Scale, DASS; Lovibond & Lovibond, 1995), obsessive-compulsive symptom 
scores (as measured by the Obsessive Compulsive Inventory – Revised, OCI-
R; Foa et al., 2002), retrospective OIT frequency (as measured by part 1 of the 
Obsessional Intrusive Thoughts Inventory; Original Spanish Version: 
“Inventario de Pensamientos Intrusos Obsesivos”, INPIOS; García-Soriano, 
Belloch, Morillo & Clark, 2011), the number of times the OIT occurred during 
prime (thought frequency); the total time spent thinking about OITs (total 
time); the mean latency with which the OIT returned (mean latency to return). 
Participants  
According to a priori power analysis, with a medium effect size (f ² = .15), an 
α =.05 and a power of .8, a sample of 85 participants was needed in total. Ninety 
participants were recruited, via e-mail, from a staff/student pool at The 
University of Sheffield. Nine participants were excluded from the study for not 
completing all relevant tasks, and four participants were excluded for scoring 
below 80% accuracy on the maths problems in the Operation Span Task 
(OSPAN task; Unsworth et al., 2005). A total sample size of 77 participants (15 
males, 62 females; mean age = 20 years; age range = 18-40 years) remained. 
Individuals who reported that they had received a diagnosis of OCD were not 
eligible to participate in the study, as they have been found to perform poorer 
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than nonclinical individuals on some executive function tasks (e.g. Snyder et 
al., 2014). Participants received either course credits or £5 cash reimbursement 
for their time.  
Materials 
Questionnaires 
The Obsessive Compulsive Inventory – Revised is an 18-item measure 
used to assess OCD symptoms. The OCI-R comprises a list of symptoms (e.g. 
“I check things more often than necessary”) for which participants indicate on 
a scale from 0 (“not at all”) to 4 (“extremely”) how distressed the symptoms 
have made them in the past month. Items cover six sub-scales, (a) washing, (b) 
checking/doubting, (c) obsessing, (d) mental neutralizing, (e) ordering, (f) 
hoarding. Total scores on the OCI-R are calculated by summing the items. 
Scores range from 0-72 with higher scores indicating higher levels of OCD 
symptomatology. The recommended cut-off score for the OCI-R is 21, with 
scores at or above this level indicating the likely presence of OCD (Foa et al., 
2002). The OCI-R has demonstrated good psychometric properties in 
nonclinical participants; excellent internal consistency (α = .89), good test-
retest reliability (1 week – r = .84), and convergent validity (significant positive 
correlations were found with the OCI-R and a range of OCD measures; Foa et 
al., 2002). Discriminant validity was mixed, with high correlations between the 
OCI-R and Beck Depression Inventory (BDI; r = .7); however, this is common 
across all OCD symptom measures (Foa et al., 2002). In this study, the 
Cronbach’s alpha was .90. 
Part one of the Obsessional Intrusive Thoughts Inventory (Original 
Spanish Version: “Inventario de Pensamientos Intrusos Obsesivos”, INPIOS; 
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García-Soriano, Belloch, Morillo & Clark, 2011) assesses the frequency with 
which participants experience 48 OITs (e.g. “The documents, papers, etc. are 
out of order or not in their place”) using a seven-point Likert scale ranging from 
0 (“never”) to 6 (“always”). Part one also includes two open-ended items (“I 
also have these other intrusions…”), which allow participants to report any 
idiosyncratic OITs. Total scale scores for part one of the INPIOS are calculated 
by dividing the total score by the number of items with a frequency ≥ 1 (see 
García-Soriano et al., 2011). Scores range from 0-6 and higher scores on the 
INPIOS correspond to more frequent OITs. Part one of the INPIOS has 
demonstrated good internal reliability (α = .94) and test-retest reliability (7-14 
days, r = .97) (García-Soriano et al., 2011) in a non-clinical sample. The 
questionnaire also demonstrated adequate convergent and divergent validity 
with INPIOS total scores being more strongly correlated with OCD measures 
than with measures of depression, anxiety or worry (García-Soriano et al., 
2011). In the current study the internal consistency for part 1 total score was α 
= .95.  
The Depression Anxiety and Stress Scale (DASS-21; Lovibond & 
Lovibond, 1995) is a 21-item measure of depression, anxiety and stress. 
Participants were presented with statements (e.g. “I found myself getting upset 
by quite trivial things”) and were required to indicate how much each statement 
applied to them in the past month, on a scale from 0 (“did not apply to me at 
all”) to 3 (“applied to me very much or most of the time”). Scores for 
depression, anxiety, and stress are calculated by summing the items for each 
subscale, with higher scores indicating higher levels of each construct. Scores 
on the depression subscale range from 0-21 (0-4 = normal; 5-6 = mild; 7-10 = 
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moderate; 11-13 = severe; 14-21 = very severe), scores on the anxiety subscale 
range from 0-21 (0-3 = normal; 4-5 = mild; 6-7 = moderate; 8-9 = severe; 10-
21 = very severe), and scores on the stress subscale range from 0-21 (0-7 = 
normal; 8-9 = mild; 10-12 = moderate; 13-16 = severe; 17-21 = very severe). 
The DASS-21 has demonstrated good psychometric properties; excellent 
internal consistency (α =.87 -.94 for a sample of individuals with OCD and 
nonclinical individuals; Antony, Bieling, Cox, Enns, & Swinson, 1998), and 
good convergent and divergent validity (when compared with other measures 
of depression and anxiety; Antony et al., 1998; Henry & Crawford, 2005). In 
this study, the internal consistency for each subscale was: depression (α = .91), 
anxiety (α = .80), & stress (α = .85).  
Working memory measurement  
A computerized version of the Operation Span task (OSPAN; 
Unsworth et al., 2005) was used to assess working memory capacity. The 
OSPAN was completed on a computer with a 17-inch monitor and running E-
Prime 2.0 software (Psychology Software Tools, Inc., Pittsburgh, PA). For each 
trial, participants were presented with a sequence of three to seven letters that 
they were asked to remember. At the end of each trial, participants were 
presented with a matrix of 12 letters and were asked to indicate which letters 
they had been presented with, in the correct order, using a mouse.  In between 
each letter, participants were presented with a maths problem (e.g. 4 + 5), which 
they were asked to answer by selecting whether a presented number is “true” 
or “false” (e.g. 9; for the sum “4 + 5” this answer would be “true”). The primary 
purpose of these maths problems was to prevent participants from rehearsing 
the letters in their short-term memory, so that the test would more closely assess 
Investigating the relationship between obsessive-compulsive symptomatology and executive functions. 
 
130 
 
executive attention and working memory, rather than short-term retention and 
rehearsal (Conway et al., 2005).  
Participants practiced both the letter recall, and math problems, before 
the main trials began. Participants were then presented with 15 trials, which 
included three of each letter set-size (ranging from three to seven letters). The 
order of set sizes was random for each participant. The OSPAN produced three 
key dependent variables: the total number of letters recalled in the correct 
position (OSPAN partial score); the total number of letters recalled as a full set 
(OSPAN absolute score); and maths accuracy. The OSPAN partial score was 
used as the main dependent variable for working memory capacity. 
Obsessive Intrusive Thought Lab Measurements 
A shorter version of the thought dismissibility task used by Purdon et 
al. (2011) was used to assess objective OIT dismissibility. This task was 
completed on a computer with a 17-inch monitor and running E-Prime 2.0 
software (Psychology Software Tools, Inc., Pittsburgh, PA). For the task, 
participants were required to indicate when they were successful in replacing 
an OIT with a neutral thought. Participants were first allowed to practice the 
task, where they were first asked to generate an image of a basket in their heads. 
Participants were asked to monitor their stream of consciousness for two 
minutes, and indicate, by pressing a red key on a keyboard, when the thought 
of a basket came into their heads. Participants were told that they could think 
about anything they liked during this time. Participants were then instructed to 
try and immediately replace the thought of a basket with the thought of a 
houseplant, and indicate this by clicking a blue key.  
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Following the practice task, participants were primed with their most 
upsetting OIT from the INPIOS (García-Soriano et al., 2011). For the prime, 
participants were asked to write about a scene involving their most upsetting 
OIT for two minutes.  
Immediately following the priming task, participants began the main 
trial of the thought dismissibility task. Participants were asked to monitor their 
stream of consciousness for five minutes and indicate, by pressing a red key, 
when their most upsetting OIT came into their head. As with the practice trial, 
participants were told that they could think about anything they liked, but if the 
OIT came into their head, they should try and immediately replace it with the 
thought of a houseplant. Participants were instructed to indicate when they had 
successfully replaced the thought, by pressing a blue key. This task produces 
four dependent variables, which were recorded by the computer: the number of 
times the OIT occurred (thought frequency); the mean latency to replace the 
OIT (thought dismissibility); the mean latency with which the OIT returned 
(mean latency to return), and the total amount of time spent thinking about the 
OIT (total time). 
Following the thought dismissibility task, participants were assessed on 
subjective OIT dismissibility (“On average… how difficult was it to dismiss 
your intrusive thoughts”) and OIT distress (“On average… how distressed did 
the intrusive thoughts make you feel?”), assessed using a 101-point scale (0-
100).  
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Procedure 
All participants attended the laboratory and completed: a short 
demographic questionnaire; the Obsessive-Compulsive Inventory – Revised 
(OCI-R; Foa et al., 2002); the Obsessional Intrusive Thoughts Inventory 
(INPIOS; Garcia-Soriano et al., 2011); and the Depression Anxiety and Stress 
Scale (DASS-21; Lovibond & Lovibond, 1995) on a computer, using the 
survey platform, Qualtrics. Participants then completed the OIT dismissibility 
task, and subsequent dismissibility and distress questions. Following this, 
participants completed the OSPAN task (Unsworth et al., 2005). Participants 
sat approximately 80 cm from the screen. Informed consent was obtained from 
all participants and the study was granted ethical approval by the University’s 
psychology ethics committee. 
4.2: Results 
Descriptive statistics 
Participants scored a mean of 17.29 (SD = 10.99) on the OCI-R (OCI-R clinical 
cut off ≥ 21). The mean total number of OITs endorsed on the INPIOS across 
the sample was 27 (SD = 11). The average total score on the INPIOS was 2.18 
(SD = .69) (total frequency of thoughts divided by total number of thoughts 
endorsed; see INPIOS description above for more details). For the DASS 
depression subscale participants scored a mean of 5.44 (SD = 4.60) (out of a 
maximum score of 21; normal 0-4; moderate 7-10; extremely severe 14+), for 
the DASS anxiety subscale participants scored a mean of 4.94 (SD = 4.02) (out 
of a maximum score of 21 normal 0-3; moderate 6-7; extremely severe 10+), 
and for the DASS stress subscale participants scored a mean of 6.97 (SD = 4.48) 
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(out of a maximum score of 21 normal 0-7; moderate 10-12; extremely severe 
17+).   
 For the thought dismissibility task, participants experienced a mean of 
7.6 OITs (SD = 8.01). It took participants a mean time of 6.8 seconds (SD = 
9.3) to dismiss the OITs, it took a mean of 43.3 seconds (SD = 42.89) for the 
OITs to return after dismissal, and participants spent a mean total time of 37.57 
seconds (SD = 42.88) thinking about the OITs.  
Preliminary analysis: 
Are there any effects of reimbursement method on OSPAN performance? 
In the current study, some participants were compensated with cash (£5; n = 
33) and others with course credit (n = 44). In order to check that there were no 
unintended effects of differential reimbursement, two ANOVAs were 
conducted, comparing OSPAN performance (absolute score and partial score) 
between those who received cash and those who received course credit. 
Reimbursement method was entered as the independent variable (with two 
levels; cash or credit) and OSPAN absolute score and OSPAN partial score 
were entered as dependent variables. No significant differences were found 
between the two groups on OSPAN performance. More specifically, no 
significant differences in OSPAN absolute score were found between those 
compensated with cash (M = 42.06, SD = 15.24) and those compensated with 
credit (M = 38.34; SD = 16.71; F[1, 75] = 1.00, p = 0.31). Similarly, no 
significant differences in OSPAN partial score were found between those 
compensated with cash (M = 59.12, SD = 12.10) and those compensated with 
credit (M = 56.02, SD = 11.84; F[1, 75] = 1.27, p = 0.26). 
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Main analyses: 
Does working memory capacity predict objective obsessive intrusive thought 
dismissibility? 
A linear hierarchical regression analysis was conducted to determine whether 
working memory capacity predicted objective OIT dismissibility (assessed by 
the mean latency to replace OITs), whilst controlling for depression, anxiety 
and distress associated with the primed OIT. The model containing only 
depression, anxiety, and OIT distress explained 11.3% of the variance (see table 
1).  The model containing all variables also explained 11.3% of the variance in 
objective OIT dismissibility (see table 1). Working memory capacity was not a 
significant predictor of objective OIT dismissibility (see table 1).  
 
Table 1. Multiple regression model, predicting OIT dismissibility (mean 
latency to replace obsessive intrusive thoughts) from working memory 
(OSPAN), depression, anxiety (DASS) and distress associated with primed 
OIT. 
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DASS = Depression, anxiety and stress scale; OSPAN = Operation span task 
* = p <.05; ** = p < .01 
R2 = .11 for Step 1 (p = .03): ΔR2 = .11 for Step 2 (p = .07) 
 Unstandardized Coefficients Standa
rdized 
Coeffi
cients 
B SE b β 
Step 1     
 Constant 459.17 2342.97  
Depression 
(DASS)  
248.61 300.20 .13 
 
Anxiety 
(DASS) 
-208.25 355.94 -.09 
 OIT distress 101.57 37.56 .32** 
Step 2     
 Constant 1725.06 5315.61  
Depression 
(DASS) 
245.38 302.43 .13 
Anxiety 
(DASS) 
-204.78 302.43 -.09 
OIT distress 101.72 37.80 .32** 
Working 
Memory 
(OSPAN) 
-22.24 83.67 -.030 
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Does working memory capacity predict obsessive intrusive thought frequency? 
A linear hierarchical regression analysis was conducted to determine whether 
working memory capacity predicted OIT frequency, whilst controlling for 
depression, anxiety, and distress associated with the primed OIT. None of the 
independent variables predicted OIT frequency: working memory (B=.05, SE 
b = .08, β = .07, p = .57), depression (B = -.21, SE b = .29, β = -.12, p = .48), 
anxiety (B = .30, SE b =.34, β = .15, p = .39), or OIT distress (B = .00, SE b 
=.04, β = .02, p = .91). 
Are symptoms of obsessive-compulsive disorder related to objective obsessive-
intrusive thought dismissibility, subjective dismissibility, frequency or total 
time experiencing obsessive-intrusive thoughts? 
Pearson’s correlation analysis and spearman’s rank correlation analysis 
were conducted to explore the relationship between OCD symptomatology, 
objective OIT dismissibility, subjective OIT dismissibility, OIT frequency and 
total time experiencing OITs. A Bonferroni correction was made to correct for 
multiple comparisons, and P-values of <.0125 (.05/4) were considered to be 
significant. Pearson’s correlation analysis revealed a significant association 
between OCD symptomatology and perceived difficulty in dismissing OITs 
(r[77] = .40, p < .01) and between OCD symptomatology and total amount of 
time thinking about OITs (r[77] = .28, p = .01). There were no significant 
relationships between OCD symptomatology and mean time taken to dismiss 
OITs (r[77] = .17, p = .14) 
A Spearman’s rank correlation analysis demonstrated no significant 
relationship between OCD symptomatology and OIT frequency (rs(77) = .20, 
p = .08) 
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Is there a relationship between obsessive compulsive symptoms and perceived 
difficulty with dismissibility, after controlling for obsessive intrusive thought 
distress? 
A partial correlation revealed a significant relationship between OCD 
symptomatology (OCI-R) and perceived difficulty with dismissibility 
(subjective dismissibility), after controlling for OIT distress (r[73] = .29, p = 
.01). 
4.3: Discussion  
The main aim of the current study was to investigate whether individual 
differences in working memory predicted an individual’s ability to dismiss 
OITs. To investigate this question, participants completed a working memory 
task followed by an OIT dismissal task. The tasks were carefully chosen to 
most accurately measure their constructs and to increase the generalizability of 
the findings. Contrary to what was predicted, working memory did not predict 
an individual’s ability to dismiss OITs. This finding suggests that the working 
memory system is not implicated in one particular type of OIT suppression: the 
removal of thoughts once they have already occurred. A further aim of the 
present study was to investigate whether individual differences in working 
memory predicted the ability to prevent OITs from reoccurring/occurring in the 
first place. Again, contrary to what was predicted, working memory did not 
predict the number of OITs experienced during a suppression task. A final aim 
of the present study was to investigate the relationship between OIT 
dismissibility (both objective and subjective) and OCD symptoms. In line with 
predictions, OCD symptoms related to subjective, but not objective, OIT 
dismissibility. That is, individuals who reported more symptoms of OCD also 
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experienced more difficulty when dismissing OITs, but this was not reflected 
by slower dismissibility times.  
Taken together, the findings from the current study suggest that 
working memory is not implicated in the suppression of OITs. This finding is 
surprising when considering the role of the working memory system. 
According to Baddeley and Hitch’s model (1974), the working memory system 
is responsible for selectively maintaining and manipulating goal relevant 
information. In addition, the working memory system is responsible for the 
exclusion of irrelevant or unwanted material (Rosen & Engle, 1998). It was 
therefore expected that this system would be responsible for the exclusion of 
OITs, thoughts which, by definition, are unwanted. The results of the present 
study, however, suggest that this is not the case. 
Interestingly, although working memory was not related to objective 
OIT dismissibility, the level of OIT distress was related to objective OIT 
dismissibility. That is, participants who reported that their OITs were more 
distressing, also found them more difficult to dismiss. This finding is in line 
with previous research that has found OITs are more difficult to dismiss than 
neutral thoughts (Edwards & Dickerson, 1987; Ólafsson et al., 2014). One 
plausible explanation for this finding is that upsetting thoughts are difficult to 
dismiss because of the emotional distress and physiological arousal associated 
with the thoughts (Edwards & Dickerson, 1987). In other words, OITs capture 
an individual’s attention in a way that neutral thoughts do not, and are therefore 
harder to dismiss. This finding not only increases confidence in the idea that 
distressing thoughts are harder to dismiss than neutral thoughts, but also 
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increases confidence that the prime used in the current study was able to elicit 
distressing OITs in participants. 
Mood, on the other hand, had no impact on suppression success. Neither 
depression nor anxiety were related to an individual’s ability to dismiss OITs 
or prevent them from reoccurring/occurring in the first place. Prior to the study 
being conducted, strong predictions could not be made about this relationship 
between mood and suppression success, as much of the OIT suppression 
literature has not investigated the relationship. Of the research that had 
investigated the relationship between mood and suppression success, some had 
found a relationship (e.g. Brewin & Smart, 2005) and some had not (Ólafsson 
et al., 2014). The difference in suppression task and instructions used in these 
two studies could explain this discrepancy in findings. It has been suggested 
that that anxiety and depression are associated with poorer suppression success 
because suppression often involves searching for distractor thoughts, and 
distractor thoughts may trigger the recurrence of OITs due to similar negative 
content (Wentzlaff & Wegner, 2000). The dismissibility task by Ólafsson et al. 
(2014) provides participants with a neutral distractor thought, meaning the 
participant is unable to identify their own (potentially negative) distractor 
thought. Brewin and Smart (2005), on the other hand, simply instructed 
participants to suppress the thought. The instructions given by Brewin & Smart 
(2005) therefore allowed participants to choose their own distractor thoughts 
(if this is the suppression method that they chose to implement). Allowing 
participants to choose their own distractor thoughts increases the probability 
that participants with more negative moods will select negative distractor 
thoughts, meaning they will be poorer at suppression. In other words, allowing 
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participants to choose their own method of suppressing thoughts increases the 
potential impact of mood on suppression success. 
The lack of a relationship between working memory and OIT frequency 
is somewhat surprising as this relationship had previously been demonstrated 
by Brewin and Smart (2005). Despite recruiting a similar sample type, sample 
size, and using the same method of assessing working memory, the current 
study did not replicate Brewin and Smart’s (2005) findings. However, there 
were differences in the task used, and there is a small possibility that this is the 
reason for the discrepancy in findings. The task used in the current study 
instructed participants to employ a specific suppression strategy (thought 
replacement) whereas Brewin and Smart (2005) instructed participants to 
suppress the OIT using whatever strategy they wished. It may be that 
suppression techniques used in Brewin and Smart (2005) recruited the working 
memory system, whereas the current thought dismissibility task did not. 
However, this seems unlikely, as there are strong theoretical reasons to believe 
that working memory would be implicated in thought replacement. It could be 
expected that the central executive would direct attention away from the OIT, 
and towards the replacement thought, which it then focusses on. It is less clear 
how working memory could be implemented in other suppression techniques 
that may have been used in Brewin and Smart’s (2005) study, such as trying to 
relax, or avoiding something that may trigger the thought (Purdon et al., 2007). 
Future studies could assess the relationship between working memory and a 
range of different suppression techniques, to help demonstrate whether a 
difference in suppression techniques could explain the discrepancy between the 
findings from the current study and those from Brewin and Smart (2005). 
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The finding that OCD symptoms related to perceived difficulty 
dismissing OITs, but not poorer dismissibility times, suggests OCD is a 
problem of OIT appraisals rather than actual difficulty dismissing thoughts.  
This relationship between perceived difficulty dismissing OITs and OCD 
symptoms remained after controlling for OIT distress. Indeed, this finding was 
in line with findings from previous questionnaire and experimental studies. 
Questionnaire studies have demonstrated individuals with OCD are more likely 
to report difficulty dismissing OITs (Parkinson & Rachman, 1981; Rachman & 
de Silva, 1978; Salkovskis & Harrison, 1984) and that individuals with OCD 
are more likely to appraise OITs as being uncontrollable (Cartwright-Hatton & 
Wells, 1997; Clark, Purdon, & Wang, 2003). Experimental studies have found 
no differences in OIT dismissal times between individuals who score high vs 
low on OCD symptoms, but have found that high-OCD symptom groups report 
more perceived difficulty with dismissing OITs (Ólafsson et al. 2014; 
experiment 1 and 2). Although this finding may simply indicate a difference in 
dismissibility perception between individuals, an alternative explanation is that 
individuals who are higher in OCD symptomatology must expend more effort 
in order to dismiss OITs as quickly as individuals who are lower in OCD 
symptomatology. Asking participants to dismiss thoughts for five minutes may 
have created a ceiling effect, whereby most individuals are able to dismiss 
thoughts quickly over a five-minute period. If this is the case, differences in 
dismissibility may become apparent by increasing the demands of the 
dismissibility task (e.g. by increasing the length of time of the task). It may be 
that once the ceiling difficulty level of the task has been increased, differences 
in OIT dismissibility become apparent.   
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The lack of a relationship between OCD symptoms and OIT 
dismissibility suggests that dismissibility is not a characteristic that should be 
considered by the continuum model of OITs. That is, thought dismissibility 
does not decrease as symptoms of OCD increase. It seemed plausible that such 
a relationship would be found, as subjective OIT dismissibility is a variable that 
is already accounted for by the continuum model and it could reasonably be 
expected that objective and subjective dismissibility would be related. 
However, the findings from the present study suggest that although subjective 
OIT dismissibility varies from being very easy to dismiss, to very difficult to 
dismiss, throughout the population, objective OIT dismissibility does not. 
 Interestingly, there was a relationship between OCD symptoms and 
total time spent thinking about OITs; which can be thought of as a combination 
of OIT frequency and duration (or dismissibility). Neither frequency nor 
dismissibility alone were related to OCD symptoms.  Based on this finding, and 
in response to Purdon et al.’s (2011) question of whether OCD is a problem of 
thought return or getting rid of the thought once it occurs, the answer would 
appear to be: both in combination.  
 There are several limitations of the current study that should be 
considered. First, although a previously used thought dismissiblity task was 
used in the current study to measure dismissibility (Purdon et al., 2011), it may 
not be accurately measuring dismissibility. Participants are required to signal 
when their OIT has occurred and also when it was dismissed. But in order to 
signal the latter, participants must still be experiencing the OIT in some form 
(Purdon et al., 2011). Dismissibility is a relatively understudied concept, and 
so it is understandable that there are some issues with measurement. Although 
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there are methods of overcoming this particular issue, they themselves suffer 
from their own issues. For example, using experience-sampling methodology, 
participants could be asked at random intervals when they last experienced an 
OIT and how quickly they were able to dismiss it. This method would avoid 
the issue of still thinking about the OIT in some form, whilst stating that it has 
been dismissed. However, this method then suffers from issues with memory 
decay, whereby participants forget how quickly they dismissed thoughts 
(particularly if the thoughts were fleeting). Future studies may therefore benefit 
from taking a mixed methods approach.  
A second limitation of the current study is the length of the 
dismissibility task. The task was based on that used by Purdon et al. (2011), 
however, a shorter version of the task was adopted in the present study to reduce 
participant demands. Reducing the length of the task could have plausibly 
created a ceiling effect (as previously discussed), which meant that differences 
between individuals high and low in working memory could not be detected. 
Future studies assessing dismissibility would benefit from using a longer 
version of the task. 
Overall, this study suggested that working memory is not implicated 
in the suppression of OITs. In addition, OCD seems to be a problem of 
perceived difficulty with removing OITs once they occur, rather than any 
demonstrable difficulty with removing them. Future research would benefit 
from adopting a mixed methods approach to measuring dismissibility, to 
clarify whether the current findings are due to the lab-based, short, nature of 
the task.  
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Chapter 5: General Discussion 
The current thesis aimed to investigate the relationship between obsessive-
compulsive symptoms and executive functions (EFs), and to provide 
information that could be used to update cognitive theories of OCD. Particular 
focus was placed on working memory as an EF, as previous research suggests 
it is the most relevant to OCD (i.e. the largest EF deficit found in individuals 
with OCD was on a working memory task; Snyder, Kaiser, Warren & Stiller, 
2014; and associations have been found between working memory and thought 
suppression; e.g. Brewin and Smart, 2005). Three separate studies were 
conducted that involved either assessing the relationship between OCD 
symptomatology and EFs (chapter two and chapter four), or assessing the 
impact of OCD symptomatology on EFs (chapter three).  
Chapter two assessed whether there were any EF differences between 
individuals with subclinical levels of obsessive-compulsive symptomatology 
(subclinical OCD) and nonclinical individuals. Few studies had investigated 
this question and the results of those that have are inconsistent. For this 
experimental study, a group of individuals with subclinical OCD and a group 
of nonclinical individuals completed a battery of computerised EF tasks 
assessing working memory, inhibition, and cognitive flexibility. Based on 
limitations of previous research, care was taken to choose stringent measures 
of the construct they were assessing, and to exclude individuals with potential 
undiagnosed OCD. Contrary to predictions, EF differences were not found 
between the two groups. In other words, individuals with subclinical OCD did 
not demonstrate EF deficits. This finding was seemingly contrary to previous 
research that has demonstrated EF deficits in individuals with OCD (e.g. 
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Snyder et al., 2014), as subclinical OCD is a term used to describe a less severe 
form of the disorder. It is plausible that previous EF deficits in individuals with 
OCD may have been caused by state factors (e.g. symptom interference), rather 
than representing an underlying deficit. Based on this idea, it is also plausible 
that individuals with subclinical OCD did not demonstrate EF deficits in the 
current chapter because their symptoms were not severe enough to interfere 
with task performance. However, the sample in this study precluded direct 
comparison with an OCD group.  
The findings from chapter two also helps inform current cognitive 
theories of OCD. These theories posit that OITs become more severe (e.g. more 
frequent, distressing, intense) when they are negatively appraised (e.g. “I am a 
bad person for having this thought”) and responded to in ineffective ways (e.g. 
suppression) (Clark & Purdon, 1993; Rachman, 1997, 1998, 2003; Salkovskis, 
1985, 1989, 1999). However, there is evidence to suggest that negative 
appraisals and ineffective control strategies do not lead to an increased 
frequency of OITs (Woody, Whittal, & McClean, 2011), leaving the question 
open as to why some individuals experience more OITs than others. One 
possible explanation was that differences in EFs could explain differences in 
OIT frequency, and chapter two aimed to test this hypothesis. However, this 
hypothesis was not supported, as individuals with subclinical OCD did not 
demonstrate poorer EFs than nonclinical individuals, and OIT frequency was 
not associated with EFs. It is plausible that the study presented in chapter two 
was underpowered and so future studies should aim to recruit larger samples of 
individuals, including individuals with OCD, and administer a wider battery of 
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EF tasks. Such a study would increase our understanding of the relationship 
between OIT frequency and EFs. 
Chapter three aimed to investigate whether state factors impair working 
memory. In particular, the study aimed to test a key prediction of the Executive 
Overload Model of OCD (Abramovitch, Dar, Hermesh, & Schweiger, 2012): 
that OITs impair working memory. A secondary aim of the study was to assess 
the relationship between a range of other OCD-relevant phenomena (e.g. 
depression, anxiety, compulsive checking, contamination fears etc.) and 
working memory. Two groups of nonclinical participants were recruited and 
completed a working memory task. One group of participants were first primed 
with OITs (“primed” condition), the other group were not (“non-primed 
condition”). Following the task, participants completed a questionnaire that 
assessed perceived interference from a range of OCD-relevant variables. In 
addition, participants completed measures of depression and anxiety. Contrary 
to predictions, no working memory differences were found between 
participants in the primed condition and non-primed condition, suggesting that 
OITs do not impair working memory in nonclinical individuals. This finding 
does not support the predictions of the Executive Overload Model of OCD. In 
addition, the study did not find an association between any other self-report 
state factors and working memory performance. Taken together, these findings 
offer preliminary evidence that state factors may not account for working 
memory deficits in individuals with OCD.  
Chapter four aimed to resolve an unanswered question of cognitive theories 
of OCD: why are there individual differences in OIT suppression ability? It was 
hypothesised that working memory differences could explain differences in 
Investigating the relationship between obsessive-compulsive symptomatology and executive functions. 
 
147 
 
suppression success (particularly dismissibility). Nonclinical individuals 
carried out a working memory task and an OIT dismissibility task.  Contrary to 
predictions, there was no relationship between working memory and OIT 
dismissiblity. Further to this, no relationship was found between working 
memory and the number of OITs experienced in the lab. Together, these finding 
suggests that working memory is not implicated in the suppression of OITs. 
The question remains, therefore, as to why there are individual differences in 
suppression success. One possibility is that inhibition is related to an 
individual’s ability to suppress OITs, rather than working memory. Future 
studies should aim to replicate the study found in chapter four, but replace the 
working memory task for an inhibition task. 
In summary, the findings from this thesis suggest: 1) individuals with 
subclinical OCD do not demonstrate EF deficits, 2) an increase in OITs does 
not lead to working memory deficits, 3) individual differences in working 
memory do not explain differences in suppression success. These three studies 
present findings that can be used to inform current cognitive theories of OCD. 
More specifically, EFs do not explain differences in OIT frequency, and 
working memory does not explain differences in suppression success.  
No support for trait or state account of executive function deficits in 
obsessive-compulsive disorder 
Taken together, the findings from this thesis do not support either the trait 
or state account of EF deficits in OCD. The trait account suggests that EF 
deficits are an endophenotype of OCD and should therefore i) be associated 
with causes of the OCD ii) be state independent (i.e. occurs in the individual 
even if they do not display the disorder) iii) be heritable iv) co-segregate with 
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illness within families v) be present in unaffected relatives at a higher rate than 
the general population (Gottesman & Gould, 2003; Gould & Gottesman, 2006). 
If EF deficits were an endophenotype of OCD, then it would be expected that 
individuals with subclinical OCD would also show such deficits, as these 
individuals are at higher risk of developing OCD (Black, Gaffney, Schlosser, 
& Gabel, 2003;  Fullana et al., 2009). However, chapter two did not 
demonstrate such deficits in individuals with subclinical OCD.  
In contrast to the trait account, the state account suggests that individuals 
with OCD do not have deficient EFs per se, but that state factors interfere in 
task performance and therefore create the appearance of EF deficits. The 
Executive Overload Model of OCD (Abramovitch et al., 2012) was developed 
to account for the impact of state factors on EFs. The Executive Overload 
Model of OCD predicts that an increase in OITs leads to impairments in EF 
tasks. However, in chapter three, experimentally induced OITs did not impair 
performance on a working memory task in nonclinical individuals. Other state 
accounts predict that symptoms such as excessive checking or contamination 
fears should also interfere in EF tasks (Moritz, Hottenrott, Jelinek, Brooks, & 
Scheurich, 2012). However, in chapter three, no self-reported state factors were 
related to performance on a working memory task.  In other words, the findings 
from chapter three did not support the state account of EF deficits in OCD. In 
addition, depressive and anxious symptoms did not correlate with task 
performance in any of the empirical chapters, suggesting these state factors are 
unlikely to account for EF deficits either.  
The lack of support for both trait and state accounts of EF deficits in OCD 
is surprising, as both accounts have previously received empirical support and 
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both appear to be plausible accounts of EF deficits.  However, since the 
completion of the empirical chapters of this thesis, a study has been published 
that also supports neither the trait nor state accounts of EF deficits. De Putter, 
Cromheeke, Anholt, Mueller, & Koster (2017) recruited forty nonclinical 
participants who scored high in contamination symptoms of OCD, and forty-
four nonclinical participants who scored low in contamination symptoms of 
OCD. All participants first completed an inhibition task (Stop-Signal Task). 
Following this, all participants were randomly assigned to either be induced 
with contamination-specific symptoms, or a neutral mood induction. The 
participants then completed the inhibition task for a second time. Contrary to 
predictions, individuals in the high contamination symptom group performed 
better than the participants in the low contamination symptom group on the 
baseline measure of inhibition. This finding is contrary to the trait account of 
EF deficits, which predicts deficits in individuals high in OCD 
symptomatology. In addition, after being induced with contamination 
symptoms, there were no changes in inhibition in any of the participants. This 
finding is contrary to the state account of EF deficits, which predicts that an 
increase in OCD symptoms would impair EF performance. In summary, the 
findings from De Putter et al. (2017) align with those of the current thesis and 
do not support either the state account or the trait account of EF deficits.  
 One plausible explanation for the lack of support for the state or trait 
accounts of EF deficits in OCD, in the current thesis and in De Putter et al. 
(2017), is that the samples did not have a diagnosis of OCD. It is plausible that 
individuals with subclinical OCD and nonclinical individuals do not experience 
severe enough symptoms of OCD, even after symptom induction procedures, 
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to cause EF interference. This highlights a potential difference between 
individuals with subclinical OCD/nonclinical individuals, and those with a 
diagnosis of OCD: symptoms of OCD have a negative impact on EFs only in 
individuals with OCD.  If this is the case, studies assessing the state account of 
EF deficits should attempt to induce state factors (e.g. anxiety, OITs) in 
individuals who have been diagnosed with OCD. In addition, trait factors may 
not be found in individuals with subclinical OCD because this sample of 
individuals may be protected from the development of OCD, due to intact EFs 
(or some other factor). This is more likely to be the case when the participants 
are adults, as OCD often develops in childhood or adolescence (Millet et al., 
2004). In other words, if individuals have not developed OCD by adulthood, 
they may be unlikely to develop it at all, and this may be due to some protective 
factor. In support of this idea is research demonstrating an increased risk of 
developing post-traumatic stress disorder in individuals with poorer EF 
(Aupperle, Melrose, Stein, & Paulus, 2012), suggesting that EF deficits may 
convey a vulnerability for other psychological disorders. However, this 
explanation does not account for the inconsistent findings in relation to EFs and 
OCD presented elsewhere (e.g. Snyder et al., 2014). 
  The current thesis did not investigate the relationship between EFs and 
OCD in individuals diagnosed with OCD. However, understanding the 
heterogeneous findings in relation to EFs and OCD (e.g. Snyder et al., 2014) 
can help us to understand more about the mechanisms of OCD, including why 
individuals with subclinical OCD do not demonstrate EF deficits. One possible 
explanation for the heterogeneous findings in relation to EFs and OCD is that 
EF deficits are only found in particular subgroups of individuals with OCD 
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(e.g. Hwang et al., 2007; Lee & Telch, 2010). Individuals with OCD can present 
with a wide range of symptom types (e.g. contamination OITs vs aggressive 
OITs) and may be diagnosed at different times (e.g. early vs late onset). It may 
be that only individuals with a specific subtype of OCD demonstrate EF 
deficits. Indeed, there is evidence that individuals who mainly experience 
autogenous OITs (highly aversive, ego-dystonic [perceived to contradict an 
individual’s self-image], spontaneous) have poorer inhibition than individuals 
who mainly experience reactive OITs (realistic, ego-syntonic, less 
spontaneous) (Lee, Yost, & Telch, 2009). If this was the case, inadvertently 
assessing EFs in large numbers of people who mainly experience autogenous 
OITs, would lead to the conclusion that individuals with OCD have EF deficits. 
On the other hand, studies that inadvertently included fewer individuals who 
mainly experience autogenous OITs, would conclude that individuals with 
OCD do not demonstrate EF deficits. Testing EF deficits of particular sub-types 
of OCD was beyond the scope of the present thesis. However, the findings from 
De Putter et al. (2017) suggest that individuals with contamination symptoms 
do not demonstrate inhibition deficits. Future studies would benefit from 
investigating EFs in other sub-types of OCD, in both clinical and subclinical 
samples.  
Objective vs subjective performance and interference 
One interesting finding to come out of the current thesis is the 
dissociation between subjective (i.e. self-report) events and objective (i.e. EF 
tasks, time taken to dismiss OITs) events. Chapter three demonstrated that 
individuals primed with OITs reported more task interference from OITs than 
individuals who were not primed. However, this subjective rating did not 
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translate to the working memory task, such that there was no difference in task 
performance between individuals who were primed with OITs and those who 
were not primed. Similarly, in chapter four, individuals higher in obsessive-
compulsive symptomatology reported that OITs were more difficult to dismiss 
than individuals lower in obsessive-compulsive symptomatology. However, 
there was no relationship between OCD symptoms and duration of time taken 
to dismiss OITs. The findings in chapter three could plausibly have been the 
result of demand characteristics, as only one group were primed with OITs; 
however, this could not be the case in chapter four. One possible explanation 
for the findings of chapter four is that individuals higher in OCD 
symptomatology need to expend more effort in order to dismiss OITs. The 
dismissibility task used for chapter four may have not been demanding enough 
to cause dismissal problems for individuals higher in OCD symptoms. 
Alternatively, these findings suggest that for those individuals in chapter four 
who scored highly on measures of OCD, they had a problem of perception 
rather than actual deficit. Indeed, cognitive models of OCD highlight the 
importance of the subjective appraisal of OITs in the development of OCD, 
rather than the experience of OITs themselves. It may have been, for example, 
that individuals higher in symptoms of OCD are less confident about their 
performance than individuals lower in symptoms of OCD, leading them to 
report that they were not competent at the task.  
Future directions 
There is a range of methodological issues with the studies in the current 
thesis that should be considered for future studies. When looking for EF 
differences between individuals with subclinical OCD and nonclinical 
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individuals, efforts should be taken to increase statistical power, such as by 
increasing the sample size. The EF deficits in individuals with OCD are 
generally moderate in size (e.g. Snyder et al., 2014), and it may be that there 
are EF deficits in subclinical OCD that are small in size. Based on this, large 
samples are needed to detect EF differences between individuals with 
subclinical OCD and nonclinical individuals. Indeed, low statistical power is 
not only an issue found in chapter two of this thesis, but an issue found more 
widely throughout the OCD/subclinical OCD and EF literature.   
When assessing the success of an OIT prime, future studies should take 
care to ask participants, in different groups, the same number of questions. In 
chapter three, primed participants were asked two questions about the number 
of OITs experienced, whereas non-primed participants were asked one 
question. As a result, it cannot be concluded with confidence that the primed 
group reported experiencing more OITs because of the prime, or as a result of 
demand effects.  
Future studies that aim to measure OIT dismissibility (e.g. the 
relationship between inhibition and OIT dismissibility) should adopt a longer 
version of the task than that which was used in chapter four, e.g. to two eight 
minute periods instead of one five minute period. Increasing the demands of 
the task in this way may increase the ceiling demands of the task, potentially 
highlighting differences between individuals who score high on measures of 
OCD symptomatology and individuals who score low. If differences are not 
found, then the idea that this is because the task is not sufficiently demanding 
can be ruled out. 
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More broadly, the findings from this thesis suggest a range of possible 
directions for future research. First, research into individuals with subclinical 
obsessive-compulsive symptoms remains an interesting area of research due to 
its implications for the prevention of OCD. However, future research in this 
area would benefit from greater clarity and consistency in relation to definition 
and methodology. Indeed, chapter two demonstrated some of the difficulties 
with operationalising subclinical OCD; care was taken to exclude individuals 
with OCD, but this may have inadvertently created a sample who were more 
representative of the general population than individuals with subclinical OCD. 
It is important to note that subclinical OCD is not a formal diagnosis. Rather, it 
is a term used in research that may serve to help identify individuals who are at 
risk, or protected from, developing OCD. Future studies may benefit from 
recruiting individuals who score highly on an OCD symptom measure, and then 
excluding individuals with OCD via diagnostic interview. Alternatively, 
research may benefit from taking a more nuanced approach to subclinical 
obsessive-compulsive symptoms. For example, it may be that particular 
variables (e.g. OIT distress) are more useful and predictive of developing OCD 
than broad categorisations of symptoms. Longitudinal studies measuring a 
range of OCD-relevant variables over multiple time points would provide 
information on risk and protective factors for OCD.  
  Longitudinal studies would also be useful in helping to resolve some 
of the current debates around trait vs state accounts of EF deficits in OCD, and 
in telling us more about the development of OCD (including potential risk 
factors). Following children who are at risk of developing OCD (e.g. as they 
have a parent with OCD) and monitoring EFs and symptoms over time may 
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help to clarify whether EFs lead to OCD symptoms, whether OCD symptoms 
lead to EF deficits, or whether some third factor leads to both EF deficits and 
OCD symptoms. However, this research is likely to be resource intensive. A 
less resource intensive method of helping to resolve the trait vs state debate of 
EF deficits in OCD would be to further test the Executive Overload Model of 
OCD (Abramovitch et al., 2012). Studies investigating the impact of OITs on 
cognitive flexibility, and studies that prime OITs in individuals with OCD, 
could reveal important information about the validity of the Executive 
Overload Model of OCD, and the state account of EF deficits in OCD as a 
whole. However, such a study may tell us less about the developmental factors 
of OCD than longitudinal studies. In combination, findings from the proposed 
longitudinal study alongside findings from the proposed experimental study 
will be useful for informing future preventative interventions.  
 Finally, future studies that investigate EFs in particular sub-types of 
OCD would help to confirm whether the current field of inconsistent findings 
is due to the fact that only a subgroup of individuals demonstrates EF deficits. 
Indeed, Lee, Yost, and Telch (2009) found that individuals with OCD who 
mainly experienced autogenous OITs demonstrated poorer inhibition than 
individuals who mainly experienced reactive OITs. In addition, subgroups 
within other clinical diagnoses have also demonstrated differential 
relationships with executive functions (e.g. in post-traumatic stress disorder; 
Polak, Witteveen, Reitsma, Olff, 2012). Future research should investigate 
whether individuals who experience mainly autogenous OITs demonstrate 
deficits in working memory and cognitive flexibility compared to individuals 
who experience mainly reactive OITs. 
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Conclusion 
 In conclusion, this thesis investigated the relationship between 
obsessive-compulsive symptomatology and EFs. Individuals with subclinical 
OCD did not demonstrate EF deficits. Obsessive intrusive thoughts did not lead 
to deficits in working memory. Working memory was not associated with the 
suppression of OITs. The findings from this thesis are contrary to the trait or 
state account of EF deficits in OCD. Future research should adopt longitudinal 
designs, investigate the Executive Overload Model of OCD further and 
investigate EFs in sub-types of OCD.  
 
  
Investigating the relationship between obsessive-compulsive symptomatology and executive functions. 
 
157 
 
 
References 
Abramovitch, A., Abramowitz, J. S., & Mittelman, A. (2013). The 
neuropsychology of adult obsessive-compulsive disorder: A meta-
analysis. Clinical Psychology Review, 33(8), 1163–1171.  
Abramovitch, A., & Cooperman, A. (2015). The cognitive neuropsychology of 
obsessive-compulsive disorder: A critical review. Journal of Obsessive-
Compulsive and Related Disorders, 5, 24–36.  
Abramovitch, A., Dar, R., Hermesh, H., & Schweiger, A. (2012). Comparative 
neuropsychology of adult obsessive-compulsive disorder and attention 
deficit/hyperactivity disorder: Implications for a novel executive 
overload model of OCD. Journal of Neuropsychology, 6(2), 161–191.  
Abramovitch, A., Shaham, N., Levin, L., Bar-Hen, M., & Schweiger, A. 
(2015). Response inhibition in a subclinical obsessive-compulsive 
sample. Journal of Behavior Therapy and Experimental Psychiatry, 46, 
66–71.  
Abramowitz, J. S., Fabricant, L. E., Taylor, S., Deacon, B. J., McKay, D., & 
Storch, E. A. (2014). The relevance of analogue studies for 
understanding obsessions and compulsions. Clinical Psychology 
Review, 34(3), 206-217. 
Abramowitz, J. S., Tolin, D. F., & Street, G. P. (2001). Paradoxical effects of 
thought suppression: A meta-analysis of controlled studies. Clinical 
Psychology Review, 21(5), 683-703. 
Investigating the relationship between obsessive-compulsive symptomatology and executive functions. 
 
158 
 
Ackerman, P. L., Beier, M. E., & Boyle, M. O. (2005). Working memory and 
intelligence: The same or different constructs?. Psychological bulletin, 
131(1), 30. 
American Psychiatric Association. (2013). Diagnostic and statistical manual 
of mental disorders (5th ed.). DC: Washington. 
Angst, J. (1993). Comorbidity of anxiety, phobia, compulsion and depression. 
International Clinical Psychopharmacology, 8, 21-26. 
Antony, M. M., Bieling, P. J., Cox, B. J., Enns, M. W., & Swinson, R. P. (1998). 
Psychometric properties of the 42-item and 21-item versions of the 
depression anxiety stress scales in clinical groups and a community 
sample. Psychological Assessment, 10,176–181. 
Aupperle, R. L., Melrose, A. J., Stein, M. B., & Paulus, M. P. (2012). Executive 
function and PTSD: disengaging from 
trauma. Neuropharmacology, 62(2), 686-694. 
Baddeley, A. (2000). The episodic buffer: a new component of working 
memory?. Trends in Cognitive Sciences, 4(11), 417-423. 
Baddeley, A., & Hitch, G. (1974). Working memory. In G. Bower (Ed.), Recent 
advances in learning and motivation (Vol. 8, pp. 47–90). New York, NY: 
Academic Press. 
Banich, M. T. (2009). Executive function: The search for an integrated account. 
Current Directions in Psychological Science, 18(2), 89-94. 
Barceló, F. (2001). Does the Wisconsin Card Sorting Test Measure Prefontral 
Function?. The Spanish Journal of Psychology, 4(1), 79-100. 
Basso, M. R., Bornstein, R. A., Carona, F., & Morton, R. (2001). Depression 
accounts for executive function deficits in obsessive-compulsive 
Investigating the relationship between obsessive-compulsive symptomatology and executive functions. 
 
159 
 
disorder. Neuropsychiatry Neuropsychology and Behavioral Neurology, 
14(4), 241-245. 
Beck, A. T. (1967). Depression: Clinical, experimental and theoretical aspects. 
New York: Harper & Row. 
Bédard, M. J., Joyal, C. C., Godbout, L., & Chantal, S. (2009). Executive 
functions and the obsessive-compulsive disorder: on the importance of 
subclinical symptoms and other concomitant factors. Archives of Clinical 
Neuropsychology, 24(6), 585-598. 
Belloch, A., Morillo, C., Lucero, M., Cabedo, E., & Carrió, C. (2004). Intrusive 
thoughts in non‐clinical subjects: The role of frequency and 
unpleasantness on appraisal ratings and control strategies. Clinical 
Psychology & Psychotherapy, 11(2), 100-110. 
Berg, E. A. (1948). A simple objective technique for measuring flexibility in 
thinking. The Journal of General Psychology, 39(1), 15-22. 
Berry, L. M., & Laskey, B. (2012). A review of obsessive intrusive thoughts in 
the general population. Journal of Obsessive-Compulsive and Related 
Disorders, 1(2), 125-132. 
Black, A. (1974). The natural history of obsessional neurosis. In: H. R. Beech 
(Ed.), Obsessional States (pp. 19–54). London: Methuen & Co. 
Black, D. W., Gaffney, G. R., Schlosser, S., & Gabel, J. (2003). Children of 
parents with obsessive‐compulsive disorder–a 2‐year follow‐up 
study. Acta Psychiatrica Scandinavica, 107(4), 305-313. 
Bomyea, J., & Amir, N. (2011). The effect of an executive functioning training 
program on working memory capacity and intrusive thoughts. Cognitive 
Therapy and Research, 35(6), 529-535. 
Investigating the relationship between obsessive-compulsive symptomatology and executive functions. 
 
160 
 
Borkovec, T. D., Robinson, E., Pruzinsky, T., & DePree, J. A. (1983). 
Preliminary exploration of worry: Some characteristics and processes. 
Behaviour Research and Therapy, 21, 9−16. 
Brewin, C. R., & Beaton, A. (2002). Thought suppression, intelligence, and 
working memory capacity. Behaviour Research and Therapy, 40(8), 
923-930. 
Brewin, C. R., & Smart, L. (2005). Working memory capacity and suppression 
of intrusive thoughts. Journal of Behavior Therapy and Experimental 
Psychiatry, 36(1), 61-68. 
Cannon, T. D., & Keller, M. C. (2006). Endophenotypes in the genetic analyses 
of mental disorders. Annual Review of Clinical Psychology, 2, 267-290. 
Cartwright-Hatton, S., & Wells, A. (1997). Beliefs about worry and intrusions: 
The Meta-Cognitions Questionnaire and its correlates. Journal of Anxiety 
Disorders, 11(3), 279-296. 
Cavedini, P., Zorzi, C., Piccinni, M., Cavallini, M. C., & Bellodi, L. (2010). 
Executive dysfunctions in obsessive-compulsive patients and unaffected 
relatives: searching for a new intermediate phenotype. Biological 
Psychiatry, 67(12), 1178-1184. 
Chamberlain, S. R., Blackwell, A. D., Fineberg, N. A., Robbins, T. W., & 
Sahakian, B. J. (2005). The neuropsychology of obsessive compulsive 
disorder: the importance of failures in cognitive and behavioural 
inhibition as candidate endophenotypic markers. Neuroscience & 
Biobehavioral Reviews, 29(3), 399-419. 
Investigating the relationship between obsessive-compulsive symptomatology and executive functions. 
 
161 
 
Chamberlain, S. R., & Menzies, L. (2009). Endophenotypes of obsessive–
compulsive disorder: rationale, evidence and future potential. Expert 
Review of Neurotherapeutics, 9(8), 1133-1146. 
Cheyne, J. A., Solman, G. J., Carriere, J. S., & Smilek, D. (2009). Anatomy of 
an error: A bidirectional state model of task engagement/disengagement 
and attention-related errors. Cognition, 111(1), 98-113. 
Cinan, S., & Tanör, Ö. Ö. (2002). An attempt to discriminate different types of 
executive functions in the Wisconsin Card Sorting Test. Memory, 10(4), 
277-289. 
Clark, D. A., & Purdon, C. L. (1995). The assessment of unwanted intrusive 
thoughts: A review and critique of the literature. Behaviour Research 
and Therapy, 33(8), 967-976. 
Clark, D. A., & Purdon, C. (2016). Still cognitive after all these years? 
Perspectives for a cognitive behavioural theory of obsessions and where 
we are 30 years later: A commentary. Australian Psychologist, 51(1), 
14-17. 
Clark, D. A., Purdon, C., & Wang, A. (2003). The Meta-Cognitive Beliefs 
Questionnaire: development of a measure of obsessional beliefs. 
Behaviour Research and Therapy, 41(6), 655-669. 
Clark, D. A., & Rhyno, S. (2005). Unwanted intrusive thoughts in nonclinical 
individuals: Implications for clinical disorders. In D. A. Clark (Ed.), 
Intrusive thoughts in clinical disorders: Theory, research, and treatment 
(pp. 1-29). New York: Guilford Press. 
Investigating the relationship between obsessive-compulsive symptomatology and executive functions. 
 
162 
 
Conway, M., Howell, A., & Giannopoulos, C. (1991). Dysphoria and thought 
suppression. Cognitive Therapy and Research, 15(2), 153-166. 
Conway, A. R., Kane, M. J., Bunting, M. F., Hambrick, D. Z., Wilhelm, O., & 
Engle, R. W. (2005). Working memory span tasks: A methodological 
review and user’s guide. Psychonomic Bulletin and Review, 12(5), 769-
786. 
Cougle, J. R., & Lee, H. J. (2014). Pathological and non-pathological features 
of obsessive-compulsive disorder: Revisiting basic assumptions of 
cognitive models. Journal of Obsessive-Compulsive and Related 
Disorders, 3(1), 12-20. 
De Bruijn, C., Beun, S., De Graaf, R., Ten Have, M., & Denys, D. (2010). 
Subthreshold symptoms and obsessive–compulsive disorder: evaluating 
the diagnostic threshold. Psychological Medicine, 40(6), 989-997. 
De Putter, L. M., Cromheeke, S., Anholt, G. E., Mueller, S. C., & Koster, E. 
H. (2017). Do obsessive-compulsive symptoms and contamination-
related stimuli affect inhibition capacity?. Journal of Obsessive-
Compulsive and Related Disorders. 
de Vries, F. E., de Wit, S. J., Cath, D. C., van der Werf, Y. D., van der 
Borden, V., van Rossum, T. B., ... & van den Heuvel, O. A. (2014). 
Compensatory frontoparietal activity during working memory: an 
endophenotype of obsessive-compulsive disorder. Biological 
Psychiatry, 76(11), 878-887. 
Investigating the relationship between obsessive-compulsive symptomatology and executive functions. 
 
163 
 
Dittrich, W. H., Johansen, T., & Fineberg, N. A. (2011). Cognitive assessment 
instrument of obsessions and compulsions (CAIOC-13)—a new 13-item 
scale for evaluating functional impairment associated with OCD. 
Psychiatry Research, 187(1), 283-290. 
Edwards, S. (1985). Intrusive thoughts. Unpublished Masters thesis in Clinical 
Psychology, Australian National University. 
Edwards, S., & Dickerson, M. (1987). Intrusive unwanted thoughts: A two‐
stage model of control. Psychology and Psychotherapy: Theory, 
Research and Practice, 60(4), 317-328. 
Eisen, Stouf, R., & Rasmussen, S. A. (2006). Impact of obsessive-compulsive 
disorder on quality of life. Psychiatry: Interpersonal and Biological 
Processes, 47(4), 270–275. 
Eriksen, B. A., & Eriksen, C. W. (1974). Effects of noise letters upon the 
identification of a target letter in a nonsearch task. Perception & 
Psychophysics, 16(1), 143-149. 
Erskine, J. A., Georgiou, G. J., Joshi, M., Deans, A., & Colegate, C. (2017). 
Ageing and thought suppression performance: Its relationship with 
working memory capacity, habitual thought suppression and 
mindfulness. Consciousness and cognition, 53, 211-221. 
Eysenck, M. W. (1992). Anxiety: The cognitive perspective. Hove, 
UK:Lawrence Erlbaum 
Investigating the relationship between obsessive-compulsive symptomatology and executive functions. 
 
164 
 
Eysenck, M. W., Derakshan, N., Santos, R., & Calvo, M. G. (2007). Anxiety 
and cognitive performance: attentional control theory. Emotion, 7(2), 
336. 
Fisher, P. L., & Wells, A. (2005). How effective are cognitive and behavioral 
treatments for obsessive–compulsive disorder? A clinical significance 
analysis. Behaviour Research and Therapy, 43(12), 1543-1558. 
Foa, E. B., Huppert, J. D., Leiberg, S., Langner, R., Kichic, R., Hajcak, G., & 
Salkovskis, P. M. (2002). The Obsessive-Complusive Inventory: 
Development and validation of a short version. Psychological 
Assessment, 14(4), 485–495 
Freeston, M. H., Rhéaume, J., & Ladouceur, R. (1996). Correcting faulty 
appraisals of obsessional thoughts. Behaviour Research and 
Therapy, 34(5-6), 433-446. 
Frost, R. O., & Shows, D. L. (1993). The nature and measurement of 
compulsive indecisiveness. Behaviour Research and Therapy, 31(7), 
683-692. 
Fullana, M. A., Mataix-Cols, D., Caspi, A., Harrington, H., Grisham, J. R., 
Moffitt, T. E., & Poulton, R. (2009). Obsessions and compulsions in the 
community:Prevalence, Interference, Help-Seeking, Developmental 
Stability, and Co-Occurring psychiatric conditions. American Journal of 
Psychiatry, 166(3), 329–336. 
Howell, A., & Conway, M. (1992). Mood and the suppression of positive and 
negative self-referent thoughts. Cognitive Therapy and Research, 16(5), 
535-555. 
Investigating the relationship between obsessive-compulsive symptomatology and executive functions. 
 
165 
 
García-Soriano, G., & Belloch, A. (2013). Symptom dimensions in obsessive-
compulsive disorder: differences in distress, interference, appraisals and 
neutralizing strategies. Journal of Behavior Therapy and Experimental 
Psychiatry, 44(4), 441-448. 
García-Soriano, G., Belloch, A., Morillo, C., & Clark, D. A. (2011). 
Symptom dimensions in obsessive-compulsive disorder: from normal 
cognitive intrusions to clinical obsessions. Journal of Anxiety 
Disorders, 25(4), 474–82. 
Gelade, G. A. (2008). IQ, cultural values, and the technological achievement 
of nations. Intelligence, 36(6), 711-718. 
Gibbs, N. A. (1996). Nonclinical populations in research on obsessive-
compulsive disorder: A critical review. Clinical Psychology 
Review, 16(8), 729-773. 
Goodman, W. K., Price, L. H., Rasmussen, S. A., Mazure, C., Fleischmann, 
R. L., Hill, C. L., ... & Charney, D. S. (1989). Yale-brown obsessive 
compulsive scale (Y-BOCS). Archives of General Psychiatry, 46, 1006-
1011. 
Goodwin, A. H., & Sher, K. J. (1992). Deficits in set-shifting ability in 
nonclinical compulsive checkers. Journal of Psychopathology and 
Behavioral Assessment, 14(1), 81-92. 
Goracci, A., Martinucci, M., Kaperoni, A., Fagiolini, A., Sbaragli, C., Corsi, 
E., & Castrogiovanni, P. (2007). Quality of life and subthreshold 
obsessive-compulsive disorder. Acta Neuropsychiatrica, 19(6), 357–
361. 
Investigating the relationship between obsessive-compulsive symptomatology and executive functions. 
 
166 
 
Gottesman, I. I., & Gould, T. D. (2003). The endophenotype concept in 
psychiatry: etymology and strategic intentions. American Journal of 
Psychiatry, 160(4), 636-645. 
Gould, T. D., & Gottesman, I. I. (2006). Psychiatric endophenotypes and the 
development of valid animal models. Genes, Brain and Behavior, 5(2), 
113-119. 
Grabe, H. J., Meyer, C., Hapke, U., Rumpf, H. J., Freyberger, H. J., Dilling, 
H., & John, U. (2001). Lifetime-comorbidity of obsessive-compulsive 
disorder and subclinical obsessive-compulsive disorder in Northern 
Germany. European Archives of Psychiatry and Clinical 
Neuroscience, 251(3), 130-135. 
Grisham, J. R., & Williams, A. D. (2009). Cognitive control of obsessional 
thoughts. Behaviour Research and Therapy, 47(5), 395-402. 
Grisham, J. R., & Williams, A. D. (2013). Responding to intrusions in 
obsessive-compulsive disorder: The roles of neuropsychological 
functioning and beliefs about thoughts. Journal of Behavior Therapy 
and Experimental Psychiatry, 44(3), 343–350. 
FitzGibbon, L., Cragg, L., & Carroll, D. J. (2014). Primed to be inflexible: the 
influence of set size on cognitive flexibility during childhood. Frontiers 
in Psychology, 5, 101. 
Harkin, B., & Kessler, K. (2012). Deficient inhibition of return in subclinical 
OCD only when attention is directed to the threatening aspects of a 
stimulus. Depression and Anxiety, 29(9), 807–15.  
Investigating the relationship between obsessive-compulsive symptomatology and executive functions. 
 
167 
 
Harkin, B., Rutherford, H., & Kessler, K. (2011). Impaired executive 
functioning in subclinical compulsive checking with ecologically valid 
stimuli in a working memory task. Frontiers in Psychology, 2, 78. 
Heaton, R.K. (1981). Wisconsin Card Sorting Test Manual. Odessa, FL: 
Psychological Assessment Resources. 
Heeren, A., Van Broeck, N., & Philippot, P. (2009). The effects of mindfulness 
on executive processes and autobiographical memory 
specificity. Behaviour Research and Therapy, 47(5), 403-409. 
Hodgson, R. J., & Rachman, S. (1977). Obsessional-compulsive 
complaints. Behaviour Research and Therapy, 15(5), 389-395. 
Hyman, I. E., Burland, N. K., Duskin, H. M., Cook, M. C., Roy, C. M., 
McGrath, J. C., & Roundhill, R. F. (2013). Going Gaga: Investigating, 
creating, and manipulating the song stuck in my head. Applied Cognitive 
Psychology, 27(2), 204-215. 
Hwang, S. H., Kwon, J. S., Shin, Y. W., Lee, K. J., Kim, Y. Y., & Kim, M. S. 
(2007). Neuropsychological profiles of patients with obsessive-
compulsive disorder: early onset versus late onset. Journal of the 
International Neuropsychological Society, 13(1), 30-37 
Ingram, R. E., Atkinson, J. H., Slater, M. A., Saccuzzo, D. P., & Garfin, S. R. 
(1990). Negative and positive cognition in depressed and nondepressed 
chronic-pain patients. Health Psychology, 9(3), 300-314. 
Investigating the relationship between obsessive-compulsive symptomatology and executive functions. 
 
168 
 
Julien, D., O’Connor, K. P., & Aardema, F. (2007). Intrusive thoughts, 
obsessions, and appraisals in obsessive-compulsive disorder: a critical 
review. Clinical Psychology Review, 27(3), 366–83. 
Johansen, T., & Dittrich, W. H. (2013). Cognitive performance in a 
subclinical obsessive-compulsive sample 1: Cognitive 
functions. Psychiatry Journal, 2013, 1-10. 
Jonides, J., Schumacher, E. H., Smith, E. E., Lauber, E. J., Awh, E., 
Minoshima, S., & Koeppe, R. A. (1997). Verbal working memory load 
affects regional brain activation as measured by PET. Journal of 
Cognitive Neuroscience, 9(4), 462-475. 
Kessler, R. C., Berglund, P., Demler, O., Jin, R., Merikangas, K. R., & 
Walters, E. E. (2005). Lifetime prevalence and age-of-onset 
distributions of DSM-IV disorders in the National Comorbidity Survey 
Replication. Archives of General Psychiatry, 62(6), 593-602. 
Kirchner, W. K. (1958). Age differences in short-term retention of rapidly 
changing information. Journal of Experimental Psychology, 55, 352–
358. 
Kim, M. S., Jang, K. M., & Kim, B. N. (2009). The neuropsychological 
profile of a subclinical obsessive-compulsive sample. Journal of the 
International Neuropsychological Society, 15(2), 286-290. 
Kim, M. S., Park, S. J., Shin, M. S., & Kwon, J. S. (2002). Neuropsychological 
profile in patients with obsessive-compulsive disorder over a period of 4-
month treatment. Journal of Psychiatric Research, 36(4), 257-265. 
Investigating the relationship between obsessive-compulsive symptomatology and executive functions. 
 
169 
 
Krishna, R., Udupa, S., George, C. M., Kumar, K. J., Viswanath, B., Kandavel, 
T., ... & Reddy, Y. J. (2011). Neuropsychological performance in OCD: 
a study in medication-naïve patients. Progress in Neuro-
Psychopharmacology and Biological Psychiatry, 35(8), 1969-1976. 
Kuelz, A., Riemann, D., Halsband, U., Vielhaber, K., Unterrainer, J., Kordon, 
A., et al. (2006). Neuropsychological impairment in obsessive–
compulsive disorder — Improvement over the course of cognitive 
behavioral treatment. Journal of Clinical and Experimental 
Neuropsychology, 28(8), 1273–1287. 
 
Kvaale, E. P., Haslam, N., & Gottdiener, W. H. (2013). The ‘side effects’ of 
medicalization: A meta-analytic review of how biogenetic explanations 
affect stigma. Clinical Psychology Review, 33(6), 782-794. 
Kyrios, M. (2011). Introduction to the Special Section: Cognitive-Behavioral 
and Neursscientific Approaches to Obsessive-Compulsive and Related 
Phenomena: Why the Need for an Interface?. International Journal of 
Cognitive Therapy, 4(1), 1-7. 
Lambert, A. E., Hu, Y., Magee, J. C., Beadel, J. R., & Teachman, B. A. (2014). 
Thought suppression across time: Change in frequency and duration of 
thought recurrence. Journal of Obsessive-Compulsive and Related 
Disorders, 3(1), 21-28. 
Investigating the relationship between obsessive-compulsive symptomatology and executive functions. 
 
170 
 
Langlois, F., Freeston, M. H., & Ladouceur, R. (2000). Differences and 
similarities between obsessive intrusive thoughts and worry in a non-
clinical population: study 1. Behaviour Research and Therapy, 38(2), 
157-173. 
Lee, H. J., & Telch, M. J. (2010). Differences in latent inhibition as a function 
of the autogenous–reactive OCD subtype. Behaviour Research and 
Therapy, 48(7), 571-579. 
Lee, H. J., Yost, B. P., & Telch, M. J. (2009). Differential performance on the 
go/no-go task as a function of the autogenous-reactive taxonomy of 
obsessions: Findings from a non-treatment seeking sample. Behaviour 
Research and Therapy, 47(4), 294-300. 
Levinson, D. B., Smallwood, J., & Davidson, R. J. (2012). The persistence of 
thought: evidence for a role of working memory in the maintenance of 
task-unrelated thinking. Psychological Science, 23(4), 375-380. 
Lewis, A. (1936). Problems of obsessional illness. Proceedings of the Royal 
Society of Medicine, 24,13–24. 
Lilienfeld, Scott O. (2014). The Research Domain Criteria (RDoC): An 
analysis of methodological and conceptual challenges. Behaviour 
Research and Therapy, 62 (0), 129–139. 
Lovibond, P. F., & Lovibond, S. H. (1995). The structure of negative emotional 
states: Comparison of the Depression Anxiety Stress Scales (DASS) with 
the Beck Depression and Anxiety Inventories. Behaviour Research and 
Therapy, 33(3), 335-343. 
Investigating the relationship between obsessive-compulsive symptomatology and executive functions. 
 
171 
 
Magee, J. C., & Teachman, B. A. (2012). Distress and recurrence of intrusive 
thoughts in younger and older adults. Psychology and aging, 27(1), 199-
210. 
 Markarian, Y., Larson, M. J., Aldea, M. A., Baldwin, S. A., Good, D., 
Berkeljon, A., … McKay, D. (2010). Multiple pathways to functional 
impairment in obsessive-compulsive disorder. Clinical Psychology 
Review, 30(1), 78–88. 
Mataix-Cols, D., Junqué, C., Sànchez-Turet, M., Vallejo, J., Verger, K., & 
Barrios, M. (1999). Neuropsychological functioning in a subclinical 
obsessive-compulsive sample. Biological Psychiatry, 45(7), 898-904. 
Mataix-Cols, D., Vallejo, J., & Sanchez-Turet, M. (2000). The cut-off point in 
sub-clinical obsessive-compulsive research. Behavioural and Cognitive 
Psychotherapy, 28(3), 225-233. 
McKay, D., Abramowitz, J. S., Calamari, J. E., Kyrios, M., Radomsky, A., 
Sookman, D., … Wilhelm, S. (2004). A critical evaluation of obsessive-
compulsive disorder subtypes: Symptoms versus mechanisms. Clinical 
Psychology Review, 24(3), 283–313.  
Millet, B., Kochman, F., Gallarda, T., Krebs, M. O., Demonfaucon, F., Barrot, 
I., ... & Hantouche, E. G. (2004). Phenomenological and comorbid 
features associated in obsessive–compulsive disorder: influence of age of 
onset. Journal of Affective Disorders, 79(1), 241-246. 
Investigating the relationship between obsessive-compulsive symptomatology and executive functions. 
 
172 
 
Miyake, A., & Friedman, N. P. (2012). The nature and organization of 
individual differences in executive functions: Four general 
conclusions. Current Directions in Psychological Science, 21(1), 8-14. 
Morillo, C., Belloch, A., & García-Soriano, G. (2007). Clinical obsessions in 
obsessive–compulsive patients and obsession-relevant intrusive thoughts 
in non-clinical, depressed and anxious subjects: Where are the 
differences?. Behaviour Research and Therapy, 45(6), 1319-1333. 
Moritz, S., Birkner, C., Kloss, M., Jacobsen, D., Fricke, S., Bothern, A., & 
Hand, I. (2001). Impact of comorbid depressive symptoms on 
neuropsychological performance in obsessive-compulsive disorder. 
Journal of Abnormal Psychology, 110(4), 653-658. 
Moritz, S., Hottenrott, B., Jelinek, L., Brooks, A. M., & Scheurich, A. (2012). 
Effects of obsessive-compulsive symptoms on neuropsychological test 
performance: Complicating an already complicated story. The Clinical 
Neuropsychologist, 26(1), 31-44. 
Moritz, S., Kloss, M., Katenkamp, B., Birkner, C., & Hand, I. (1999). 
Neurocognitive functioning in OCD before and after treatment. CNS 
Spectrums, 4, 21-22. 
Morris, N., & Jones, D. M. (1990). Memory updating in working memory: The 
role of the central executive. British Journal of Psychology, 81(2), 111-
121. 
Investigating the relationship between obsessive-compulsive symptomatology and executive functions. 
 
173 
 
Najmi, S., Hindash, A. C., & Amir, N. (2010). Executive control of attention 
in individuals with contamination‐related obsessive–compulsive 
symptoms. Depression and Anxiety, 27(9), 807-812. 
Nakao, T., Nakagawa, A., Yoshiura, T., Nakatani, E., Nabeyama, M., 
Yoshizato, C., et al. (2005). Brain activation of patients with obsessive–
compulsive disorder during neuropsychological and symptom 
provocation tasks before and after symptom improvement: A functional 
magnetic resonance imaging study. Biological Psychiatry, 57(8), 901–
910. 
Neurotrax, Corporation. (2003). Neruotrax computerized cognitive tests. 
Bellaire, TX: NeuroTrax Corporation 
Nielen, M. M. A., & Den Boer, J. A. (2003). Neuropsychological performance 
of OCD patients before and after treatment with fluoxetine: evidence for 
persistent cognitive deficits. Psychological Medicine, 33(5), 917-925 
Nolen-Hoeksoma, S. (2004). The response styles theory. In C. Papageorgiou & 
A. Wells (Eds.), Depressive rumination: Nature, theory and treatment 
(PP. 107-123). Chichester, UK: Wiley. 
Obsessive Compulsive Cognitions Working Group. (1997). Cognitive 
assessment of obsessive-compulsive disorder. Behaviour Research and 
Therapy, 35(7), 667-681. 
Obsessive Compulsive Cognitions Working Group. (2001). Development and 
initial validation of the obsessive beliefs questionnaire and the 
Investigating the relationship between obsessive-compulsive symptomatology and executive functions. 
 
174 
 
interpretation of intrusions inventory. Behaviour Research and 
Therapy, 39(8), 987-1006. 
Obsessive Compulsive Cognitions Working Group. (2005). Psychometric 
validation of the obsessive belief questionnaire and interpretation of 
intrusions inventory—Part 2: Factor analyses and testing of a brief 
version. Behaviour Research and Therapy, 43(11), 1527-1542. 
Ólafsson, R. P., Snorrason, Í., Bjarnason, R. K., Emmelkamp, P. M., Ólason, 
D. Þ., & Kristjánsson, Á. (2014). Replacing intrusive thoughts: 
Investigating thought control in relation to OCD symptoms. Journal of 
Behavior Therapy and Experimental Psychiatry, 45(4), 506-515. 
Parkinson, L., & Rachman, S. (1981). Part II. The nature of intrusive thoughts. 
Advances in Behaviour Research and Therapy, 3(3), 101-110. 
Polak, A. R., Witteveen, A. B., Reitsma, J. B., & Olff, M. (2012). The role of 
executive function in posttraumatic stress disorder: A systematic 
review. Journal of affective disorders, 141(1), 11-21. 
Purdon, C. (2001). Appraisal of obsessional thought recurrences: Impact on 
anxiety and mood state. Behavior Therapy, 32(1), 47-64. 
Purdon, C. (2004). Empirical investigations of thought suppression in 
OCD. Journal of Behavior Therapy and Experimental Psychiatry, 35(2), 
121-136. 
Purdon, C., & Clark, D. A. (1993). Obsessive intrusive thoughts in nonclinical 
subjects. Part I. Content and relation with depressive, anxious and 
Investigating the relationship between obsessive-compulsive symptomatology and executive functions. 
 
175 
 
obsessional symptoms. Behaviour Research and Therapy, 31(8), 713–
720. 
Purdon, C., & Clark, D. A. (2001). Suppression of obsession-like thoughts in 
nonclinical individuals: Impact on thought frequency, appraisal and 
mood state. Behaviour Research and Therapy, 39(10), 1163-1181. 
Purdon, C., Gifford, S., McCabe, R., & Antony, M. M. (2011). Thought 
dismissability in obsessive-compulsive disorder versus panic 
disorder. Behaviour Research and Therapy, 49(10), 646-653. 
Purdon, C., Rowa, K., & Antony, M. M. (2007). Diary records of thought 
suppression by individuals with obsessive-compulsive 
disorder. Behavioural and Cognitive Psychotherapy, 35(1), 47-59. 
Rachman, S. (1981). Part I. Unwanted intrusive cognitions. Advances in 
Behaviour Research and Therapy, 3(3), 89-99. 
Rachman, S. (1997). A cognitive theory of obsessions. Behaviour Research and 
Therapy, 35(9), 793–802. 
Rachman, S. (1998). A cognitive theory of obsessions: Elaborations. Behaviour 
Research and Therapy, 36(4), 385-401. 
Rachman, S. J. (2003). The treatment of obsessions. Oxford, UK: Oxford 
University Press. 
Rachman, S., & de Silva, P. (1978). Abnormal and normal 
obsessions. Behaviour Research and Therapy, 16(4), 233-248. 
Investigating the relationship between obsessive-compulsive symptomatology and executive functions. 
 
176 
 
Radomsky, A. S., Alcolado, G. M., Abramowitz, J. S., Alonso, P., Belloch, A., 
Bouvard, M., ... & Garcia-Soriano, G. (2014). Part 1—You can run but 
you can't hide: Intrusive thoughts on six continents. Journal of Obsessive-
Compulsive and Related Disorders, 3(3), 269-279. 
Radomsky, A. S., Rachman, S., Shafran, R., Coughtrey, A. E., & Barber, K. C. 
(2014). The nature and assessment of mental contamination: A 
psychometric analysis. Journal of Obsessive-Compulsive and Related 
Disorders, 3(2), 181–187. 
Rajender, G., Bhatia, M. S., Kanwal, K., Malhotra, S., Singh, T. B., & 
Chaudhary, D. (2011). Study of neurocognitive endophenotypes in drug‐
naïve obsessive–compulsive disorder patients, their first‐degree relatives 
and healthy controls. Acta Psychiatrica Scandinavica, 124(2), 152-161. 
Rasmussen, S. A., & Eisen, J. L. (1994). The epidemiology and differential 
diagnosis of obsessive compulsive disorder. The Journal of Clinical 
Psychiatry, 55, 5-10. 
Rao, N. P., Reddy, Y. J., Kumar, K. J., Kandavel, T., & Chandrashekar, C. R. 
(2008). Are neuropsychological deficits trait markers in OCD?. Progress 
in Neuro-Psychopharmacology and Biological Psychiatry, 32(6), 1574-
1579. 
Riskind, J. H., Abreu, K., Strauss, M., & Holt, R. (1997). Looming 
vulnerability to spreading contamination in subclinical OCD. Behaviour 
Research and Therapy, 35(5), 405–414.  
Investigating the relationship between obsessive-compulsive symptomatology and executive functions. 
 
177 
 
Roh, K. S., Shin, M. S., KIM, M. S., HA, T. H., SHIN, Y. W., Lee, K. J., & 
Kwon, J. S. (2005). Persistent cognitive dysfunction in patients with 
obsessive‐compulsive disorder: A naturalistic study. Psychiatry and 
Clinical Neurosciences, 59(5), 539-545. 
Rosen, V. M., & Engle, R. W. (1998). Working memory capacity and 
suppression. Journal of Memory and Language, 39(3), 418–436.  
Ruscio, A. M., Stein, D. J., Chiu, W. T., & Kessler, R. C. (2010). The 
epidemiology of obsessive-compulsive disorder in the National 
Comorbidity Survey Replication. Molecular psychiatry, 15(1), 53-63. 
Sahakian, B. J., & Owen, A. M. (1992). Computerized assessment in 
neuropsychiatry using CANTAB: discussion paper. Journal of the Royal 
Society of Medicine, 85(7), 399. 
Salkovskis, P. M. (1985). Obsessional-compulsive problems: A cognitive-
behavioural analysis. Behaviour Research and Therapy, 23(5), 571-583. 
Salkovskis, P. M. (1989). Cognitive-behavioural factors and the persistence of 
intrusive thoughts in obsessional problems. Behaviour Research and 
Therapy, 27(6), 677-682. 
Salkovskis, P. M. (1999). Understanding and treating obsessive—compulsive 
disorder. Behaviour Research and Therapy, 37, S29-S52. 
Salkovskis, P. M., & Harrison, J. (1984). Abnormal and normal obsessions—a 
replication. Behaviour Research and Therapy, 22(5), 549-552. 
Salkovskis, P. M., & Millar, J. F. (2016). Still cognitive after all these years? 
Perspectives for a cognitive behavioural theory of obsessions and where 
we are 30 years later. Australian Psychologist, 51(1), 3-13. 
Investigating the relationship between obsessive-compulsive symptomatology and executive functions. 
 
178 
 
Sanavio, E. (1988). Obsessions and compulsions: the Padua 
Inventory. Behaviour Research and Therapy, 26(2), 169-177. 
Schmeichel, B. J., Volokhov, R. N., & Demaree, H. A. (2008). Working 
memory capacity and the self-regulation of emotional expression and 
experience. Journal of Personality and Social Psychology, 95(6), 1526. 
Segalas, C., Alonso, P., Labad, J., Jaurrieta, N., Real, E., Jiménez, S., ... & 
Vallejo, J. (2008). Verbal and nonverbal memory processing in patients 
with obsessive-compulsive disorder: Its relationship to clinical 
variables. Neuropsychology, 22(2), 262. 
Seli, P., Risko, E. F., Purdon, C., & Smilek, D. (2017). Intrusive thoughts: 
linking spontaneous mind wandering and OCD symptomatology. 
Psychological Research, 81(2), 392-398. 
 
Shin, N. Y., Lee, T. Y., Kim, E., & Kwon, J. S. (2014). Cognitive functioning 
in obsessive-compulsive disorder: a meta-analysis. Psychological 
Medicine, 44(6), 1121-1130. 
Smallwood, J., Davies, J. B., Heim, D., Finnigan, F., Sudberry, M., O'Connor, 
R., & Obonsawin, M. (2004). Subjective experience and the attentional 
lapse: Task engagement and disengagement during sustained 
attention. Consciousness and Cognition, 13(4), 657-690. 
Smallwood, J., & Schooler, J. W. (2006). The restless mind. Psychological 
bulletin, 132(6), 946. 
Snyder, H. R., Kaiser, R. H., Warren, S. L., & Heller, W. (2015). Obsessive-
compulsive disorder is associated with broad impairments in executive 
Investigating the relationship between obsessive-compulsive symptomatology and executive functions. 
 
179 
 
function: A meta-analysis. Clinical Psychological Science, 3(2), 301-
330. 
Soref, A., Dar, R., Argov, G., & Meiran, N. (2008). Obsessive–compulsive 
tendencies are associated with a focused information processing 
strategy. Behaviour Research and Therapy, 46(12), 1295-1299. 
Spitznagel, M. B., & Suhr, J. A. (2002). Executive function deficits associated 
with symptoms of schizotypy and obsessive–compulsive 
disorder. Psychiatry Research, 110(2), 151-163. 
Sternheim, L., Van Der Burgh, M., Berkhout, L. J., Dekker, M. R., & Ruiter, 
C. (2014). Poor cognitive flexibility, and the experience thereof, in a 
subclinical sample of female students with obsessive-compulsive 
symptoms. Scandinavian Journal of Psychology, (55), 573–577. 
Stroop, J. R. (1935). Studies of interference in serial verbal reactions. Journal 
of Experimental Psychology, 18(6), 643. 
Taylor, S. (2012). Endophenotypes of obsessive–compulsive disorder: Current 
status and future directions. Journal of Obsessive-Compulsive and 
Related Disorders, 1(4), 258-262. 
Teasdale, J. D., Dritschel, B. H., Taylor, M. J., Proctor, L., Lloyd, C. A., 
Nimmo-Smith, I., & Baddeley, A. D. (1995). Stimulus-independent 
thought depends on central executive resources. Memory and 
Cognition, 23(5), 551-559. 
Teasdale, J. D., Proctor, L., Lloyd, C. A., & Baddeley, A. D. (1993). Working 
memory and stimulus-independent thought: Effects of memory load and 
presentation rate. European Journal of Cognitive Psychology, 5(4), 417-
433. 
Investigating the relationship between obsessive-compulsive symptomatology and executive functions. 
 
180 
 
The Psychological Corporation. (1997). Wechsler Adult Intelligence Scale (3rd 
edition) and Wechsler Memory Scale (3rd edition): Technical manual. 
USA: The Psychological Corporation. 
Tolin, D. F., Abramowitz, J. S., Przeworski, A., & Foa, E. B. (2002). Thought 
suppression in obsessive-compulsive disorder. Behaviour Research and 
Therapy, 40(11), 1255-1274. 
Torres, A. R., Prince, M. J., Bebbington, P. E., Bhugra, D., Brugha, T. S., 
Farrell, M., ... & Singleton, N. (2006). Obsessive-compulsive disorder: 
prevalence, comorbidity, impact, and help-seeking in the British 
National Psychiatric Morbidity Survey of 2000. American Journal of 
Psychiatry, 163(11), 1978-1985. 
Turner, S. M., Beidel, D. C., & Stanley, M. A. (1992). Are obsessional 
thoughts and worry different cognitive phenomena?. Clinical 
Psychology Review, 12(2), 257-270. 
Turner, M. L., & Engle, R. W. (1989). Is working memory capacity task 
dependent?. Journal of Memory and Language, 28(2), 127-154. 
Unsworth, N., Heitz, R. P., Schrock, J. C., & Engle, R. W. (2005). An 
automated version of the operation span task. Behavior Research 
Methods, 37(3), 498-505. 
van der Wee, N. J., Ramsey, N. F., Jansma, J. M., Denys, D. A., van Megen, 
H. J., Westenberg, H. M., et al. (2003). Spatial working memory deficits 
in obsessive compulsive disorder are associated with excessive 
engagement of the medial frontal cortex. Neuroimage, 20(4), 2271–2280. 
Investigating the relationship between obsessive-compulsive symptomatology and executive functions. 
 
181 
 
Vytal, K. E., Cornwell, B. R., Arkin, N. E., Letkiewicz, A. M., & Grillon, C. 
(2013). The complex interaction between anxiety and cognition: insight 
from spatial and verbal working memory. Frontiers in Human 
Neuroscience, 7, 93. 
Vriend, C., de Wit, S. J., Remijnse, P. L., van Balkom, A. J., Veltman, D. J., 
& van den Heuvel, O. A. (2013). Switch the itch: a naturalistic follow-
up study on the neural correlates of cognitive flexibility in obsessive-
compulsive disorder. Psychiatry Research: Neuroimaging, 213(1), 31-
38. 
Wegner, D. M., Schneider, D. J., Carter, S. R., & White, T. L. (1987). 
Paradoxical effects of thought suppression. Journal of Personality and 
Social Psychology, 53(1), 5. 
Wegner, D. M. (1989). White Bears and Other Unwanted Thoughts. New 
York: Guilford Press. 
Wegner, D. M. (1994). Ironic processes of mental control. Psychological 
Review, 101(1), 34. 
Wentzlaff, R. M., & Wegner, D. M. (2000). Thought suppression. Annual 
Review of Psychology, 51, 59-91. 
Whittal, M. L., Woody, S. R., McLean, P. D., Rachman, S. J., & Robichaud, 
M. (2010). Treatment of obsessions: A randomized controlled trial. 
Behaviour Research and Therapy, 48(4), 295–303. 
Wilhelm, S., Steketee, G., Reilly-Harrington, N. A., Deckersbach, T., 
Buhlmann, U., & Baer, L. (2005). Effectiveness of cognitive therapy for 
Investigating the relationship between obsessive-compulsive symptomatology and executive functions. 
 
182 
 
obsessive-compulsive disorder: An open trial. Journal of Cognitive 
Psychotherapy, 19(2), 173-179. 
Woody, S. R., Whittal, M. L., & McLean, P. D. (2011). Mechanisms of 
symptom reduction in treatment for obsessions. Journal of Consulting 
and Clinical Psychology, 79(5), 653–66. 
Yap, K., Mogan, C., & Kyrios, M. (2012). Obsessive-compulsive disorder and 
comorbid depression: the role of OCD-related and non-specific factors. 
Journal of Anxiety Disorders, 26(5), 565-573. 
 
 
 
  
Investigating the relationship between obsessive-compulsive symptomatology and executive functions. 
 
183 
 
Appendices 
Appendix A – Scatter plots to show the relationship between executive 
functions and symptoms of obsessive-compulsive disorder. 
Fig. 1. Relationship between OCI-R total score and SwIFT reaction time switch cost 
(MS). 
 
 
Fig. 2. Relationship between OCI-R total score and SwIFT accuracy switch cost (%). 
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Fig. 3. Relationship between OCI-R total score and Flanker Reaction Time 
Interference Cost (MS). 
 
 
Fig. 4. Relationship between OCI-R total score and Flanker Accuracy Interference 
Cost (%). 
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Fig. 5. Relationship between OCI-R total score and Backward Digit Span Total Score. 
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Appendix B – Correlation matrix to show the relationships between self-
reported OCD-relevant symptom interference and working memory 
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